CA Unpub Decisions

Anthony T. and Amanda B. appeal from separate judgments that terminated parental rights to their daughter, Tatiana T., upon petitions brought by the childs grandparents and guardians, Timothy B. and Gina B. Anthony and Amanda each argue there is insufficient evidence to support the respective judgment against them. Court not agree, and so affirm.

After a jurisdictional hearing, minor Alfredo V., was declared a ward, placed on probation, and ordered to a juvenile facility for 90 days. He was no stranger to the juvenile court: between 2002 and 2006, at least six petitions and subsequent petitions were filed against him. On the day in question, a month or so after his previously imposed wardship was terminated, minor engaged in a physical altercation with his father and his mother, the police were called, and thereafter a petition was filed charging him with two counts of assault (Pen. Code, 240) and two counts of battery (Pen. Code, 242). These charges were found to be true. The petitions remaining charge for possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, 11364) was also found to be true but is not the subject of this appeal.
The courts statement that the push administered by father was effective parental discipline equates with a finding that the amount of force used by father was justifiable, a finding supported by substantial evidence. Implicit in this is that the court knew the law but was not persuaded that self defense was available under the facts of this case. To the extent the altercation also involved minors mother, no argument is made that minor here also was merely defending himself.
The judgment is affirmed.

Motherof Baby Boy T., now one and one-half years of age. In October 2006, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a date for a permanency hearing. At the time, the court also found further visitation with mother would be detrimental to Baby Boy T., since mother had missed visits and failed to perform any part of her case plan for four months.
Mother appeared at a nonstatutory notice review hearing in November 2006, and asked that visitation be reinstated. The court advised mother it could not reinstate visitation at a nonstatutory hearing without notice to all parties, and encouraged her to file a petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Mother appeals from the juvenile courts refusal to grant her the visitation she requested.
Court conclude the juvenile court did not err in refusing to consider mothers request for visitation without providing notice to all parties. The original order finding further visitation with mother would be detrimental to Baby Boy T. given her lack of visitation and participation in the case plan, and thus terminating visitation, was not improvidently granted; indeed, mother never challenged that order. Further, the hearing at which mother made her request was nonstatutory and was not scheduled for the purpose of reconsidering visitation or services; it was intended only to ensure mother and Herbert P. (father) had received notice of the permanency hearing date. The juvenile court could not have modified its earlier order regarding visitation and reunification services absent notice. Court therefore affirm.

This People's appeal is taken from an order dismissing charges against defendant Michael Grecu. The trial court concluded that defendant's "due process rights to a speedy trial" had been violated based on this court's decision in People v. Martinez (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1589. For reasons that follow, Court disagree with the trial court and reverse the trial court's order.

This matter has been remanded by the Supreme Court (S136922) with directions to vacate our previous decision (The Limited Stores, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board (July 28, 2005, A102915) [nonpub. opn.]) and reconsider the cause in light of Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 750 (Microsoft) and General Motors Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 773. In our earlier decision we affirmed a summary judgment granted in favor of the Franchise Tax Board (FTB). Court concluded that the full price of securities held to maturity and redeemed were not properly treated as gross receipts by the taxpayer under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) (Rev. & Tax. Code, 25120 et seq.). Microsoft, however, reached a contrary result. Court vacate our previous decision, and affirm the judgment of the trial court, albeit on a different ground.

Hubert Lee Fontenot, Jr. (Fontenot) appeals from his conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter and assault with a firearm. He argues that the court erred in imposing the aggravated term for the handgun use enhancements, based in part on the United States Supreme Courts holding in Cunningham v. California. Court agree and remand the case for resentencing.

Attorney David R. Medlin appeals from an order imposing $15,000 sanctions payable to Wymac Capital, Inc. (Wymac) based on the trial courts conclusion that Medlins failure to recognize a disqualifying conflict of interest delayed a trial and would cause Wymac additional expense. Although Medlin challenges the order on several procedural grounds that may well have merit, Court believe the appeal is most simply resolved on the ground that the trial court erred in disqualifying Medlin, thus eliminating the predicate on which sanctions were imposed.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

Mary Ellen Schooler appeals from judgment entered following an order revoking probation. Previously she pled no contest to corporal injury to a spouse (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)).
During the pendency of the matter and pursuant to Penal Code section 1368, defense counsel declared a doubt as to the mental competence of appellant, and the matter was set for a jury trial on the issue of competence.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that no arguable issues exist, and that appellant has, by virtue of counsels compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered against her in this case. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112.)
The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant was charged with sale of cocaine base, possession of cocaine base for sale, and three sentence enhancements based on prior convictions. At trial, the court admitted evidence of defendants prior misconduct under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to prove his intent and knowledge. In a unitary trial, the jury found defendant guilty of possession of cocaine base for sale and found true the prior conviction allegations. On appeal, defendant contends the courts admission of evidence of his prior misconduct was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his due process rights and the trial court erred by instructing the jury on joint possession and aiding and abetting during the prosecutions case. Finding no prejudicial error or abuse of discretion, Court affirm the judgment.

After his motion to suppress evidence was denied, defendant Oscar Meneses Rosas pled no contest to residential burglary and admitted he used a firearm during the offense. The court sentenced him to eight years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. Disagreeing with defendant, Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff appeals from entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant Spring Hill Manor Convalescent Hospital. Plaintiff sued Spring Hill for professional negligence in connection with the death of his mother, Jessie Wilson. Spring Hills motion for summary judgment contended Plaintiff could not establish an element of his cause of action -- breach of the applicable standard of care.
In support of its motion, Spring Hill submitted the declaration of an expert whose opinion was that Spring Hill did not breach its duty of care in providing convalescent services to Jessie. William did not provide an expert declaration in opposition. Given this fact, Court agree with the trial court that Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for professional negligence as a matter of law.
In his opposition to the motion, Plaintiff raised a claim of negligence per se based on alleged statutory violations by Spring Hill. Since Plaintiff failed to include this claim in his pleadings, Court may not consider it at this time. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

After he entered a negotiated plea of guilty to a charge he sold or transported methamphetamine, defendant received a three year prison sentence.
Defendants sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to recite in detail all of the fines, fees, and penalties imposed.
The judgment is affirmed, except that the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to separately state all fines, fees, and penalties imposed, with the appropriate statutory basis; amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.