CA Unpub Decisions

After a day and a half jury trial in which he personally testified, appellant was convicted on both drug-related counts in the charging information. He appeals claiming (1) the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to impeach him on cross-examination by confronting him with a prior drug-related conviction and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective because, during the course of cross examination of a prosecution drug expert, a question by that counsel adduced evidence of appellants prior drug convictions. Court reject both arguments and affirm the judgment of conviction.

Joseph A. appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders sustaining allegations of automobile theft, receiving stolen property, evading arrest, resisting arrest, driving under the influence of alcohol and driving without a license, and committing him to the California Youth Authority (CYA). He contends the commitment order must be reversed because there was no evidence he would likely benefit from a commitment to the CYA. He additionally urges his maximum period of confinement must be recalculated. Court agree that the maximum period of confinement must be recalculated and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Defendant Chad Jacobsen appeals his conviction by jury trial of unlawfully killing a living animal, which was the property of another. (Pen. Code, 597, subd. (a).) He contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and the court erroneously excluded evidence. Court reject the contentions and affirm.

Janet S. is the mother of Jaylen S., who was declared a dependent child of the Alameda County juvenile court when he was five months old. Following a contested hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the court found it likely that Jaylen would be adopted and terminated mothers parental rights. Mother contends the court applied the wrong legal standard when determining whether her bond with Jaylen made it detrimental to terminate her rights. She further argues that the court abused its discretion when it refused to apply the beneficial contact exception to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). Court affirm.

When a trial judge grants a motion for new trial in a civil case concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support a jurys finding, is the court required to identify the facts relied on by the judge in so ruling? We conclude that Code of Civil Procedure section 657 (section 657) requires that the written order granting a new trial motion must include a specification of the facts upon which the decision is based.
In this case, the trial courts order granting the motion for new trial simply stated that the evidence as presented by the parties is insufficient to justify the jurys verdict of non-negligence of [d]efendant . . . . This conclusory statement is inadequate to satisfy section 657s mandate that the court specify the . . . reason or reasons for granting the new trial. . . . ( 657.) Accordingly, Court reverse.

Maricruz B. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights as to her daughters Elizabeth and Rosa. She contends the order must be reversed because (1) the court failed to apply the correct standard when finding it was likely the children would be adopted, (2) substantial evidence does not support the courts conclusion that the children were adoptable, and (3) the court erred when it declined to find applicable the exception to termination that is set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, (c)(1)(A).Court conclude the court did not commit any prejudicial

Appellant Vladimir P., a minor, appeals from the judgment entered by the trial court committing him to Fouts Springs Youth Facility. His counsel raises no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Independent review of the record reveals no arguable issues. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

These dependency proceedings were initiated in November 2005 when a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed and six-month-old M.W. was initially detained from parental custody. Her mother, Carla, submitted to jurisdiction on the social workers report. She was offered reunification services, and M.W. was adjudged a ward of the court. The appeal is dismissed.

Manuel Hernandez (appellant) was convicted by a jury of first degree robbery (count 1, Pen. Code, 211, 212.5),[1]aggravated mayhem (count 2, 205), and dissuading a witness by force or threat (count 3, 136.1, subd. (c)(1)). The jury also found as to all counts that he personally used a firearm, as to counts 1 and 2, that he intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury, and as to counts 1 and 3, that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. ( 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d), 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated trial, the jury found that he committed all three offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) Appellant was sentenced to a determinate term of 31 years, two terms of life with the possibility of parole, and a term of 25 years to life. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.
Appellant appeals, contending that there is insufficient evidence to support the aggravated mayhem conviction, the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences, and his constitutional rights were violated when the court imposed consecutive sentences, relying on facts not found true by the jury.
Court conclude the evidence supports the jury verdict, and determine the court erred when it ordered consecutive sentences for all three counts. Court modify the judgment by staying the sentence imposed for dissuading a witness, as alleged in count 3, and affirm.

Tyrone Prince Denmark appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of first degree residential burglary with a person present (Pen. Code, 459, 667.5, subd. (c)(21)) with admissions that he suffered a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (d)), a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (a)), and a prior felony conviction for which he served a separate prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced appellant to prison for nine years.
Court hold the trial court properly denied appellants Pitchess motion. To the extent the motion sought information relating to the alleged dishonesty of three officers to show they fabricated that appellant waived his Miranda rights and made a statement, appellant failed to establish a plausible factual foundation that the officers committed misconduct. The supporting declaration of appellants trial counsel conclusorily asserted that she expect[ed] unspecified evidence to show the officers were fabricating. To the extent the motion sought information relating to the alleged dishonesty of the officers to show they committed other fabrications, including fabricating witnesses identifications of appellant during field showups, appellant waived the issue by failing to raise it below. In any event, the conclusory assertion of appellants trial counsel that she expected evidence to show the officers were fabricating failed to establish a plausible factual foundation that the officers fabricated anything. To the extent the motion sought information other than evidence relating to the alleged dishonesty of the officers, the motion was overbroad.

Defendant appeals from a judgment for plaintiffs in their action for wrongful eviction arising from their emergency evacuation from his rent-controlled building. Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding that he was required formally to evict the displaced tenants prior to re-renting the apartments, that his increased profits due to the re-renting of the units was not the proper measure of damages, and that his conduct did not cause the tenants emotional distress. The tenants cross-appeal, contending the trial court erred in failing to find defendants conduct was an unfair business practice under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200, et seq.) or that his conduct constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. Court affirm.

Appeals from a judgment and postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, David A. Workman, Judge. Judgment and postjudgment order denying Plaintiffs attorney fees motion affirmed; postjudgment order denying Defendants attorney fees motion reversed and remanded with directions.

Plaintiff and appellant Sea Planes, Inc. (Sea Planes), an operator of a commercial ferry service, sued defendants Investment Advantage Group (IAG) and its president Randy Glessner (Glessner),[1]as well as the attorney for IAG and Glessner, defendant and respondent Michael Tse-Wen Sun (Sun), for return of approximately $145,000, among other damages. Sea Planes deposited approximately $130,000 into Suns client trust account and provided $15,000 to IAG as a brokers fee as part of a plan to finance Sea Planess purchase of a passenger ferry. After IAG executed a promissory note in favor of Sea Planes in the approximate amount of $145,000, Sun dispersed the $130,000 in the client trust account according to directions from Glessner. When the plan to purchase the ferry failed, IAG and Glessner did not refund or repay any amount to Sea Planes.
Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Sea Planes against defendants Glessner and IAG. The trial court, however, entered judgment in favor of defendant Sun. The trial court found that Sun did not breach a duty of care to Sea Planes. The trial court denied Sea Planess post-verdict request to amend the pleadings to add a negligence cause of action against Sun.
Sea Planes appealed the portion of the judgment in favor of Sun, as well as the order denying the request to amend the pleadings. We affirm the judgment and the order denying the motion to amend. Substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding that Sun did not breach a duty of care to Sea Planes. For this reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request to amend the pleadings.
The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant challenges the sentence imposed for his possession of cocaine base conviction on the ground the trial court violated his right to a jury trial by imposing the upper term. Court conclude the trial court permissibly relied upon recidivism type factors to impose an upper term.