CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for robbery and carjacking. (Pen. Code, 211, 215.) He also contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights in sentencing him to upper terms on all offenses, and in committing other sentencing errors. Court reject appellants contentions as to the sufficiency of the evidence, but agree with appellant that the matter must be remanded for resentencing.

In this appeal, the People seek to overturn a trial court order that granted respondent American Contractors Indemnity Company (ACIC) relief from a summary judgment against it arising out of the forfeiture of a bail bond posted by ACICs agent on behalf of a criminal defendant. Court agree with the People that the trial court had no statutory authority to grant ACICs postjudgment motion, and accordingly reverse.

After a jury determined that defendant Dominic Faber qualified as a sexually violent predator (SVP), the trial court committed him to Atascadero State Hospital for treatment. Defendant appeals, contending only that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was likely to engage in sexually violent criminal conduct if released. Court conclude that defendants contention is without merit and affirm the commitment order.

In January 2003, appellant was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a state mental hospital for a maximum term of commitment of four years ten months. In April 2004, he was granted conditional release on outpatient status. (See Pen. Code, 1026.2, subd. (a).) In April 2006, that outpatient status was revoked. On appeal from the order revoking his outpatient status, Kirgiorgis contends that the trial court miscalculated his maximum term of commitment in its January 2003 order. He reasons that this sentence was unauthorized, entitling him to an eight-month reduction in his maximum term of commitment. (See 654.) While contesting this claim of error, the People also assert their own claim that the maximum term of commitment was miscalculated, seeking to have it increased by eight months. Court affirm the revocation order, but modify the underlying commitment order to reduce the maximum term of commitment by eight months.

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count each of first degree residential robbery and forcible rape, and admitted a ten year enhancement to the robbery count for personal use of a firearm. He was sentenced to the agreed term of 24 years. Later, following an oft continued restitution hearing, the court ordered appellant to pay $2550 to a robbery victim and $4015 to the rape victim, the latter jointly and severally with co defendant Michael Talford.
Appellant appeals only the restitution order, and only the $4,015 aspect of it, contending that such order was an abuse of discretion and violated due process. Court conclude that such contention has no merit, and Court affirm.

Appellant attempts to appeal, in propria persona, from an order in a marital dissolution proceeding (1) granting the motion of respondent to compel production of documents and denying appellants related motion to strike; and (2) ordering appellant to pay $10,000 in attorney fees to respondents counsel. Court dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner, the mother of minor, seeks extraordinary writ review pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 to vacate the order of respondent juvenile court made at the conclusion of the six month review hearing. Before setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for adoption of a permanent placement plan, the court ordered termination of reunification services to petitioner from real party in interest San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency), finding that the reunification services offered to petitioner by the Agency were adequate. Petitioners sole contention for review is whether substantial evidence supports that finding, and the courts related decision to terminate services. Court conclude that the record has more than ample evidence to sustain both of those determinations, and Court deny the petition on its merits.

Mother challenges an order of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, which set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for M. G. (born November 2005). She claims there was insufficient evidence to support two of the juvenile courts prerequisite findings. As discussed below, Court disagree and deny her petition on the merits.

Appellant appeals a judgment entered in favor of Sandra Shewry, Director of the California Department of Health Services (the Department), setting aside the fraudulent transfer of real property to his two children, Julia Valdez (Julia) and Carl A. O'Laco (Carl), and ordering him to "take all necessary steps to effect the retransfer of the real property back into his name . . . ." Appellant contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment due to the absence of Julia and Carl, whom he deems indispensable parties. Court disagree, and affirm the judgment.

In this consolidated appeal, appellant Janice G. (mother) challenges several juvenile court orders. First, she objects to the January 30, 2006, order, designating a plan of legal guardianship for her daughter, Jennifer C. (Jennifer), on the grounds that (1) the juvenile court did not appoint a guardian at the time it designated the plan of guardianship; (2) the juvenile court stayed the guardianship order, in excess of its jurisdiction; and (3) substantial evidence failed to support the order for the plan of legal guardianship. Mother also asserts that the juvenile courts orders should be reversed because respondent Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to provide proper notice as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).
In her subsequently filed notice of appeal, mother contends that the juvenile courts July 31, 2006, and August 17, 2006, orders designating a plan of guardianship and implementing that plan should be reversed.
To the extent mother attacks the juvenile courts order designating a plan of legal guardianship and then staying that plan, her appeal is moot. On January 30, 2006, the juvenile court merely designated a plan of legal guardianship for Jennifer; it did not order a guardianship at that time. However, an order of guardianship was put in place by August 17, 2006, when grandmothers letters of guardianship were filed. Thus, we must address mothers challenge to that order, namely that DCFS did not undertake a proper investigation of the guardians home. We are not convinced. Substantial evidence indicates that a proper investigation was completed.
As for mothers complaint that DCFS did not comply with ICWAs notification requirements, DCFS concedes in its respondents brief that notice was deficient. Those deficiencies, however, do not compel reversal of the juvenile courts orders. Rather, pursuant to In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, this matter is remanded for the limited purpose of allowing DCFS to provide proper ICWA notice.
Accordingly, Court affirm the juvenile courts orders and remand the matter with directions to the juvenile court to direct DCFS to provide notice as required by the ICWA and California law and then determine whether the ICWA applies.

Appellant challenges his attempted voluntary manslaughter and assault with a firearm convictions on the ground the trial court violated his right to a jury trial by imposing the upper term. Court conclude the trial court permissibly relied upon recidivism factors to impose an upper term.

Appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his pregnant girlfriend, Noelle Chagolla. He contends: (1) The trial court should not have permitted the prosecutor to re-create before the jury the position of Chagollas body when a sheriffs deputy first found it. (2) His Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated, under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford), because a deputy county coroner testified, without objection, both as to the results of the autopsy he conducted and as to the findings that were made by a sexual assault consultant from his office. (3) There were numerous errors in the CALCRIM instructions that were given.
Court find that, assuming there was any error in the re creation of the bodys position, there was no prejudice, due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Court reject appellants other issues, and affirm.

Minor appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile court declared him a delinquent ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) based on (1) its finding after a contested hearing that he had committed a lewd act on a child under 14 years old, and (2) his admissions pursuant to a negotiated disposition that he had unlawfully taken a vehicle (a felony) and dissuaded a witness from reporting a crime (a misdemeanor). (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a); 136.1, subd. (b)(1); Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a); all further undesignated section references are to the Pen. Code.) As agreed, the court set Melvins maximum confinement time at 9 years and ordered him suitably placed.
Melvin, who was 13 years and 10 months old when he committed the lewd act, contends that the court erred in failing to make an express finding pursuant to section 26 and In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 858, 862-867 that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct when he committed the proscribed act, and that substantial evidence does not support the implied finding. Court reject the contention and affirm the judgment (order of wardship).

Plaintiff appeals from the summary judgment against her and in favor of defendants, on appellants complaint for damages arising out of injuries she suffered in a car accident. Appellant contends summary judgment was improper because: (1) respondents should not have filed a combined motion; (2) the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings; (3) there were triable issues of material fact; and (4) the relation back doctrine applied to negate application of the statute of limitations. Court affirm.