CA Unpub Decisions

A police officer contacted defendant Enrique Guerrero and searched the vehicle he was driving. The officer found a loaded firearm under the passenger seat and additional ammunition in the trunk. The jury found Guerrero guilty of several crimes, including one count of unlawful possession of ammunition by a convicted felon.
On appeal, Guerrero argues that the trial court erred because it failed to instruct the jurors that they had to unanimously agree on which act of possession he committed: the ammunition inside of the vehicle or the ammunition in the trunk. We find that a “unanimity instruction” was not required under these facts.
Guerrero also asks this court to review a sealed portion of the record to determine if the trial court improperly failed to disclose the police officer’s personnel records during a Pitchess motion. We have done so and we find no errors.
Thus, we affirm the judgment.

Angel Munoz-Guerrero was arrested and convicted for possession and transportation of methamphetamine for sale. He was given probation. On appeal he raises one major issue concerning prosecutorial misconduct and one minor issue regarding Penal Code section 1464 assessments on the two $50 laboratory analysis fees he was ordered to pay.
While we recognize the issue of possession for sale was a close one for the jury, the issue of the prosecutor’s “misconduct” amounted to nothing more than a de minimis misstatement about the respective origins of the defense expert’s referrals – whether 75 percent of them came from the Orange County Public Defender’s office as distinct from public defender’s offices in general. That comment did not constitute misconduct and did not mar the fairness of the trial.
The minor issue on the penalty assessment on the lab fee was settled by the Supreme Court after briefing closed. The issue did not go Munoz-Guerrero’s way. Lab analys

On July 18, 2017, a petition was filed by the Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency (agency) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 alleging that B.A., then three years old, was at serious risk of physical harm because her mother A.A. (mother) had bound and gagged B.A. by placing socks in her mouth and taping it shut. In addition to the physical abuse she suffered from mother, B.A. was further at risk because her two-year-old cousin had also been abused, hospitalized, unable to breathe on his own, and later died from the physical abuse inflicted by mother, mother’s sister, and another adult roommate. There were further allegations against mother for failure to protect, severe physical abuse, cruelty, and inability to care for B.A. due to incarceration.

Appellant Eva Marie McIntyre appeals from the trial court’s denial of her petition to reduce her prior felony forgery conviction (Pen. Code, § 470) to a misdemeanor (§ 1170.18). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

On October 6, 2014, the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 alleging that mother’s boyfriend hit then 14-year-old K.S.T. in the head with a two by four and placed him in a headlock. K.D.T., who was six years old, and K.Z.T., who was five years old, were also living with mother. The petition included allegations that the children were at risk of serious physical harm, mother failed to protect them, K.D.T. and K.Z.T. were at risk because of abuse of a sibling, and mother left them with no provision for their support. B.E. was named in the petition as an alleged father to K.Z.T. Another man was named as K.D.T.’s alleged father. Although he did not initially receive services, B.E. (father) eventually filed a petition pursuant to section 388 seeking reunification services after genetic testing showed he was the biological father of K.D.T. and K.Z.T.
Father appeals from the termination of h

Bradley Cole Smith was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing ammunition while being prohibited from owning a firearm. The court sentenced him to two years on each count, to run concurrently with a four-year sentence imposed at the same time for a probation violation. He now argues that the trial court erred in excluding third-party culpability evidence, and that one of the sentences for the current offenses should have been stayed under Penal Code section 654. We disagree with both contentions and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Aldo Delacruz of two counts of attempted murder, one count of carjacking, and one count of attempted driving or taking of a vehicle without the consent of the owner. The jury also found true special allegations regarding great bodily injury and firearm use. Delacruz appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted murder, and that the trial court should be permitted to consider striking the firearm enhancements in light of recent amendments to the Penal Code (Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) stats. 2017, ch. 682 (Senate Bill 620)). We conclude the trial court had no duty to instruct on the lesser included offense because no substantial evidence exists to support the charge. We therefore affirm the conviction. We agree with both parties that the case should be remanded for resentencing to permit the trial court to exercise its dis

Duane Reed filed a complaint against Selvi Stanislaus in her capacity as Executive Director of the Franchise Tax Board (hereafter FTB), asserting wrongful termination, sexual harassment, retaliation, and failure to ensure a workplace free of sexual harassment. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court dismissed all of Reed’s claims except for the retaliation cause of action, and ultimately granted the FTB’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Reed failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to show triable issues of material fact regarding causation and pretext.

W.J. (the minor), then 13, intentionally damaged a mannequin while fleeing a Kohl’s store where he had been performing backflips on display beds and engaging in other acts of mischief with his companions. He appeals from the juvenile court’s finding he was aware of the wrongfulness of his actions (Pen. Code, § 26) and adjudicating him to be a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after sustaining the allegation he committed felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1)) that the court deemed a misdemeanor (§ 17, subd. (b)(3)). The minor was granted probation and ordered to pay $648 in restitution to Kohl’s.

In 2006 defendant Raymond Nelson Coleman was convicted of murder and sentenced to life without parole (LWOP). He committed the crimes when he was 21. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) (hereafter, section 1170(d)(2)). According to defendant, section 1170(d)(2) violates his equal protection rights because it limits relief to juveniles sentenced to LWOP, whereas certain offenders age 25 years or younger are eligible for youth parole hearings under section 3051, depending on their sentence and time served.
We requested the parties to provide supplemental briefing regarding the recent amendments to section 3051, including the amendments increasing the eligibility age from 23 years to 25 years and adding eligibility for juvenile defendants sentenced to LWOP, and the recent decision in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 (Contreras), which held that sentences of 50

Defendant David Wayne Scarbrough was caught on video trying to break into a safe at his girlfriend’s workplace. A jury convicted him of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), and the court found true enhancement allegations for one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to six years in state prison.
Defendant contends on appeal that insufficient evidence supports his burglary conviction, and that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence based on the two prior prison terms. For the burglary charge, he argues that the area where the safe was located did not constitute a “room” within the meaning of the burglary statute, and that the prosecution’s evidence was “muddled and inconsistent.” For the prison priors, he contends that a prior enhancement imposed for his 2006 drug conviction (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) was improper since that conviction had already been reduced

Kerry Burns, the murder victim, recruited defendant Victor Bernard Rodgers to participate in a bank fraud scheme. After defendant did not receive any money from the scheme, but learned the bank was investigating his account for fraud, he retaliated against Burns by shooting and killing him. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found true the firearm enhancement. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced defendant to 50 years to life in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence of third party culpability relating to defendant’s fellow fraudster Cerwilliam Pryor (also known as Man-Man). Specifically, defendant contends it was error to exclude statements made by the victim and his wife that suggested Pryor was present at the scene near the time of the killing; he also contends error in excluding evidence of Pryor’s false alibi and anger at Burns to show consciousness of guilt an

This case began as a dispute over approximately $300 in unpaid wages. It has since transmogrified into a dispute concerning attorney fees totaling nearly 200 times that amount and is here now for the second time. In the previous appeal, appellant Thomas Beck challenged the trial court’s award of attorney fees for work that respondent Anthony Stratton’s attorney performed in that forum. We affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that Stratton’s motion for $31,365 in statutory attorney fees was timely and supported by substantial evidence. At the conclusion of our opinion, we stated, “In the interest of justice, the parties are to bear their own costs of appeal.” (Stratton v. Beck (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 483, 487, 498 (Stratton)). We reiterated that allocation in the ensuing remittitur: “The parties are to bear their own costs of appeal.”

A jury convicted Erick Hernandez of second degree murder. Hernandez admitted a prior strike conviction, and he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 36 years to life in state prison. Hernandez contends the trial court erred in declining to strike the prior conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). He also contends the court erred in the calculation of his custody credits. We modify the judgment to correct the award of custody credits and affirm the judgment in all other respects.