CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant, entered negotiated guilty pleas to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, 191.5, subd. (a)) and hit and run (Veh. Code, 20001, subd. (a)). He admitted a prior conviction of driving under the influence (Pen. Code, 181.5, subd. (d)) and entered a Blakely waiver (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely). The court sentenced him to prison for 15 years, eight months to life: 15 years to life for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated with a prior conviction of driving under the influence, with a consecutive eight months for hit and run (one third the middle term). On September 15, 2006, Morris filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis. He contended that he changed his pleas from not guilty to guilty because his counsel falsely advised him that the district attorney agreed to recommend that the court impose a determinate term rather than a possible life term. The trial court denied the petition for a writ of coram nobis.
The judgment is affirmed.

The issue in this case is whether Code of Civil Procedure section 426.16, commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute, applies to a trustees performance of her duties in a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding. Plaintiff M. Kathleen Boberg filed a lawsuit against Sharyn S. Peterson, Shoshone Services Corporation, and other defendants to set aside a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The court denied the motion, finding that defendants conduct did not arise from constitutionally protected activity, as required under the anti-SLAPP statute. On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying the motion because their conduct qualified as either speech or petitioning activity. For the reasons stated below, Court reject defendants argument and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Darrick Armand Booker appeals from judgment entered following jury convictions for assault of a child under eight years of age, causing death (count 1; Pen. Code, 273ab), and second degree murder (count 2; 187, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison for count 1, and a concurrent prison term of 15 years to life for count 2.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on felony murder and in disqualifying as incompetent defense witness, B.C., who was five years old at the time of the trial. Defendant also asserts, and the People agree, that the concurrent term imposed for count 2 must be reversed because it violates the prohibition against multiple punishment under section 654.
Court reject defendants contentions challenging the felony murder instruction and disqualification of B.C. as a witness and thus affirm defendants convictions, but order defendants sentence modified to stay the term imposed on count 2 (murder) pursuant to section 654.

This is an appeal from the trial courts order for a first and final accounting for the conservatorship of the now deceased Ione M. Evans (Evans), filed by temporary co-conservators, Corrine L. Cagle and Corralee A. Longdin (collectively Conservators). Alberta Martin, Evanss sister, filed an objection to the accounting on a number of grounds, including Conservators failure to give notice to Evanss personal representative in Colorado. The trial court overruled Martins objection and granted Conservators petition. On appeal, Martin reiterates the objection raised below. Court conclude that, even if notice should have been given to the personal representative, Martin lacks standing to challenge the courts order on this ground. Court dismiss the appeal.

Defendant pled guilty to rape (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2)), rape with a foreign object (Pen. Code, 289, subd. (a)(1)) and residential robbery (Pen. Code, 211). He was sentenced to the agreed to term of 15 years, 4 months in prison. His request for a certificate of probable cause was denied by the trial court.
Court have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to show that the term for Count 2 is not 1/3 the midterm, but the full midterm, imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (c). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

An individual and corporation appeal from an order granting a motion to add them as judgment debtors. The judgment creditor claimed the individual and corporation were the alter egos of the original judgment debtor. The superior court agreed. On appeal, the individual and corporation contend (1) the superior court lacked jurisdiction because of improper service, (2) the superior court applied an incorrect standard of law, (3) the superior court improperly took judicial notice of certain materials, and (4) the evidence submitted was insufficient to support the superior courts findings under the alter ego doctrine.
Court make the following conclusions of law. First, the superior court had jurisdiction of the person over the individual and corporation as a result of their general appearance. Second, the superior court did not commit error by applying the wrong legal standards to the disputed matters. Third, the findings of fact (both express and implied) were supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Bobby Alonza Jones contends the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to a total term of 28 years in prison, while sentencing his codefendants to lesser terms. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury found Dennis Henry Hudson guilty of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)). Hudson admitted he served two prior prison terms one for forgery and another for identity theft. The court sentenced Hudson to five years in state prison (three for the current conviction and one for each prior prison term), but suspended that sentence and placed him on three years of formal probation. On appeal Hudson contends the court erred by denying his request for a continuance to obtain medical records, and coerced the jurys guilty verdict. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of several different criminal counts, all in connection with a failed attempt to rob a 7 Eleven convenience store. On appeal, defendant raises a number of different challenges to the jury instructions, all of which Court reject. Court therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.

Defendant pleaded no contest to four counts of forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (b)(1), hereafter, 288(b)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 32 years, based upon consecutive upper term sentences of eight years for each count.
Defendant challenged the conviction, claiming that the court committed sentencing error: (1) under the United States Supreme Courts decision in Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely), which was decided after judgment was entered on defendants conviction; and (2) by imposing an ex post facto parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45.
In our decision filed July 8, 2005, Court held, inter alia, that there was no Blakely error. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the prior judgment, and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of the Supreme Courts decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham). After such reconsideration, Court conclude that there was Blakely error. Court hold further that imposition of the fine was improper. Court therefore reverse and remand for resentencing with instructions that any new sentence not include a parole revocation restitution fine.

Plaintiff sued defendants Terayon Communication Systems, Inc., and Elaine Fleming for breach of an employment contract and related causes of action. The trial court granted defendants motion for summary judgment as to causes of action for employment discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress that were alleged in the second amended complaint. It later entered judgment for defendants after granting their motion for summary judgment as to causes of action for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and negligent misrepresentation that were alleged in the fourth amended complaint. On appeal, plaintiff contends that she raised triable issues of fact as to the causes of action alleged in the fourth amended complaint and as to causes of action for employment discrimination alleged in the second amended complaint. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)) and admitted suffering a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and serving one prior prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to a 44 month term in the state prison. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, Court have reviewed the entire record and have concluded that there is no arguable issue on appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal from an order imposing a surcharge against the estate of Jack L. Ottovich, the deceased conservator of the estate of Francis L. Ashley (conservatee). The trial court ordered the surcharge after finding Jack Ottovich breached his fiduciary duty to the conservatee by using conservatorship funds to make an unsecured loan and to invest in a poorly performing annuity. The trial court imposed joint and several liability for the surcharge against Jack Ottovichs estate (Estate); appellants Karen Rayl, Harvey Ottovich and Randy Ottovich, as the Estates executors; and respondent Seaboard Surety Company (Seaboard), the Estates surety. Court affirm.

Ulysses Davis, Jr., (Davis) appeals the judgment imposed following his jury-trial convictions for attempted murder and other offenses. Davis contends, inter alia, the trial court erred by dismissing Juror Number 12 (Juror 12) for failing to deliberate. We agree. Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings. Court address Davis other contentions where necessary for purposes of retrial. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.