CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant comes before us a second time to appeal his case. In the first appeal, defendant asserted that he requested a Marsden motion at the sentencing hearing, and the trial court failed to hold such hearing or even address defendants request. Court reviewed the transcript of the sentencing hearing, and deemed it to be ambiguous whether defendant in fact made such request. As a result, we remanded the matter to the trial court for it to make such determination. Our disposition provided that in the event defendant did make a request for a Marsden hearing, the trial court needed to hold such hearing, and if required, appoint a new attorney for defendant. However, if the court determined that such request was not made, the original judgment was to be reinstated. (People v. Heard, (Feb. 14, 2006, H027023) [nonpub. opn.].)
Pursuant to our opinion in the original appeal, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether defendant made a request for a Marsden hearing at his sentencing. Although defendants original attorney and the prosecutor were present, defendant was not. The trial court reviewed the transcript and determined defendant had not requested the Marsden hearing, and reinstated the judgment.
Defendant now appeals a second time, asserting the failure to ensure his presence at the hearing to determine whether he requested a Marsden was a violation of his federal and state constitutional rights to be present at a critical stage.

Petitioners appeal from the superior courts denial of their petition for a peremptory writ of mandate. Petitioners sought by their petition to reverse the City of Concords (City) approval of real party in interest Harvest Churchs (Harvest) proposed church use of a second-floor space owned by Harvest and located at the Park & Shop commercial center (shopping center). Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant, appeals from his false imprisonment by violence conviction by a jury (Pen. Code, 236) and the trial courts finding that he was previously convicted of three serious felonies and served three prior prison terms. ( 667, subd. (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12.) Defendant argues: the trial court improperly failed to instruct on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor false imprisonment; he was denied his right to an impartial jury; and, the prosecutor committed misconduct. Court reject these contentions but modify the fines imposed.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of robbery and carjacking. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in discharging a juror for consulting outside materials, and for failing to conduct adequate inquiries into allegations of juror misconduct. He also contends the court improperly denied his request for juror contact information. Finally, he argues the court abused its discretion in excluding an exculpatory written statement for lack of reliability. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)). Following a court trial, he was found to have suffered one prior conviction and served a prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Imposition of sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation pursuant to Penal Code section 1210.1, upon various terms and conditions. He contends the true finding that appellant suffered a prior prison conviction must be stricken because it was never pled in the information. During the pendency of this appeal, respondent filed a request for judicial notice and proposed order that this court take judicial notice of the trial courts minute order dated January 31, 2007. Court have done so. The order reflects that on January 31, 2007, appellant admitted a violation of probation and was sentenced to the middle term of two years. Pursuant to the Peoples motion, the 1 year prior pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5(b) [was] ordered stricken. Appellant advised this court that he did not oppose the request for judicial notice and proposed order and further agreed that the issue whether the trial court erroneously imposed a one year prior prison term enhancement was moot.
The appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiff filed an unverified first amended complaint seeking, inter alia, to quiet title to real property against the adverse claim of defendant and appellant Fariborz Tavassol Kashani (defendant). The case proceeded to trial without any objection by defendant that the first amended complaint was unverified. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff.
On appeal from the judgment, defendant contends that plaintiffs failure to verify the first amended complaint, as required in quiet title actions under Code of Civil Procedure section 761.020,[1]was a jurisdictional defect that deprived the trial court of the power to enter a judgment of quiet title. Defendant further contends that because the judgment must be reversed, so too must the postjudgment order awarding plaintiff attorney fees.
Court hold that plaintiffs failure to verify the first amended complaint was merely a procedural not jurisdictional defect that defendant forfeited by failing to move to strike the first amended complaint and proceeding to trial without objection. Court therefore affirm the judgment and the postjudgment order awarding attorney fees.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered after his no contest plea to burglary, petty theft with a prior, and multiple counts of forgery. Jackson claims the sentence, which he agreed to as part of a negotiated plea, was improper on several grounds. Court affirm because the trial court denied Jacksons request for a certificate of probable cause and because he is estopped to challenge his sentence because he agreed to the prison term that the court imposed.

Defendant, also known as Joseph Alscano, appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his convictions of possession of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)), as a lesser included offense of possession for sale of cocaine base ( 11351.5), and selling/offering to sell, furnishing, administering, and giving away a controlled substance ( 11352, subd. (a)). The trial court found to be true the allegation that appellant suffered two prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellants attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Father appeals from the juvenile courtorder terminating jurisdiction and ordering that there be no visitation between father and Brandon S. (Brandon), the minor (born Feb. 1995). Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from a judgment entered following his no contest plea to three counts of oral copulation by force or fear (Pen. Code, 288a, subd. (c)(2)) and his admission that he suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a) - (d) and 667, subds. (b) - (i)). Pursuant to the negotiated plea, he was sentenced to prison for a total of 48 years, consisting of three consecutive upper terms of eight years, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law.
Following appellants plea and before sentencing, defense counsel presented a report from a Dr. Knapke, a psychiatrist, who concluded that appellant was sane at the time of the offenses. Dr. Knapke observed that when appellant was arrested, he had marijuana in his system and was acutely intoxicated on methamphetamine. Dr. Knapke opined the drugs led to appellants behavior. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that no arguable issues exist and that appellant has, by virtue of counsels compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered against him in this case. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113.)
The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant appeals the judgment entered following his pleas of guilty to failing to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, 290, subd. (f)(1)(A)) and willfully resisting or obstructing a peace officer in the discharge of his or her duties ( 148, subd. (a)(1), his admission he previously had been convicted of two serious or violent felonies within the meaning of Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and a jurys finding he committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced Cabrera to a term of four years in state prison. Court remand the matter to the trial court for correction of a clerical error and, in all other respects, affirm the judgment.

Defendant appeals from judgment entered after a jury convicted him of possession of cocaine for sale. (Pen. Code, 11351.) Appellant admitted an on-bail enhancement. (Pen. Code, 12022.1.) The court sentenced him to four years in prison.
Court appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court to independently review the record. On April 13, 2007 we advised appellant he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. To date, we have received no response.
Court have examined the entire record and have not found any arguable issues. (People v. Wende(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner, seeks extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.542.) Court find sufficient evidence supports the juvenile courts finding that petitioner did not substantially comply with the juvenile court orders and therefore deny the petition.

Plaintiff, appeals from a judgment of dismissal following a grant of summary judgment to defendant, County of Sacramento (the County). The trial court concluded Westcons claim for breach of contract stemming from a construction project was barred by Westcons failure to provide the County with notice of its claim within one year of accrual, as required by the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, 900 et seq.). Westcon contends the period for submitting a Government Claims Act claim was tolled while the parties attempted to resolve a related claim submitted by Westcon under the Public Contract Code. Westcon further contends it substantially complied with the claim-filing requirement of the Government Claims Act. Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.