CA Unpub Decisions

Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of 16 counts of committing lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a)) (counts 1 through 16) and four counts of forcible lewd acts on a child ( 288, subd. (b)(1)) (counts 17 through 20). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of 30 years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 16 separate counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 within the meaning of section 288, subdivision (a); and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because there was insufficient evidence of force to support his conviction on counts 17 through 20 for violating section 288, subdivision (b)(1). Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Billy Ray Castleberry appeals his conviction for the second degree murder of his son, Bradley. He contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on involuntary manslaughter, in light of the evidence that defendant believed that his gun was not loaded and that he acted without malice but only with criminal negligence when he aimed the gun at his son and pulled the trigger. Court agree, and Court therefore reverse his conviction.

Deana Marie Arellano (mother) filed an order to show cause to change her daughters surname from her maiden name, Oregon, to her married name, Arellano. Lee Raymundo (father) objected and requested a hyphenated surname. The trial court granted mothers request. Father appeals and raises the following claims: there was insufficient evidence to support the trial courts findings; the court failed to provide a full hearing and make the appropriate finding; and the court erred in making a ruling in the absence of fathers attorney. Father also argues that the court erred in denying his motion to vacate the order.
Court conclude that the court held an adequate hearing, considered fathers previously lodged objection, afforded father ample time to seek alternative relief, and arrived at its conclusion based on substantial evidence. The court properly granted mothers request and denied fathers motion to vacate the order. Court affirm.

The County of San Bernardino sued defendant Antonia Bivings and obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting her from conducting a commercial trucking business and allowing commercial parking on her residential real property located at 10917 and 10943 Larch Avenue in Bloomington. Bivings appeals, arguing that granting the injunction was an abuse of discretion and raising a new issue that sections of the county code are unconstitutional. (Code Civ. Proc., 904.1, subd. (f).) Court affirm the judgment. The County as prevailing party recovers its costs on appeal.

The Riverside Sheriffs Association (RSA) appeals from the trial courts order denying its petition for writ of mandate. RSA requested that the court order the County of Riverside (County) to meet and confer with RSA, as authorized under the Meyers Milias Brown Act (MMBA) (Gov. Code, 3500 et seq.), to establish the appropriate procedures for a name-clearing hearing for a probationary officer. RSAs request to meet and confer arose out of this courts prior unpublished disposition in the case, Madrigal v. County of Riverside (E037113), which was filed on October 19, 2005. In that case, Court held that, although Xavier Martin Madrigal, a former probationary officer with the Riverside Sheriffs Department, was not entitled to challenge his termination because of his probationary status, he should have been afforded an administrative appeal under the former section 3304, subdivision (b). The County maintained that it had no obligation to bargain with RSA under the MMBA. The trial court agreed and denied the writ of mandate. As discussed below, Court also conclude that the County had no duty to meet and confer with RSA to determine the procedures for an administrative appeal for a probationary officer under section 3304, subdivision (b). The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant (Husband), and respondent, (Wife), signed a premarital agreement approximately two weeks before they were married. In this appeal, Husband challenges the trial courts ruling that the agreement is unenforceable because Wife did not enter into it voluntarily. According to Husband, the trial courts findings were insufficient to support the judgment.
Contrary to Husbands position, substantial evidence supports the trial courts determination that Wife did not voluntarily execute the agreement. Accordingly, the judgment affirmed.

Respondent, Eric Manfredi, was charged with 45 criminal counts. Following a successful motion to suppress, the court dismissed a number of counts. The People filed a motion to reinstate the counts. That motion was denied. The People appeal. We reverse, determining the search warrant that was issued was sufficient to authorize the searching officer to search defendants computer; alternatively, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply to the facts as found by the court. The order denying the Peoples motion to reinstate the criminal complaint is reversed.

A jury convicted appellantJoseph Navarette of possession of a firearm (count 1) and ammunition (count 2) by a felon (Pen. Code 12021, subd. (a)(1), 12316, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court found true allegations that he had a prior strike conviction ( 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), and had served a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The court imposed a prison sentence of four years for count 1 (the two year midterm doubled under the Three Strikes law) plus one year for the prior prison term enhancement for a total of five years. The court imposed a concurrent four year term for count 2. On appeal, Navarette contends substantial evidence does not support his conviction for possession of the firearm or ammunition. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Jerimichael Cooley of murder as charged in count one. It found to be true enhancements under Penal Code sections 12022, subdivision (b) and 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). (Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The trial court struck the gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) for purposes of sentencing and sentenced defendant to 30 years to life in prison plus one year for the enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (b) and six years for his prior convictions for a total of 37 years in state prison.
Court conclude the true finding on the gang enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) should be ordered stricken from the record, for all purposes, because it was not charged in the information. We also hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion or vindictively punish defendant and deny him rights of due process for successfully appealing his prior conviction when it denied defendants motion to bifurcate. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion when it permitted expert gang testimony. Court affirm as modified.

Defendant John Jairo Sandoval appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of misdemeanor assault in violation of Penal Code section 240. (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Defendant contends substantial evidence does not support the judgment. Court affirm.

Defendant was convicted of discharging a firearm with gross negligence, assault with a firearm, and being a gang member carrying a loaded firearm in public, all in connection with an assault on his then girlfriend. Court reject each of defendants challenges to his convictions and sentence, and affirm the judgment.

The parties appear before us in round three of their appellate battles. In the second appeal, Court reversed an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion. (Adoption Network Law Center, Inc. v. Tayyanipour (January 24, 2007, G036870) [nonpub. opn.].)[1] We now have before us both an appeal and a cross-appeal from the order awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party on the anti-SLAPP motion. The appealing plaintiffs say no attorney fees should have been awarded and the appealing defendant says the amount of the fee award was too low. Inasmuch as the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion has been reversed, the attorney fees award must also be reversed. Court deny the motion to dismiss the cross appeal pertaining to the amount of the award and reverse the order awarding attorney fees.

Defendant was ordered to serve 320 days in jail after pleading guilty in case No. SS060650A to misdemeanor receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496)[1] and she was placed on felony probation after pleading nolo contendere in case No. SS060900A to taking a vehicle without the owners consent. The trial court imposed numerous conditions of probation, seven of which she now challenges. In a supplemental brief, she claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the challenged conditions.Probation conditions Nos. 18 and 19 are modified.

Defendant Charles Anthony Chuck Diaz was convicted by a jury of the murder of Dallas Grondalski (Pen. Code, 187, 189) with the use of a knife (Pen. Code, 12022, subd. (b)); and he and defendants Sammie Lester, Robert L. Huffman, and Mary Ann Hodgson, were convicted by the jury of conspiracy to obstruct justice (Pen. Code, 182, subd. (a)(5)) in connection with Dallass murder, and the murders of her father, Billy Grondalski, her mother, Patti Grondalski, and her stepbrother, Jeremy Vandagriff. On defendants appeals from the conspiracy convictions, Court hold that those convictions must be reversed for lack of substantial evidence of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy within the period of the statute of limitations. On Diazs appeal from the murder conviction, Court find one evidentiary error that was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and conclude that his other arguments lack merit, as Court discuss below. The murder conviction is therefore affirmed.