CA Unpub Decisions

Anthony Clinton Raines appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of first degree robbery of a person immediately after the person had used an automated teller machine (Pen. Code, 211). The trial court sentenced Raines to three years in prison. Court affirm the judgment.

Ernest David Basua appeals the judgment (order revoking probation) entered following his plea of no contest to the willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Basua to three years in state prison. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Garrett Crane guilty of receiving stolen property and two misdemeanor counts of resisting a peace officer. The jury also found defendant had numerous prior convictions.
The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of seven years in prison, which included the upper term of three years for receiving stolen property, doubled as the result of a prior strike. The trial court also sentenced him to time served in jail on each count of resisting a peace officer, concurrently with each other and consecutive to the state prison sentence.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support one of his convictions for resisting a peace officer; (2) the trial court erred in failing to define the term great bodily injury for the jury; (3) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to certain remarks the prosecutor made during closing argument; (4) the trial courts imposition of the upper term sentence for receiving stolen property violated his federal constitutional right to a jury trial; and (5) the trial court erred in failing to stay one of his sentences for resisting a peace officer.
Court accept the Peoples concession of error regarding the trial courts failure to stay one of the sentences for resisting a peace officer and will modify defendants sentence by staying the sentence on count four (the second count of resisting a peace officer). We will also conclude the trial court erred to the extent it relied on some aggravating circumstances not found by the jury in imposing an upper term sentence, but find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the court undoubtedly would have imposed the upper term even if it had not taken those circumstances into account.
Rejecting the remainder of defendants arguments, Court affirm the judgment as modified.

Defendant Julio Luna pled no contest to being a felon in possession of ammunition and giving false identification to police officers after the court denied his suppression and Faretta motions. On appeal, defendant argues that the court improperly denied the suppression motion because the Sacramento police officers relied on information from anonymous informants that failed to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. He also argues that he made two unequivocal Faretta motions, and as a result he was denied the right to represent himself.
Disagreeing on both issues, Court affirm the trial courts judgment.

Landowners agreed to sell land to a buyer for purposes of development. The purchase agreement called for a continuing relationship between the parties, with the sellers to receive a small percentage of profits from the development. The buyer sought the sellers approval for assignment of the buyers interests to an assignee, pursuant to an assignment agreement requiring the assignee to provide minimum funding. The buyer then signed amendments to the assignment agreement (including deletion of the minimum funding clause), without advising the sellers of the changes. The sellers agreed to consent to the original assignment agreement but never signed anything to that effect.
In this appeal, the buyers purported assignee cross complainant River Rock Development, an Arizona limited liability company (River Rock)appeals from summary judgment entered in favor of the sellers cross defendants Young J. Paik and Sue K. Paik, individually and as trustees of the Young J. Paik Family Trust (the Paiks). River Rock contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence and in determining there was no valid assignment. Court affirm the judgment.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (Ibid.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief.
Court received a letter from defendant on September 8, 2006. This letter was initially construed as a pro se supplemental brief but, upon further examination, we construed it as a request for an extension of time to file a pro se supplemental brief and granted that request. Thereafter, we granted defendant an additional extension of time.
The time for filing the supplemental brief has elapsed and Court received no brief from defendant. Accordingly, Court address the issues mentioned in defendants September 8, 2006, correspondence, in addition to undertaking a review of the record as required by Wende, and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Cary D. Palmquist pled no contest to felony grand theft. He was sentenced to three years of informal probation, 30 days (stayed) in jail and 100 hours of community service, and ordered to pay victim restitution of $7,000.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the $7,000 in victim restitution. He also argues that this amount must be determined not by a judge, but by a jury, and failure to do so violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments according to Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403]. Disagreeing with these contentions, Court affirm the judgment.

In the first portion of a bifurcated trial, a jury found James Daniel Soper guilty of both the second degree murder of James Olson (Pen. Code, 187)[1](count 1) and the first degree murder of George Rigby ( 187) (count 2). The jury also found, with respect to each count, that Soper personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the murders, within the meaning of sections 12022, subdivision (b)(1) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23). In the second portion of the trial, the jury found that Soper had served four prior prison terms and that he had suffered one prior strike conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (b-i). The trial court sentenced Soper to a total term of 86 years to life in prison.
On appeal, Soper claims the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to sever trial of the two murder charges; (2) failing to instruct the jury regarding involuntary manslaughter; (3) admitting evidence of his pretrial assault on a witness and in instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.06 regarding that assault; (4) instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.52 regarding flight as reflecting consciousness of guilt; and (5) denying his postverdict application to disclose jurors' names, addresses and telephone numbers.
Court conclude that the trial court erred in denying Soper's motion to sever. Court further conclude that this error requires reversal of the judgment and retrial with respect to both murders. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment in its entirety. In light of our reversal, Court need not consider Soper's claim regarding his postverdict application to disclose juror information since that issue is not likely to recur on remand. However, Court consider Soper's remaining claims because those issues are likely to recur on remand.

Plaintiff appeals from an order denying his motion for class certification to litigate claims against defendants Consumer Portfolio Services (CPS), The Finance Company, Inc. (TFC), and TFC president and director Ronald G. Tray. Henry's operative complaint alleged causes of action against defendants for violations of the Automobile Sales Finance Act (AFSA, also known as the Rees-Levering Act) (Civ. Code, 2981, et seq.); California Uniform Commercial Code (CUCC)[1]section 9601 and its predecessor statute (CUCC, 9-504); Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200, et seq.); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (15 U.S.C.
1692, et seq.); and declaratory relief stemming from allegations that TFC, which had repossessed Henry's vehicle, sent Henry a defective post-repossession notice and along with CPS demanded deficiency monies without any legal right to do so under the AFSA and the CUCC.
On appeal, Henry contends the court erred in denying class certification because (1) he is an adequate class representative; (2) his claims are typical of the claims alleged on behalf of his proposed class; (3) individual issues do not predominate as to tolling of the various statutes of limitation and CUCC claims; (4) a nationwide class is manageable; and (5) his FDCPA claim does not fail as a matter of law. Court affirm.

Kim Alvarez (Kim) appeals a child custody order restricting her to supervised visitation. She contends the order must be reversed because she was denied due process, the court improperly admitted hearsay evidence, it applied an erroneous standard and acted in excess of jurisdiction. Court affirm the order.

Ann H., the mother of Aaron G., appeals the order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition, which sought termination of Aaron's guardianship and full custody of Aaron. Ann contends she met the statutory requirements of section 388. The order is affirmed.

In this construction defect case, defendant Edward Houghton appeals the denial of his motion for relief from judgment (Code Civ. Proc., 473, subd. (b); statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure). That motion followed the granting of a motion for summary judgment ( 437c) brought by plaintiff Cajon Valley Union School District (Cajon Valley). Houghton and Cajon Valley have now filed a "joint motion and stipulation for vacatur of judgment and remand of action to the superior court." ( 128, subd. (a)(8).) The parties use the word "vacate" (and its variants) rather than the word "reverse." "[I]t makes no difference under [section 128, subdivision (a)(8)] whether the court is asked to reverse or vacate the judgment . . . ." We prefer the former term. (Hardisty v. Hinton & Alfert (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 999, 1002, fn. 1.) Court accept the stipulation and reverse the order.

Erin O. appeals the findings and orders entered at the termination of parental rights hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
Erin O.'s counsel also requests leave for her to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.
The appeal is dismissed.

Ernesto P. appeals the findings and orders entered at a nonstatutory hearing at which the court entered custody and visitation orders and terminated dependency jurisdiction. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.Ernesto P.'s counsel also requests leave for him to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.
The appeal is dismissed.