CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants appeals from an order denying her petition for administrative writ of mandamus, filed after the San Francisco Fire Commission (the commission) terminated her employment as a firefighter with the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD). Court affirm.

Appellants appeal from a judgment entered upon special verdicts finding Kindred liable for breach of contract, fraud and intentional conversion of medical equipment belonging to respondents Tarik Omari and Bio Tek Technology, Inc., doing business as Tartech. (See appendix A.) The jury also found by clear and convincing evidence that Kindred committed the fraud or conversion by means of malice, oppression or fraud, and awarded punitive damages. (See appendix B.) Kindreds primary contentions are that the fraud verdicts are not supported by substantial evidence, the court erroneously excluded impeachment evidence, compensatory and punitive damages were excessive and the punitive damage award was invalid under California law and the United States Constitution. Court reject appellants contentions and affirm the judgment.

The minor, Reynaldo M., appeals from the June 2, 2006 order declaring him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) and placing him in a short-term camp community placement program. The juvenile court sustained the allegations of delinquency petitions filed March 16 and April 5, 2006, charging the minor with: possession of tools to commit vandalism or graffiti (Pen. Code, 594.2, subd. (a)); stun gun possession (Pen. Code 12651, subd. (d)); second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211); and carrying a switchblade knife. (Pen. Code, 653k.) The juvenile court declared the robbery a felony and the remaining three counts misdemeanors. The clerks minutes state the juvenile court ordered the maximum confinement to be 5 years, 10 months. No such oral pronouncement was ever made though by the juvenile court. The minor argues the juvenile court improperly: set his confinement time beyond the statutory maximum; failed to indicate whether it was aggregating the maximum confinement term; and failed to set forth probation conditions. Court affirm the wardship order but remand the matter with directions to calculate the maximum confinement time and set probation conditions.

A modification decision.

Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile courts February 21, 2007 finding that the return of his son, E.H. (born in January 2005) to Fathers custody posed a substantial risk of detriment to E.H.s well-being because of Fathers unresolved domestic violence problem. Because substantial evidence supports the courts finding, Court deny Fathers petition.

Parents of dependent child Rachel O. and her siblings Jeremy and Kaitlyn, petition for extraordinary writ review of orders granting Rachels petition alleging changed circumstances pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and setting a second permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26. ( 366.22, 366.26; California Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) These recent orders issued after we earlier reversed the juvenile courts denial of Frances section 388 petition and termination of her parental rights and ordered the juvenile court to return Rachel to her parents. (In re Rachel O. (Feb 8, 2006, B183736) [nonpub. opn.] (Rachel II).) Court grant the petitions.

Petitioners claim damages for Judith Wilson falling off a golf cart shuttle at a boat show. They seek an extraordinary writ of mandate directing the respondent court to vacate its order striking from their complaint allegations that Real Party in Interest, the Southern California Marine Association (Marine Association), acted as a common carrier, giving the utmost care and diligence to its passengers. Court hold that the respondent court erred by striking the allegations that the Marine Association was acting as a common carrier.

Mother of John, appeals from orders terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395.) Appellant contends the court erred in terminating her parental rights because she established the minor would benefit from continued contact with her, there was insufficient evidence to support the courts finding the minor was likely to be adopted and the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, et seq., regarding notice were not met. Court affirm.

A jury convicted Defendant of selling and furnishing a controlled substance (Health and Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a), count one); possession of cocaine base for sale (Health and Saf. Code, 11351.5 and 11350, subd. (a), counts two and three); and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. (Health and Saf. Code, 11364, count five.) As to count three, the jury found true the allegation that the offense was committed while he was released from custody on bail. (Pen. Code, 12022.1, subd. (b).) The jury acquitted him of a charge of unlawful failure to appear. ( 1320.5; count four.)
Defendant contends: (1) with respect to counts one and two, the court erred by admitting into evidence photocopies of the buy money that was not provided to the defense before trial; (2) with respect to count three, the criminalist's report was testimonial, and therefore its introduction into evidence violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (3) the trial court erred by instructing regarding flight in the language of CALJIC No. 2.52; (4) the trial court imposed a parole revocation fine in an unauthorized amount; and, (5) the upper term sentence on count three violated his constitutional rights to a jury trial and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution. Court affirm in part and reverse in part.

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of residential burglary and lewd act on a child. The offenses arose from Gutierrez's conduct of entering a home and undressing a two year old child in her crib. He challenges: (1) the admission of uncharged sexual offense evidence; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the lewd act conviction; and (3) the court's failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted lewd act. He also argues the imposition of a 15 year to life sentence for commission of the sex offense during a burglary as required under Penal Code section 667.61 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Court reject his arguments and affirm the judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and admitted suffering a prior conviction constituting both a serious felony ( 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)) and a strike under the "Three Strikes" law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12) under a plea agreement in which he acknowledged possible maximum punishment of 15 years in state prison as well as a specified fine and parole. Before his sentencing hearing, Trotter unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his guilty plea on grounds he entered his plea out of fear, ignorance, and coercion by his codefendants, and he was later sentenced to an 11-year prison term. On appeal, Trotter contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion because he presented clear and convincing evidence that his "package" plea was coerced by his codefendants. Because we conclude the undisputed evidence showed that Trotter was threatened by one of his codefendants during the plea negotiations, and the trial court's reasoning on Trotter's motion did not address those threats or carefully consider the issue of coercion, Court reverse the judgment with directions that the court grant Trotter's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

This marital dissolution case involves a pro per appellant husband who has consistently refused or failed to comply with any of the trial court orders, and has repeatedly engaged in fraudulent conduct to evade his lawful responsibilities to the detriment of the respondent wife and undoubtedly to the great frustration of her counsel and the trial court. Appellant Calvin Belnap Ross now has heaped misery upon this court, counsel and respondent Gail B. Ross, by filing an utterly incomprehensible, meritless appeal, which adds only cost and delay to the progress of this family law matter.[1]In all fairness to Gail and her counsel, we should strike Calvin's opening and reply briefs, which make no effort to comply with the rules of court and offer no rational authority for the positions taken, and dismiss this meritless appeal. However, because the case is "fully briefed" and the appeal presents no substantive challenge to the trial court's orders, Court resolve the case on the merits in an effort to foreclose at least one avenue of Calvin's obfuscation. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted Defendant of robbery (Pen. Code, 211) but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on a charge that he personally used a deadly weapon, a knife. (Pen. Code, 10222, subd. (b)(10.) The court denied a motion for a new trial, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed Defendant on three years probation including a condition he serve 120 days in custody. Court affirmed.

The mother of minors appeals the orders terminating her reunification services at the 12-month review hearing. R.A. contends that the juvenile court erred because she was not provided reasonable services. R.A. also contends that the court abused its discretion when it terminated her services, but continued services for the children's father. The orders are affirmed.