CA Unpub Decisions

On a date not discernible from the record, the marriage between appellant Bernadette Waina (Bernadette) and David Keema (David) was dissolved.[1] They have one minor daughter. In October 2005, upon motion by respondent Monterey County Department of Child Support Services (Department), the court below issued a temporary order requiring that Bernadette pay $776.00 in monthly child support to David. The court continued the case for review of Bernadettes earned income. After further hearing, the court in March 2006 ordered that monthly child support be fixed at $729.00. Approximately three months laterafter a hearing attended only by Departments attorney in which no evidence was presentedthe court entered a permanent order that Bernadette pay monthly child support of $776.00.
Bernadette challenges that order. She contends that the record reflects that the trial judge intended to make permanent the March 2006 order that monthly child support be set at $729.00, but that the order erroneously stated the higher amount ($776.00) contained in the original temporary order. She asks that we correct the order because it was simply a clerical error. Bernadette argues further that the order reflects an abuse of the courts discretion because there was no evidentiary support for increasing monthly child support from the amount then in effect ($729.00) to $776.00.
Court conclude that the lower court abused its discretion by making a permanent order increasing child support to the higher level of $776.00. Accordingly, Court reverse.

The father of the three children in this juvenile dependency proceeding seeks extraordinary relief from an order terminating reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450-8.452.) He contends that the order should be reversed because he had made progress on his reunification plan, and because he did not receive reasonable services. In particular, he claims that the social services agency failed to take his medical condition into consideration when implementing the case plan, and that the agency failed to maintain regular contact with him or help him seek services while he was incarcerated. After reviewing the record, we find it supports the courts order. Accordingly, Court deny the petition for extraordinary relief.

Court deny a motion to dismiss an appeal upon concluding that appellant has standing to appeal as a party aggrieved by the judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., 902.) Court express no opinion on the merits of the appeal.

Plaintiff (Murphy) appeals from an order of the Alameda County Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants City of Alameda (City), City Council of the City of Alameda (City Council), and Planning Board of the City of Alameda. He asserts the trial court erred in concluding that a city ordinance authorizing the construction of work/live studios does not violate a city charter provision that prohibits the construction of multiple dwelling units. Court conclude there was no error, and therefore, Court affirm.

In these child dependency proceedings, the mother, Michelle H., appeals from an order terminating her parental rights as to two of her children and limiting her right to make decisions as to a third child. Court affirm.

Appellant appeals from a civil judgment entered in favor of respondent Alliance Imaging following a jury trial. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the issue of causation. Court conclude that, because the jury determined that respondent was not negligent and, therefore, it did not reach the issue of causation, any claimed error was not prejudicial and is harmless.

Plaintiffs Raymond Reudy and Kevin Hicks sued defendants O.K. Investments, Inc. (OKI) and Homayoun Naimi in connection with two wall signs for outdoor advertising. Among other claims, plaintiffs alleged that the signs did not comply with San Francisco ordinances and sought an injunction against their illegal use. OKI cross-complained. The trial court agreed that the signs were illegal and granted an injunction and attorney fees to plaintiffs, but the court also found for OKI on its cross-complaint. Plaintiffs appealed, but defendants did not. In an earlier decision, this court reversed the trial courts award on the cross-complaint but otherwise left its judgment intact.
While the matter was pending on appeal, Business and Professions Code section 5466, subdivision (a) was enacted. Although defendants now contend that section 5466 defeats plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief, the statute was not raised on the earlier appeal. After remittitur, plaintiffs submitted a proposed amended judgment to conform to our ruling. Only after the amended judgment was entered did defendants, for the first time, seek relief under section 5466, filing a motion to vacate the amended judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 663. The trial court denied that aspect of the motion to vacate. Court affirm.

After the juvenile court held a hearing on a petition for modification filed by appellant Barney L.the father of Barry L., it modified its prior order in a different manner, implementing a recommendation from respondent San Mateo County Human Services Agency. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, 388.) Barney appeals, contending that the court violated his due process rights by modifying its prior order without providing him with sufficient advance notice of the proposed modification. Court affirm the order.

Appellant Brandon W., a minor, contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ, formerly, the California Youth Authority, or the CYA) and that it erred in its calculation of his presentence custody credits. Court affirm the lower courts judgment regarding appellants commitment, and modify the calculation of his custody credits.

Appellants Jon Green and Green Right OWay Constructors appeal from a order denying their petition for a writ of mandate. They contend the trial court applied the statute of limitations incorrectly. Court disagree and affirm.

Counsel appointed for defendant Heriberto Macias has asked this court to independently examine the record in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, to determine if there are any arguable issues that require briefing. Defendant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he elected not do so. Court have conducted that review, conclude there are no arguable issues, and affirm.

Richard R. Blake, appearing in propria persona, filed this appeal from the judgment in a marital dissolution proceeding initiated by his former wife, Rachelle A. Blake. Rachelle filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, which we denied, but she has not filed a respondents brief. Court affirm.

Court reject Samuel Verdins challenge to his conviction for the attempted murder of his cousin. Court also reject Paymen Parvizis challenge to his conviction for assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (of Verdins cousin), being a felon in possession of a firearm, and evading a police officer. Neither appellant demonstrates prejudicial error. Court affirm both judgments.

Plaintiffs and appellants Maryann Gallagher and Blake Brown bought a new Mercedes-Benz ML430. Defendant and respondent Mercedes-Benz USA (Mercedes-Benz ) distributes the ML430. Plaintiffs car experienced, among other things, a series of stalling episodes. After some or all of those episodes, defendant and respondent Calabasas Motorcars, Inc. (Calabasas), serviced plaintiffs car. Based on a claim their ML430 is defective, plaintiffs demanded a refund under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act). When defendants refused, plaintiffs sued Mercedes-Benz and Calabasas for a violation of the act and for fraud. The trial court directed a verdict in defendants favor on the fraud claims, and the jury found in defendants favor on the claim under the act. With respect to their claims under the act, plaintiffs primary contention concerns the admission of evidence that they bought a service contract, rather than an extended warranty, after the cars original warranty expired. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting that evidence and by failing to instruct the jury that defendant had the burden of proving the existence of the service contract. Additionally, they contend that the court erred in excluding evidence of other consumer complaints about the ML430. We hold that no error occurred, and Court therefore affirm the judgment on the claims brought under the act.