CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant (mother) appeals the juvenile court order finding that her daughter, Jasmine M. (minor), was subject to jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c), and the juvenile court order establishing a case plan requiring mother to attend individual counseling but not neuropsychological counseling or evaluation. According to mother, the finding under section 300, subdivision (c) was not supported by substantial evidence, and the case plan was not tailored to meet the neurological problems she faces due to a brain injury she suffered in 1994. As to the first argument, Court note that mother does not challenge the juvenile courts finding that the minor was a child described in section 300, subdivision (b). Thus, there is no basis for reversing the finding of jurisdiction. As to the second argument, we find that the case plan was appropriate under the circumstances and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
Court affirm.

Nery D. appeals an order denying his request for presumptive parent status as to Jonathan G. and purports to appeal an order denying his request for presumptive parent status as to Carolina M. Court affirm the juvenile courts orders.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to sale of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a). On February 17, 2006, an undercover police officer gave appellant $30 in exchange for two solids of rock cocaine.
On June 9, 2006, appellant was sentenced to the low term of three years plus three years for an admitted prior drug conviction pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1370.2, subdivision (a). Court appointed counsel to represent him on this appeal.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellants attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Issac Donte Eaton (Eaton) appeals the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to one count of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (d)(2)) and his admission he personally used a semiautomatic firearm during the commission of the offense ( 12022.5, subds. (a) & (d)). The trial court sentenced Eaton to a term of ten years in prison. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Khalafala M. Khalafala assaulted Debra P. intending to rape her. Later, out of custody from the first assault, defendant assaulted Shelly C. intending to rape her. In a court trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with intent to commit rape. Sentenced to eight years in state prison, defendant appeals. Representing himself on appeal, defendant makes numerous contentions of error. Court conclude his contention that he was improperly sentenced to full and consecutive terms pursuant to former Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (d) has merit because defendant does not have the requisite prior conviction. Accordingly, Court affirm the conviction but vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment denying relief after a court trial in an action seeking damages for destruction of 13,548 bottles of spoiled wine. Spinetta blamed the destruction on the exposure of the wine to sulfur dioxide, oxygen, and possible other gases from a nitrogen gas cylinder supplied by defendant Complete Welders Supply. The trial court found that the spoilage was not caused by exposure to the gas from the cylinder. Spinetta contends the trial court erred in failing to award partial damages after finding that some of the wine was exposed to the contents of the cylinder. He contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the finding that only part of the wine was exposed to gas from the cylinder. He contends that the trial court erred in failing to place the burden of proof of lack of causation on Complete Welders Supply or in failing to find he satisfied the burden of proof of causation under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant of car burglary and receiving stolen property. On appeal, defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions, the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the proper number of custody credits, and the court security fee must be stricken because it was based on a nonexistent statute. Court conclude the judgment and the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the proper statutory basis for the court security fee and the proper number of days of custody credit, respectively. Court also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions.

Defendant Steve Alan Smith beat his wife into unconsciousness in front of their daughters. Convicted of various assault crimes and inflicting mental suffering on a child and sentenced under the Three Strikes law, defendant appeals. He contends we must consider enhancements in determining whether he was improperly convicted of both infliction of corporal injury on a spouse and a lesser included offense. He also contends the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for inflicting mental suffering on his daughters. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant of four counts of felony indecent exposure with a prior (Pen. Code, 314, subd. 1), and one count of sexual battery ( 243.4, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of four years eight months in state prison, calculated as follows: the lower term of two years on the sexual battery count, plus consecutive eight month terms (one third the midterm) for each of the four exposure counts.
Defendant appeals, claiming:
(1) There was no substantial evidence the victim of the sexual battery was restrained, an element of that crime;
(2) There was no substantial evidence defendant exposed himself under circumstances giving rise to criminal liability;
(3) Section 314, subdivision 1, establishing the crime of indecent exposure, is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to this case; and
(4) The trial court denied defendant his right to counsel when it denied his request to substitute retained counsel for the public defender.
Court affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A modification decision.

On April 7, 2005, defendant received a ticket because her trucks registration had expired. On April 30, 2005, another officer stopped her for the same violation and detained her. Defendant refused the officer permission to search the truck. The officer impounded the truck and conducted an inventory search, which disclosed methamphetamine.
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378), transportation of methamphetamine with a not-for-personal-use allegation (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a); Pen. Code, 1210, subd. (a)), and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)).
Defendant moved to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, 1538.5.) The trial court denied the motion. Defendant pled no contest to transportation of methamphetamine and was sentenced to four years of probation with jail time.
Defendant mainly contends that the search of her truck was unlawful because (1) the ticket she received on April 7, 2005, was a fix-it ticket within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 40610 (section 40610); (2) this ticket authorized her to continue driving her truck with its expired registration until June 6, 2005; (3) therefore, once she had produced the ticket, her continued detention lacked legal basis and she was entitled to refuse permission to search the truck. As will appear, we need not decide whether fix-it tickets issued under section 40610 have this legal effect, because defendant did not receive such a ticket; rather, she received a notice to appear in court on June 6, 2005, following her arrest on April 7, 2005, for the expired registration. (Veh. Code, 40522 (section 40522).) Finding defendants challenge to the search to lack merit, Court affirm.

Defendant Calvin Earl Lee pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, admitted he had served three prior prison terms, and was placed on probation pursuant to Proposition 36. Over the course of the next several months, he admitted four separate probation violations. Consequently, the trial court revoked defendants probation and sentenced him to the upper term of six years in state prison, due to defendants prior felony convictions and related factors.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the imposition of the upper term violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435] (hereafter Apprendi), Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403] (hereafter Blakely), and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856] (hereafter Cunningham), and (2) the trial court impermissibly used the fact that defendant had served prior prison terms to both enhance and aggravate his sentence. Court affirm the judgment.

On four separate occasions between December 7, 2005, and January 25, 2006, defendant James Veillon sold morphine, cocaine, and rock cocaine to an undercover police officer. During the execution of a search warrant at defendants home, defendant admitted selling the drugs.
With the condition that he serve no more than four years in state prison, defendant pled guilty to four counts of selling a controlled substance. On appeal, he contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation and imposing the middle term of four years. He also contends the court erred in failing to recite in detail all of the fines, fees, and penalties imposed. Only the last contention has merit, as the People concede.
The judgment is affirmed.

In June 2006, defendant Richard Lee Smith became angry with the victim regarding what he perceived as her infidelity. He yelled at her, dragged her by the hair, pushed and pulled her, ripped her clothing, and hit her in the face approximately five times. In August 2006, defendant pleaded guilty to infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a); further statutory references are to the Penal Code) and admitted two prior convictions of that offense. As a result of the plea, defendants probation in three unrelated cases was revoked. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, Court find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. The judgment is affirmed.