CA Unpub Decisions

Samantha D. seeks extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order terminating family reunification services for her daughter C.H., and setting the matter for a permanent plan hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.22; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Court deny the petition for extraordinary writ.

In this juvenile court dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300 et seq.), Johnny V., the biological father of Matthew G. (Father and Matthew, respectively), has filed a petition for extraordinary writ seeking relief from an order of the dependency court that set as section 366.26 hearing. ( 366.26, subd. (l).) His specific contentions are that the trial court erred when it denied his section 388 petition whereby he sought presumed father status, reunification services, and visitation with the minor child, and his parental rights were thwarted by the dependency system and courts. Our review of the record convinces us his contentions are without merit. Court therefore deny his petition.

Paranoid and delusional as a result of methamphetamine use, defendant took his elderly landlord on a bizarre all-night trip from Redding to Sacramento and back. A jury convicted defendant of kidnapping for carjacking (Pen. Code, 209.5, subd. (a)), carjacking (Pen. Code, 215, subd. (a)), kidnapping (Pen. Code, 207, subd. (a)), false imprisonment of an elder (Pen. Code, 368, subd. (f)), and elder abuse (Pen. Code, 368, subd. (b)(1)), and found true allegations as to the first three crimes of a violent crime committed against a vulnerable person (Pen. Code, 667.9, subd. (a).) The jury also found defendant sane. Defendant was sentenced to a life term plus one year.
On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of his victims lack of consent and insufficient evidence of his specific intent for carjacking or kidnapping for carjacking. He further contends it was prejudicial error to admit evidence of his prior bad acts. In a supplemental brief filed on rehearing, defendant contends the convictions for carjacking, kidnapping and false imprisonment of an elder must be dismissed because they are necessarily included in the enhanced kidnapping for carjacking count. He also contends the concurrent sentence for elder abuse should be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Court reverse the convictions for carjacking, kidnapping and false imprisonment of an elder and otherwise affirm.

In each of these three superior court cases, defendant Jack Lee Perry, Jr., admitted violating probation. Thereafter, the court revoked probation, and imposed sentence in all three cases in a single proceeding. On appeal, defendant urges us to correct errors in the abstract of judgment because it (1) incorrectly identifies one of the offenses of which he was convicted and (2) incorrectly indicates that the sentences he received in two cases represent the low, rather than the middle, term for each offense. His claims of error have merit: Court order the abstract amended.

Defendant Aaron Bruce Canty was found guilty by a jury of assault with a deadly weapon. The jury also found that defendant inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of that offense. Defendant admitted he had served two prior prison terms. Probation was denied and defendant was sentenced to state prison for nine years, which included an upper term of four years for the underlying assault offense.

Defendant appeals, raising various claims of instructional and sentencing error. He also contends his admissions regarding his prior prison terms were invalid. Court agree with defendants contention regarding his admissions and, accordingly, Court reverse the courts findings on the prior prison term allegations and remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing or (at the Peoples election) retrial of the prior prison term allegations. Court otherwise affirm the judgment.

In exchange for the dismissal of a charge of murder (Pen. Code, 187) and a stipulated sentence of 15 years, defendant Basilio Raimundo Mitchell pled no contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, 192, subd. (a)) and admitted use of a firearm in the commission of the offense (Pen. Code, 12022.5, subd. (a)).
The court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of 15 years in state prison and restitution fines of $3,000 in accordance with Penal Code sections 1202.4 and 1202.45. The judgment is affirmed.

In this case, defendant Kenneth Bowers entered into a plea bargain that called for his plea of no contest to possession of cocaine base for sale and his sentence to be six years in state prison. During the same court hearing at which defendant entered his plea, the trial court released defendant on his own recognizance (O/R) pursuant to an agreement with defendant that defendant could be sentenced to up to 10 years in state prison if he did not appear at the time set for sentencing, November 3, 2005. Defendant did not appear at the time set for sentencing; he was picked up on a bench warrant; and, at sentencing, the trial court imposed a term of eight years in state prison. The judgment is affirmed.

Mike McBurney sued the builder of his home (Ultimate) and the company that did the soil engineering work (Youngdahl), alleging latent defects for which defendants were responsible. The trial court granted summary judgment. McBurney timely appealed from the judgment.
Court agree with the trial court that the undisputed facts show McBurneys claims against each defendant are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation and therefore Court affirm.

Plaintiff Karl Brun had been employed by defendant Truckee-Tahoe Airport District (TTAD) since 1991 to perform a variety of ground services to aircraft, arriving passengers and crews. On February 16, 2000, Brun suffered an epileptic seizure while off duty, and returned to work the following month. Beginning in 2002, several incidents occurred which Brun believed violated his rights under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, 12900 et seq.) as a person with a medical disability. Brun and TTAD negotiated a mutually acceptable accommodation agreement in April 2004, after Brun formally invoked FEHA. In December 2004, Brun filed a civil complaint for injunctive relief and damages against TTAD, its general manager David V. Gotschall, and supervisors Michael Scott, and Jake Mihevc after they initiated actions which ultimately resulted in his termination. Several of the disciplinary actions, including an incident in which TTAD accused Brun of leaving a Caterpillar front-end loader running in an enclosed building, Bruns termination, and the subsequent Skelly hearing, occurred after Brun filed his FEHA charge.
In addition to alleging facts in support of his request for an injunction to halt the termination process, Brun alleged workplace harassment in violation of FEHA, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, retaliation in asserting the protection of FEHA, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy (against TTAD alone). Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment and Brun appeals.
Brun challenges only the trial courts entry of summary judgment and dismissal of the second cause of action for harassment, the fourth cause of action for retaliation, and the fifth cause of action for wrongful termination. As to the causes of action for harassment and retaliation, Brun argues the court erred in ruling the claims were barred on grounds he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies through the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) before filing suit in superior court. As to the cause of action for wrongful termination, Brun contends the court erred in finding TTAD was immune from tort liability under section 815, subdivision (a). Because Court conclude there was no error in the courts rulings, Court need not address the merits of Bruns substantive claims.

A jury convicted defendant Danny Woodrow Flippin of driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a); count one) and driving with a blood-alcohol content of .08 percent (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (b); count two) and found four prior drunk driving convictions to be true (Veh. Code, 23550, subd. (a)).
The court sentenced defendant to state prison for the midterm of two years for a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a) (count one), with four priors and a concurrent two-year county jail term for violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b) (count two).
Defendant appeals, contending his constitutional rights to due process were violated in that the trial court allowed an officer to testify about horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test results, that the prosecutor committed misconduct in eliciting the inadmissible testimony, and that the harm was not cured. Court reject defendants contentions. As the Attorney General notes, the trial court miscalculated presentence custody credit; Court modify the judgment to correct the error. Court also modify the judgment to stay sentence on count two.

Appellant, mother of the minors, appeals from the juvenile courts orders denying her reunification services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 360, 361.5, subd. (b), 395; further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Appellant claims reversal is mandated because it was not shown that the experts whose evaluations were the basis for denying services had the requisite qualifications. She also argues there was insufficient evidence that her mental disability was the cause of her inability to benefit from services. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Ronnie Crawford of possessing heroin. He thereafter admitted that he had served three prior prison terms. In parallel proceedings, he had admitted that he had violated his parole and was recommitted to prison for one year; in the present proceedings, the trial court sentenced him to prison rather than grant probation for purposes of treatment, concluding that the incarceration for the violation of parole precluded this option.
On appeal, the defendant contests the courts conclusion on this issue. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike any of the enhancements for his prior prison terms. Court affirm.

A jury returned a verdict in favor of Robert Canfield on his complaint against his landlord, Flora Dooley. On appeal, Canfield contends the trial court erred in denying Canfields request for an award of attorney fees. Court affirm the judgment.

On the day set for trial, defendant Phillip Guillory pleaded no contest to a count of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (with an enhancement for personally inflicting great bodily injury) and admitted recidivist allegations. The total prison term was to be 12 years.
On the date set for imposition of sentence, defense counsel stated that the defendant was interested in withdrawing his plea. Defense counsel had explained there is a narrow legal standard for such a motion, but the defendant wanted the opportunity to consult with another attorney whom he had contacted. The other attorney addressed the court, requesting a continuance of one day to speak with the defendant on the issue. The trial court stated that it would proceed with sentencing; if the defendant were to retain the attorney and, after conferring with the defendant, the attorney wanted to file some motion based on grounds to recall the sentence, it would be willing to entertain the motion. The other attorney noted that there was new evidence in the form of an affidavit from the victim that she had fabricated her account. The court noted there was independent corroborative evidence and it did not find a recanting victim of domestic violence to be highly persuasive. The prosecutor also noted that the parties and the court took the victims inconsistencies into account in discussing the plea. The court then imposed sentence in accord with the negotiated disposition (despite the probation officers recommendation for a longer sentence).
The defendant filed his notice of appeal, but did not obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial court. (Pen. Code, 1237.5.) We denied his request to deem that he had obtained the certificate, or to allow him leave to obtain one belatedly from the trial court.
The defendant contends on appeal that the denial of the continuance request from the defendants prospective attorney was the vehicle resulting in the denial of [his] right to counsel of his choice. Court dismiss the appeal.