CA Unpub Decisions

Ka Wah Yuan, appearing in propria persona, appeals from the probate court’s June 2017 order settling and approving the first and final account, allowing compensation to conservator and her attorneys. Yuan fails to identify a claim of error on appeal, provides no cognizable legal analysis, and no error is apparent to us after our review of the record. Because Yuan fails to carry his burden of demonstrating error on appeal, we affirm the challenged order.

Appellant D.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating parental rights over now six-year-old Aubrie B., four-year-old Emma B. and two-year-old B.B. In her section 388 petition, mother sought reinstatement of reunification services. She contends the evidence supported her request and the court erred in believing it lacked authority to grant it. She also contends the termination order was error because there was insufficient evidence the children were adoptable. We affirm.

Appellant Xzayvia Samoan Peterson pled no contest in case No. BF163967A to infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5), in case No. BF165609A to assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and in case No. BF166408A, to assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1) and she admitted an on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1) in this last case.
On March 6, 2018, pursuant to a plea agreement involving the three cases, the court sentenced her to an aggregate prison term of six years, the middle term of three years on her assault conviction in case No. BF165609A, and an on-bail enhancement in that case; a consecutive one year (one-third the middle term of three years) on her domestic violence conviction in case No. BF163967A; and a concurrent middle term of two years on her assault conviction in case No. BF166408A.
On appeal, Peterson contends the trial court improperly ordered victim resti

Appellant Jeremiah David Gaunt (appellant) contends there was insufficient evidence to support his felony criminal threats conviction, and the trial court should have granted his post-trial motion to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b).) We conclude the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion, and affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury convicted appellant of felony criminal threats (§ 422), misdemeanor battery (§ 242), and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)). At sentencing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to reduce his criminal threats conviction to a misdemeanor. (§ 17, subd. (b).) The court then suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation.

Defendant and appellant T.H. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights over her son C.H. (child) and ordering the child be placed for adoption. Mother argues the juvenile court should have instead applied the beneficial parental relationship exception and selected legal guardianship as the child’s permanent plan. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Defendant and appellant M.M. (defendant) appeals the grant of a civil harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6) ordering her to keep 100 yards away from plaintiff and respondent M.A., M.A.’s husband W.L. (husband) and M.A.’s daughter, K.M. M.A. had been in a relationship with defendant’s brother, who was K.M.’s father, but he had died. Defendant and M.A. maintained a relationship after defendant’s brother died and defendant visited with K.M. However, suddenly defendant sent threatening text messages to M.A. stating she was going to kill her, threatening to call child protective services (CPS) on M.A., and warning M.A. not to “mess with” defendant. M.A. obtained a temporary restraining order and the day it was served on defendant, CPS arrived at M.A.’s home to check on K.M. Defendant contacted M.A. twice after the TRO was granted. M.A. was granted a permanent restraining order after a hearing; it expired on June 27, 2018.

K.D., father of Christine D., appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to change Christine's placement with a relative, and the order terminating parental rights under section 366.26 and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for Christine. K.D.'s sole contention on appeal is that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), and therefore the matter must be remanded with directions to the juvenile court to direct compliance with those provisions. Specifically, K.D. contends the Agency erred by failing to question the maternal grandfather about Christine's possible Indian heritage. The Agency concedes that the ICWA inquiry and notice were deficient and a limited remand is appropriate to ensure compliance with ICWA's inquiry and notice provisions. The parties have stipul

Appointed counsel for defendant John Thomas Darrell Defeher filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the judgment.

This case arises under the Public Employees’ Retirement Law (PERL) (Gov. Code, § 20000 et seq.). Plaintiff Karen K. Parker applied for a disability retirement alleging she could not perform her job as a rehabilitation therapist at Napa State Hospital (Napa) due to a work injury that prevented her from controlling assaultive patients. After the California Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) denied her application, she filed an administrative appeal. An administrative law judge (ALJ) filed a proposed decision denying her appeal which the PERS Board adopted as its own. Parker then filed this successful administrative mandamus petition compelling PERS to grant her disability retirement application. PERS timely filed this appeal.
Although PERS purports to raise seven purely legal issues, it largely attacks the sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court was required to and did exercise its independent judgment on the evidence. We find no legal error and find the facts-

After pleading no contest to possession of a controlled substance for sale, the trial court imposed drug education program and crime lab fees, and attendant penalty assessments. Defendant Jesus Cruz Torres appeals the imposition of the penalty assessments, contending the drug education program and crime lab fees are not fines, and are not subject to penalty assessments.
In an unpublished opinion, we rejected defendants’ claim that the trial court erred by imposing the penalty assessments and affirmed the judgment. (People v. Torres (Jan. 30, 2018, C083981) [nonpub. opn.].) Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the matter on the propriety of the penalty assessments. The Supreme Court granted his petition for review and deferred the matter pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in People v. Ruiz, S235556, or pending further order of the court.

A jury found defendant Phillip Romay Flores guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of ammunition, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor possession of a smoking device. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant suffered a prior prison term. The court sentenced defendant to four years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it (1) admitted the testimony of a police detective stating that people who possess controlled substances are also known to carry weapons, (2) ordered defendant to register as a narcotics offender, and (3) imposed but stayed, pursuant to Penal Code section 654, a concurrent three-year term on the possession of ammunition conviction. The People concede the latter two claims.
Finding defendant’s first claim lacks merit, we will reject it. We will accept the People’s concession as to defendant’s second and third claims, modify the judgment accordingly, and af

The jury found defendant and appellant Justin Sagisagi Field guilty of two counts of assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245 [counts 4 and 5]) and one count of battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d) [count 6].) It found true the allegation that Field personally inflicted great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)
The trial court sentenced Field to seven years in prison, including the middle term of three years in count 5, plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement, plus one year (one-third the middle term) in count 4. The court imposed and stayed a sentence of two years in count 6 pursuant to section 654.

Caitlin P. (Mother) appeals from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders made by the juvenile court regarding her son, Cameron P. Mother contends the juvenile court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) when it did not inquire into the potential Indian ancestry of Cameron’s father, D.W. (Father), at the adjudication hearing. We affirm.

M.B. was declared a ward of the juvenile court after the court sustained a petition alleging he had committed second degree robbery and aggravated assault. We affirm.