CA Unpub Decisions

Barbara Hines appeals from an order directing her to convey her 50 percent interest in certain real property to the estate of her mother, Josephine De Rouen; removing her as administrator of the estate; and appointing her brother Rufus De Rouen as successor administrator. Court affirm.

A jury convicted Defendant of premeditated attempted murder committed to benefit a gang, during which he personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a), 189; 186.22, subd. (b)(1); 12022.53, subd. (d); all further undesignated references are to the Penal Code.) In a bifurcated hearing after a jury waiver the court found that Reyes had a strike prior felony conviction. ( 667, subds. (b) (i), 1170.12.) The court imposed an aggregate 55 years to life sentence.
Defendant appeals, contending that (I) his conviction violates section 1111 because insufficient evidence corroborated the accomplices testimony that Reyes shot the victim;[1](II) the court erred in admitting one portion of his third post-arrest statement to the police but excluding another portion of that same statement (Evid. Code, 356); and (III) the prosecutor committed misconduct during his argument to the jury.
Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

In the underlying action, appellants Pamela Beaty and Kandis Leigh alleged that their landlords permitted toxic mold to infest their apartment, and then wrongfully terminated their rental agreement. Arthur Travieso, Lan Nguyen, and the law firm of Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith (LBB&S) represented respondents Harriet Raasch and Karen Raasch before and during the action. Appellants challenge orders denying them leave to assert claims against Travieso, Nguyen, and LBB&S, and to depose the attorneys who had represented Harriet Raasch and Karen Raasch. Court affirm the denial of leave to assert claims against these attorneys, and dismiss the appeal regarding the denial of leave to depose opposing counsel.

At a preliminary hearing where a judge acting as magistrate denied his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5), defendant was held to answer to one count of possessing cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5). After that ruling was reviewed and upheld on his unsuccessful motion to set aside the information (Pen. Code, 995), Phillips entered a plea of guilty to the count in return for an indicated suspended imposition of sentence, three years felony probation, and a jail condition limited to time already served. Sentenced accordingly, Phillips appeals, challenging the denial of suppression. (Pen. Code, 1538.5, subd. (m).) Court affirm the judgment.

Mother appeals after the juvenile court denied further reunification services with her son, Antonio G., removed Antonio from the care of Mothers mother (Grandmother), and terminated Mothers parental rights. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from a judgment following his plea of no contest and imposition of sentence. His counsel has raised no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to defendant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; see Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259.) Upon independent review of the record, Court conclude that no arguable issues are presented for review, and affirm the judgment.

Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company (Mitsui) appeals from the grant of summary judgment in its subrogation action against Cargo Solution, Inc. (CSI) and Happy Singh, Rajesh Sharma Aka, Bobby Kang, Yudvinder Kang, Balwinder Kang and Baldeu Singh Kang (collectively Singh) for payment of monies to Mitsuis insured Sony Electronics, Inc. (Sony) for non delivery of cargo entrusted to CSI. The trial court found Singh had no personal liability for the non-delivery of cargo, and that CSIs liability was limited to $100,000 as set forth in the bill of lading. Mitsui contends that (1) the trial court erred in proceeding with the motion when Mitsui had not completed discovery, (2) CSIs and Singhs liability is not limited to $100,000, and (3) the trial court erred in denying prejudgment interest on CSIs $100,000 liability. CSI cross-appeals the trial courts denial of its request for an offset of monies paid by the shipping broker to Mitsui. Court affirm.

Glickman & Glickman, a law corporation, and Steven C. Glickman, an individual (collectively Glickman), appeal from the trial courts denial of its Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 special motion to strike[1]plaintiff Dannel Arnolds complaint for malicious prosecution. Glickman contends that Arnold failed to establish he would prevail on his claims because he did not establish lack of probable cause and that the underlying action was pursued with malice. Court affirm.

Petitioner, in pro. per., sustained an industrial injury and entered into a compromise and release settlement agreement with respondent, State Compensation Insurance Fund. The compromise and release was approved as adequate compensation by the workers compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). Phillips timely petitioned to reopen the compromise and release on the ground that he was misled by respondent into believing that further benefits would be paid with documentation of additional earnings. The WCJ determined Phillips may have misunderstood the compromise and release; however, there was no fraud or good cause to reopen under Labor Code section 5803 and the Workers Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) affirmed.

Carl B. appeals from an order of wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 upon a finding that as an aider and abettor, he committed vandalism causing damage under $400, in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor. He was placed in a short term camp community placement program and the maximum period of confinement was determined to be one year and four months.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that no arguable issues exist, and that appellant has, by virtue of counsels compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered against him in this case. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113.) The order is affirmed.

Rabbi Sam Bronstein, individually and as trustee for the Sam and Molly Bronstein Family Trust (the Trust), and Ida Finkelstein, his wife, sued respondents Crowell, Weedon & Co. (Crowell) and Trennon J. Waters for damages arising from investment losses of approximately $4 million. Appellants alleged that the losses were from a scheme spearheaded by Keith Gilabert (Gilabert) and carried out through his companies, The GLT Venture Fund, LP (GLT) and CMG-Capital Management Group Holding Company, LLC (CMG). It was further alleged that respondents, as well as UBS Financial Services, Inc. (UBS), UBS Securities LLC and Justin Paperny (collectively the UBS defendants) and various Does participated in the wrongdoing. Court find that appellants waived opposition to respondents evidentiary objections by failing to assert them below. Furthermore, Court are satisfied that even if the challenged statements had been admitted, they would not have raised a triable issue of material fact to support denial of summary judgment. Court further find that appellants failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to any legal basis for holding Crowell or Waters liable for the damages alleged in their first amended complaint (FAC). But, Court conclude the court acted in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the ex parte order for discovery sanctions and reverse the sanction order. In light of our affirmance of summary judgment, any appeal from the order for production is moot.

Property owners sued their adjoining neighbor for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to prevent the neighbor from building a residence on what had been a vacant lot. The property owners claimed the declaration of restrictions governing the tract limited each lot to a single family residence, and because their residence already existed on the lot originally designated in 1948, the neighbor was prohibited from placing any improvements on the earlier subdivided portion of the same lot. The trial court found the declaration of restrictions permitted building on any legal lot in the tract, and not just on the original lots designated in 1948. Accordingly, the trial court found the property owners were unlikely to prevail on the merits of their claims and denied injunctive relief. Court affirm.

Transguard Insurance Company of America and Uribe Trucking, Inc., dba Alex Moving & Storage, Inc. (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from an order sustaining the County of Los Angeless demurrer without leave to amend and dismissing plaintiffs first amended complaint. The trial court concluded plaintiffs could not state a cause of action against the County because they failed to comply with the claim presentation requirement of the California Tort Claims Act. Court find plaintiffs have shown there is a reasonable possibility they can amend their complaint to allege they notified the County of Los Angeles in writing about the existence of a monetary claim and the County failed to give plaintiffs notice of the insufficiency of the claim as presented. Such factual allegations, if true, could demonstrate the County waived its defense under the Tort Claims Act as to the sufficiency of the claim. Accordingly, Court reverse the order of dismissal and remand the matter to give plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint.

Mario P. appeals from the order of wardship after the juvenile court found he had inflicted corporal injury to his childs mother in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a). The only issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court erred in failing to declare on the record whether the offense was a misdemeanor or a felony. Court remand for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion to declare the offense a misdemeanor or a felony as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702.