CA Unpub Decisions

Pursuant to an open plea to the court, defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)). In addition, she admitted that she had four enhancements that made her presumptively ineligible for probation (Pen. Code, 1203.073, subd. (b)(7)) and that she had suffered a prior strike conviction ( 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). The plea agreement was conditional on the fact that probation would be denied and that defendant would be ordered to undergo a 90 day diagnostic study pursuant to section 1202.03. Following a sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced to a total term of eight years in state prison: four years doubled to eight years on count 1; sentences on counts 2 through 4 were imposed concurrently. Additionally, the entire case was ordered to run concurrent with the sentence imposed in case No. RIF 102028, for which defendants probation was revoked as a result of the current case. Defendants sole contention on appeal is that the sentencing court abused its discretion by predetermining it would not consider probation or other commitment, thereby foreclosing any invitation to exercise its discretion pursuant to section 1385. Court reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

In case number FVI021124, defendant pled nolo contendere to possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378). As part of his plea bargain, he waived his right to appeal and agreed to be sentenced to the upper term of 3 years, to run concurrently with the time imposed in FVI024225. In that later case, defendant pled nolo contendere to selling/transporting cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)), and admitted having suffered a prior conviction for a drug offense. (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (a).) As part of his plea bargain, he waived his right to appeal and he agreed to be sentenced to 6 years in prison. There is no certificate of probable cause for either case in the record before this court.
Defendant appealed, and upon his request this court appointed counsel to represent him. (People v. Wende(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436) Court offered the defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which he has not done.
Court have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.

Defendant pled guilty to inflicting corporal injury on his spouse. (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a).) He also admitted having committed a strike prior. (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i).) Sentencing was suspended on his agreed-to 8 year term and he was granted probation. Following a contested hearing shortly thereafter, the court found that defendant was in violation of one of the terms of his probation and imposed the 8 year sentence. Defendant appealed, and upon his request this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493] Court have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.

An original juvenile wardship petition was filed on August 21, 2006, which alleged that T.W. (the minor) came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), because he possessed marijuana for sale, a felony, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11359. After a contested trial, the juvenile court found the allegation in the petition to be true. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared the minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation, with terms that included serving 122 days in juvenile hall. The court then credited the minor with 62 days and ordered him released on in December 2006, on his 18th birthday, when probation would terminate. The court also ordered that the minors drivers license or the privilege to obtain his drivers license be delayed for a period of one year. The minor filed a timely notice of appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a)(1),[1]and admitted the gang enhancement allegation ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). In return, defendant was placed on formal probation for three years on various terms and conditions, including serving 388 days in county jail. Subsequently, while on probation in this case, defendant was convicted of commercial burglary ( 459) in Orange County. As a result, his probation in this case was revoked, and he was sentenced to a total term of seven years in state prison as follows: the upper term of three years for the gun possession charge, plus the upper term of four years for the gang enhancement allegation. Defendants sole contention on appeal is that he was deprived of his federal and state constitutional rights to a jury trial and due process under Cunningham v. California (2007) U.S., [127 S .Ct. 856, 868] (Cunningham), Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403] (Blakely) and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435] (Apprendi) when the trial court imposed the upper term. Pursuant to the prior conviction exception articulated in Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224 [118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350], court reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Defendant pled guilty to attempted second degree murder (Pen. Code, 664 & 187, subd. (a)) and admitted he had used a firearm during the offense (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (b)) and had inflicted serious bodily injury on his victim. (Pen Code, 12022.7.) As part of his plea bargain, he waived his right to appeal. He was sentenced to prison for the agreed-to term of 20 years. No certificate of probable cause appears in the record before this court.

Defendant appealed, and upon his request this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493] Court have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.

On September 15, 2006, defendant and appellant Gilbert Wesley Langford (defendant) was charged with two counts of first degree robbery within an inhabited dwelling house (Pen. Code, 211 & 212.5), and one count of evading police (Veh. Code, 2800.2). The People also alleged that defendant had served four prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Court have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
The judgment is affirmed.

A felony complaint filed on August 29, 2006, alleged that defendant and appellant (defendant) received stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a). The complaint also alleged that defendant had been convicted of a violent or serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1), and served a prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On September 5, 2006, defendant, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to the sole count of receiving stolen property and admitted the strike allegation, a violation of section 459. Defendant agreed to a sentence of 32 months in state prison with custody credits at eighty percent.
On October 16, 2006, the trial court sentenced defendant to 32 months in state prison, consistent with the plea bargain, awarded 79 days of custody credits, and imposed a restitution fine of $400 and a parole revocation fine in the same amount.
Court have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
The judgment is affirmed.

Respondent was sentenced to a total prison term of ten years and four months pursuant to a plea agreement, which included his no contest plea to felony assault with a deadly weapon. In pronouncing sentence, the trial court stayed the three-year enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7 for inflicting great bodily injury. Because the court did not strike the enhancement, the Department of Corrections treated respondent as a violent offender and limited his sentence credits to fifteen percent pursuant to section 2933.1. Respondent then sought relief by petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he was being denied the full benefit of his plea bargain. When word of the petition reached the sentencing judge, he issued an amended sentencing order striking the enhancement. Shortly thereafter, the judge assigned to the petition for writ of habeas corpus summarily granted relief on the merits without first issuing an order to show cause or a writ. In separate appeals, the People (hereafter appellant) challenge the validity of both orders on procedural grounds, contending that (1) the amended sentencing order was improper because no statement of reasons for striking the enhancement was set forth as required by section 1385, and (2) the order granting relief under the petition for writ of habeas corpus was improper due to failure to comply with procedural requirements and due process. Court agree and, by separate opinions, reverse both orders with instructions on remand.

Defendant was convicted by jury trial of two counts of felony sexual battery (Pen. Code, 243.4, subd. (a)) and one count of misdemeanor indecent exposure (Pen. Code, 314, subd. (1)). He was convicted after a court trial of unlawful possession of testosterone (Health & Safe. Code, 11377, subd. (a)). Defendant was committed to state prison for a term of five years.
On appeal, defendant claims that the sexual battery counts are not supported by substantial evidence. He also contends that the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion, which was based on juror misconduct. Court conclude that substantial evidence supports both sexual battery counts, but Court find that the trial court erred in denying defendants new trial motion. Court reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a new trial.

In this probate proceeding, petitioner and appellant appeals a judgment of the probate court. Pursuant to an Antenuptial Agreement (Agreement), appellant's now deceased wife, Blanche Lear, granted child life estate in a condominium unit (the condo) in, California, which was Blanche's separate property. Blanche's two adult daughters, respondents Donna Goldfarb and Jill Richman (Goldfarb and Richman), have remainder interests in the condo.

Defendant appeals from the order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 entered after the court determined that appellant committed three counts of second degree burglary, three counts of vandalism, three counts of vehicle tampering and one count of possession of burglary tools. The court declared counts 3, 6 and 9 to be felonies and counts 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 15 to be misdemeanors. The court ordered defendant placed home on probation subject to various conditions and calculated his maximum term of confinement to be six years.

Appellant appeals from a dispositional order of the San Mateo CountyJuvenile Court (San Mateo court) committing him to the California Department of the Youth Authority (CYA) for a maximum confinement period of six years six months. He contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the CYA because the evidence does not establish that a CYA commitment would benefit him, or that less restrictive alternatives were inappropriate or unavailable. Appellant also claims that his dispositional hearing should not have taken place before the San Mateo court because his case had been erroneously transferred to the San Mateo court by the Solano County Juvenile Court (Solano court), and that it was further error for the San Mateo court to refuse to transfer the case back to the Solano court. Court affirm.

Plaintiff decided to go into business together, and formed two corporations for that purpose. Their efforts quickly came to naught, ending in acrimony, the bankruptcy of one of the corporations, and extensive litigation in state and federal courts. This, the fourth of the cases, was filed by Currier and the surviving corporation against Chow (and his wife) and certain attorneys who had been involved in the prior litigations. The Chows and the attorneys filed separate motions to strike Curriers complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16). The trial court granted both motions, and Currier and the corporation appeal. Our independent review leads to the same conclusion as the trial courtthat Currier and the corporation have no probability of prevailing on their claims. Court thus affirm.