CA Unpub Decisions

Jason Ahdoot, Mahnaz Hendifar, and Paul Hendifar appeal from the order granting the special motion of respondents, 10811 Ashton Apartments, a California Limited Partnerhsip (Ashton), Ishak Bibawi and Soraya Soltani, to strike four causes of action of the complaint and the order for related attorney fees pursuant to the SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., 426.16 et seq.)
SLAPP is an acronym for strategic lawsuits against public participation. A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the persons right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.[2]( 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
Appellants contend reversal of the order granting the SLAPP motion is compelled, because although service of a three-day notice to pay rent or quit (Three-Day Notice) constitutes activity protected under the SLAPP statute, the stricken causes of action did not arise from the notice but from respondents unprotected activities. They challenge the related order awarding respondents attorney fees and costs as prevailing defendants solely on the ground that reversal of the order granting the motion to strike mandates reversal of the order for attorney fees and costs.
Court conclude the stricken causes of action arose primarily from respondents service of the Three-Day Notice and the exercise of their right to freedom of speech, both activities protected under the SLAPP statute. The orders striking the first, second, fifth and sixth causes of action and awarding attorney fees and costs were thus correct. Court therefore affirm both orders.

Defendant Mark Steven Winget appeals from a judgment after a jury found him guilty of grand theft by use of an access card, in violation of Penal Code section 484g. Defendant was placed on probation for three years.
The trial court is ordered to modify the probation condition in the judgment that defendant possess no blank checks, not write any portion of any checks and not have a bank account upon which checks may be drawn to read as follows: Possess no blank checks, not write any portion of any checks, not have a bank account upon which checks may be drawn, in any name other than his true name, Mark Steven Winget. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Carlo Parlanti was tried before a jury and convicted of forcible rape, inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant, and false imprisonment by force or violence. (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2), 273.5, subd. (a), 236.) The trial court sentenced appellant to nine years in prison, including an eight-year upper term for rape, and a consecutive one-year middle term for corporal injury to a cohabitant. The three-year term for false imprisonment was stayed pursuant to section 654. Appellant contends that the trial court committed instructional and sentencing errors and that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to request certain instructions. Court affirm the judgment, vacate appellant's sentence, and remand the matter for resentencing.

Appellant Caesar Escobar appeals from a restitution order issued by the trial court after he pled no contest to robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211 and involuntary manslaughter in violation of section 192, subdivision (b). On February 23, 2006, the trial court ordered appellant to pay restitution for the victims medical and burial bills of $25,063.82 as follows: $505 to Providence Holy Cross Trauma; $761 to California Emergency Physicians; $6,547.02 to Mission Hills Catholic Mortuary; $10,699 to Providence Holy Cross Medical Center; and $6,551.80 to Catholic Cemeteries Archdiocese of Los Angeles. At a subsequent hearing on March 7, 2006, upon being informed by the People that the cemetery and the mortuary bills had been paid in full by the victims wife, Maria Del Carmen Gonzalez (Gonzalez), the trial court modified the order in part by ordering appellant to pay the amounts of $6,547.02 and $6,551.80 directly to Gonzalez.
Court affirm and modify with directions.

In a petition filed on January 17, 2006, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, appellant, N.L., was alleged to be a person described in that section because she violated Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d), battery with serious bodily injury, a felony. Appellant denied the allegations. On April 21, 2005, the juvenile court found the petition true and ordered appellant home on probation. The court found the maximum term of confinement was four years and awarded 43 days of predisposition credit.
The petition was filed based on an incident occurring on November 15, 2005, where without provocation; appellant was alleged to have struck a classmate in the face, fracturing her nose. There was conflicting evidence regarding the provocation with some evidence indicating that the incident started when appellant and her classmate had agreed to a game of body shots; where each would hit each other in the body. The incident escalated when the classmate struck appellant in her face, instead of the body per the agreement.
The condition in the judgment that appellant not have any F Grades or D grades is stricken. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal from an order directing a party to pay attorneys fees as sanctions for discovery abuse in connection with a motion to tax costs. We conclude the trial court erred in granting respondents underlying motion to quash and that sanctions were unwarranted. Accordingly, Court reverse.

Appellant Hovanes Meliksetian appeals his conviction, after a nonjury trial, of stalking (Pen. Code, 646.9, subd. (a))[1], assault with a deadly weapon ( 245, subd. (a)(1)), and first degree burglary ( 459). He was sentenced to the middle term of four years in prison for the burglary conviction, with a concurrent two-year term for the stalking conviction and a stayed three-year term for the assault conviction. Contrary to appellants contentions, the stalking charge was filed before the statute of limitations ran and is supported by substantial evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Christopher W. appeals from a jurisdictional/dispositional order in the matter of his daughter, Ciera W. He challenges the juvenile courts proceeding with the dispositional hearing in his absence and determination that he was entitled to allegedrather than presumedfather status. Court affirm the order.

Defendant Larry Reed appeals from a judgment of conviction following a no contest plea entered after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. Court affirm.

Appellant Louis Bernstein (appellant), the administrator for the estate of Harry Sheldon Temkin (the estate), appeals from the trial courts order authorizing the payment of $1,500 in extraordinary fees incurred by appellant in administering the estate and requiring appellant to pay, out of the assets of the estate, $10,000 to respondent Jamie Schloss (Schloss) and $16,000 to respondent Michael York (York). The trial court disallowed appellants claim for additional fees and expenses, including the $885 per annum cost of a bond premium, and certain filing fees and publication fees. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by under-compensating him for fees and expenses incurred in administering the estate, and that the courts order violates the provisions of Probate Code section 11420[1] and inequitably shifts fees and costs to other creditors and beneficiaries of the estate. Schloss filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because appellant failed to account for the $27,500, as ordered by the trial court and requested sanctions against appellant in the amount of $3,445 for bringing a frivolous appeal.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing appellants claim for additional fees and denying appellant reimbursement for filing and publication fees, nor did the courts order violate the provisions of section 11420. The trial court erred, however, by denying appellant reimbursement of the reasonable cost of the bond premium, which appellant was entitled to under section 8486. We reverse the order denying reimbursement of the cost of the bond premium and remand the matter to the trial court to modify its order to reimburse appellant for the reasonable cost of the bond premium and to reapportion the payments from the estate to appellant and York accordingly. Court affirm the order in all other respects. Court deny Schlosss motion to dismiss the appeal and request for sanctions.

Defendant, appeals from his convictions for methamphetamine possession (Health & Saf. Code, 1377, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor obstruction of a peace officer. (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant argues the trial court improperly denied his motion to compel disclosure of peace officer personnel records. Defendant further requests Court independently review the in camera proceedings conducted in the trial court. Court reverse and direct the trial court to conduct an in camera review of the material peace officer personnel records of Officer Richard Martinez.

In this consolidated appeal, Daniel G. Drommerhausen III, (Daniel) challenges 3 separate orders of the probate court declaring that 38 real properties and 11 bank and brokerage accounts belong to: the Estate of Daniel G. Drommerhausen II; the Estate of Marjorie M. Drommerhausen; or the Drommerhausen Family Trust (the trust). Daniel G. Drommerhausen and Marjorie Drommerhausen were the parents of Daniel and Debra Hutchings. Ms. Hutchings, who is the executor of the parents wills and the sole successor trustee of the trust, filed three Probate Code section 850 petitions to confirm that the real properties and accounts belong either to the estates or the trust. The probate court entered the three orders following a stipulated trial by reference before Retired Superior Court Judge Eli Chernow. Court affirm.

A jury acquitted Leslie King of second degree robbery but convicted him of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, 211, 212.5, 245, subd. (a)(1); all further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.) In a bifurcated trial after a jury waiver, the trial court found that King had one strike prior felony conviction, a 1983 residential burglary. ( 667, subds.(b)-(i), 1170.12; 459, 460.) The trial court also found King's conviction in his current case constituted a violation of the conditions of probation of his 2003 conviction for unlawful vehicle taking. (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a).) The trial court denied King's motion to strike the strike for sentencing purposes ( 1385; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) and imposed a 3-year middle term, doubled to 6 years under the Three Strikes law, and a consecutive 8-month term (one-third of the 2-year middle term) for the probation violation.
King appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion to strike the 1983 burglary conviction for purposes of sentencing. Court disagree and affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Joseph Sabbagh appeals a judgment entered against him following both a jury trial and statement of decision in his action against defendant and respondent Chukrala George Isak (Isak). The jury concluded that Isak did not breach the partnership agreement between appellant and him, and the trial court concluded that the jurys finding necessarily disposed of appellants remaining causes of action for dissolution of partnership and accounting, and required that judgment be entered in favor of Isak on his cross-complaint seeking cancellation of a note and deed of trust. Appellant asserts that the jury verdict form did not accurately reflect what the court and counsel had agreed to submit to the jury and that it erroneously and prejudicially precluded the jury from determining whether the parties entered into a separate buyout agreement constituting a novation and the terms of that agreement. He further asserts that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to Isak because the parties oral partnership did not include an attorney fees provision and he was not a signatory to the deed of trust which provided for an award of attorney fees.
Court affirm. Appellant cannot now challenge the verdict form because he took the position below that he was not aggrieved by it and stipulated to permit the court to determine the issues remaining after the jury verdict. But even if he could challenge it, appellant was not prejudiced by the verdict form. With respect to the award of attorney fees, the trial court properly construed the partnership agreement and deed of trust together as part of a single transaction and properly applied Civil Code section 1717 to award fees to Isak as the prevailing party.