CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and appellant Joseph Sabbagh appeals a judgment entered against him following both a jury trial and statement of decision in his action against defendant and respondent Chukrala George Isak (Isak). The jury concluded that Isak did not breach the partnership agreement between appellant and him, and the trial court concluded that the jurys finding necessarily disposed of appellants remaining causes of action for dissolution of partnership and accounting, and required that judgment be entered in favor of Isak on his cross-complaint seeking cancellation of a note and deed of trust. Appellant asserts that the jury verdict form did not accurately reflect what the court and counsel had agreed to submit to the jury and that it erroneously and prejudicially precluded the jury from determining whether the parties entered into a separate buyout agreement constituting a novation and the terms of that agreement. He further asserts that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to Isak because the parties oral partnership did not include an attorney fees provision and he was not a signatory to the deed of trust which provided for an award of attorney fees.
Court affirm. Appellant cannot now challenge the verdict form because he took the position below that he was not aggrieved by it and stipulated to permit the court to determine the issues remaining after the jury verdict. But even if he could challenge it, appellant was not prejudiced by the verdict form. With respect to the award of attorney fees, the trial court properly construed the partnership agreement and deed of trust together as part of a single transaction and properly applied Civil Code section 1717 to award fees to Isak as the prevailing party.

In 2001, Raymond Damon Smith (defendant) pled no contest to possessing a controlled substance, cocaine. (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a).) Imposition of sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for three years. On May 10, 2006, Smith personally filed a document entitled Motion for Writ of Error Coram Nobis or other Extraordinary Remedy, which requested the trial court to vacate the judgment on the grounds of ineffective trial counsel. The trial court denied the motion.He appeals from the order denying the Motion for Writ of Error Coram Nobis or other Extraordinary Remedy and contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider the merits of the motion and by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. Court disagree and affirm the trial courts order.

Josiah Hernandez appeals from a judgment entered following his guilty pleas to three counts of attempted murder, counts 1, 2, and 3 (Pen. Code, 664/187) and his admission that he personally discharged a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Pursuant to his negotiated plea, he was sentenced on count 1 to prison for the low term of five years plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. On counts 2 and 3 he was sentenced to concurrent five-year terms.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that no arguable issues exist, and that appellant has, by virtue of counsels compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered against him in this case. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113.) The judgment is affirmed.

Tyler J. Schaeffer, as personal representative of the Estate of Richard T. Manuzak, appeals from orders vacating a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement and denying his motion for attorney fees under the Mobilehome Residency Law, Civil Code section 798 et seq. (MRL). Court affirm the order denying attorney fees. The appeal from the order vacating the judgment is dismissed as moot.

Reginald Dean Harris appeals from judgment entered following his no contest plea to carrying a concealed firearm (Pen. Code, 12025, subd. (a)(2)), a misdemeanor. His plea followed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 and his motion to set aside the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995. Imposition of sentence was suspended, and he was placed on summary probation for three years upon certain terms and conditions. He asserted his appeal was based on the denial of his motion to suppress evidence made pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that no arguable issues exist, and that appellant has, by virtue of counsels compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered against him in this case. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal. 4th 106, 112.)

Mario Gonsales, also known as Mario Gonzalez, appeals from a judgment entered upon his conviction of possession of a concealed firearm (Pen. Code, 12025, subd. (a)(2) upon a negotiated plea of no contest, after his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 was denied. Appellant admitted having suffered a prior felony-strike conviction within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate state prison term of two years eight months. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence because the police officers strong suspicion that appellant had a gun was unreasonable, and the officer could not articulate facts to provide an objective manifestation that appellant was involved in criminal activity. Court affirm.

Appellant David Joseph Baker challenges the trial courts reinstatement of the judgment convicting him of evading an officer, assault on a peace officer, resisting an executive officer, possession of methamphetamine, and various sex offender registration requirements following a remand for further proceedings in relation to his Pitchess discovery motions. Appellant contends the court erred by concluding he was not prejudiced by the prior non-disclosure of a complaint against a police officer who tasered him. Court conclude the trial court did not err, as the evidence appellant developed upon remand was inadmissible.

Plaintiff GTX Global Corporation, a Nevada corporation, styles itself as the leading provider of innovative IP [internet protocol] multimedia technologies that enable quality IP multimedia communications. Defendant Andrew Left is the founder of codefendant Stocklemon.com, which he describes as a four-year-old interactive weblog[[2]] that publishes information and opinion about dubious stocks that Left believes are lemons. GTX alleged Left does not run Stocklemon.com as public service, but rather as a vehicle for private gain whereby Left buys short positions on publicly traded stocks (including shares of GTX) in order to realize substantial profits when he publishes negative information that causes the stocks value to drop. According to GTX, Left wantonly published at least five defamatory falsehoods concerning GTX through Stocklemon.com, causing more than $50 million in damages. GTX alleged various causes of action based on those defamatory statementstrade libel; intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; securities fraud in violation of Corporations Code section 25400, subdivision (c);[3]federal securities fraud in violation of section 77q of title 15 of the United States Code; and conspiracy. GTX also sought an injunction to prevent Left from publishing defamatory statements.
The trial court granted Lefts motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute)[4]and dismissed the entire GTX complaint. GTX timely appeals, contending the trial court erred in finding all of its causes of action arose from defendants constitutionally protected speech activity and GTX failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on those claims. Court affirm.

Pablo S. (father) appeals from the judgments declaring his children, Lucien S., Etienne S., and Jolie S., dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and from the orders removing them from his custody. Father raises the following contentions: (1) the order granting rehearing was unauthorized and deprived him of due process; (2) permitting one witness to testify in chambers violated his right to confrontation; and (3) substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders.
Court hold that the grant of rehearing was authorized and did not deprive father of due process. Father forfeited the issue pertaining to receiving testimony in chambers by failing to object to the procedure. Substantial evidence supports the findings and orders. Accordingly, the judgments and orders are affirmed.

David J. and Florencia M. appeal from orders of the juvenile court denying their motions for modification and terminating their parental rights. Court find no error and affirm the orders.

Joseph Gamero appeals from the judgment entered upon revocation of probation which was granted following his plea of guilty to count 1, identity theft in violation of Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a) and count 2, grand theft personal property in violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (a). He was sentenced to the midterm of two years on each count to be served concurrently. Court appointed counsel to represent him on this appeal.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellants attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Melvin Deonte Price challenges the constitutionality of his negotiated state prison sentence under Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296. Inasmuch as defendant failed to secure a certificate of probable cause from the trial court following his conviction by way of a plea of no contest, Court dismiss his appeal.

Appellant Darryl H. appeals from the orders made under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300 and 361 finding dependency court jurisdiction over his son, Brian H., and removing Brian from Darryls custody. Darryl contends that no substantial evidence supported the dependency courts finding of jurisdiction under section 300, the court erred when it found by clear and convincing evidence that Brian faced a substantial risk of harm if he were not removed from Darryls custody, and the court abused its discretion by ignoring reasonable alternatives to removing Brian. Court disagree and affirm.

Defendant T.M. appeals from the order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 entered after the court determined that he committed the crime of being a minor in possession of a firearm, a felony violation of Penal Code section 12101, subdivision (a)(1). The court ordered defendant placed in the camp community placement program and imposed various terms and conditions of probation. Defendants sole contention on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offense. Court reject his contention and affirm the order.