CA Unpub Decisions

Generally, as a fundamental rule, when a civil litigant sues for monetary damages, “the amount demanded must be stated.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(2).) A demand for “damages according to proof” is insufficient; such a demand does not provide adequate notice to sustain a default judgment. (§ 585, subds. (a) & (b).)
Here, Bann-Shiang Liza Yu hired Automatic Teller Modules, Inc. (ATMI), a general contractor, to design and build a hotel. After the hotel opened, Yu filed a complaint against ATMI for construction defects, praying for “not less than $10 million dollars” in damages. ATMI filed a cross-complaint against its subcontractors, including Fitch Construction and Fitch Plastering (collectively the Fitch Entities). ATMI’s cross-complaint prayed for “compensatory damages according to proof.”

In Riverside County Department of Child Support Services v. Briscoe (May 5, 2015, G050115) [nonpub. opn.] (Briscoe I) this court concluded two things:
– California did not have personal jurisdiction over Tim Briscoe, a resident of Michigan, until September 11, 2008; thus child support orders entered against him in Riverside Superior Court in 1999 and 2001 were void at least until September 11, 2008.
– A child support order made in Michigan in 1999 was the exclusive operative child support order concerning Briscoe’s son Marion until Briscoe moved to Texas sometime after September 11, 2008. But even though there never was a Texas support order, Michigan relinquished its exclusive jurisdiction in February 2011. That relinquishment allowed California’s support orders to become effective when Briscoe moved to Texas. We did not know exactly when that was.

Following a jury trial, appellant was committed to a state mental hospital as a sexually violent predator (SVP). He contends there is insufficient evidence to support the commitment order, but we disagree and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted appellant Jesus Alejandre Murillo of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)/count 1), sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 16 (§ 261.5, subd. (d)/count 2), and attempted sodomy with a child under the age of 16 (§§ 664 & 286, subd. (b)(2)/count 3). In a separate proceeding, the court found true a serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and allegations that Murillo had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
On July 26, 2017, the trial court sentenced Murillo to an aggregate prison term of 16 years 8 months, a doubled upper term of 16 years on count 1, a consecutive eight-month term on his conviction in count 3, and a stayed term on count 2.

Anthony Angelo Albert Reyes and Rene Molina Vargas (together appellants) were found guilty as charged of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664) and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). As to both Reyes and Vargas, the jury found true the crimes had been committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). As to Reyes, the jury found true various firearm enhancement allegations that he personally used and discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), 12022.7, subd. (a)). And as to Vargas, the jury found true various firearm allegations that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury.

Defendants and appellants, C.G. (mother) and Q.W. (father), appeal the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights over their daughter, E.W. They argue (1) the court erroneously failed to find whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) applied, and (2) the inquiries and ICWA notices of plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), were defective. The parents seek a conditional reversal of the order terminating parental rights and a limited remand for compliance with ICWA. CFS concedes a conditional reversal and limited remand is appropriate. We agree and therefore conditionally reverse with directions.

This consolidated action involves probate petitions, a petition to contest the validity of a trust, and a civil complaint. Appellant, Audella Patterson, brought the trust petition and the civil complaint, both relating to her interest in real property in Brawley, California (the Brawley property). In these pleadings, Audella principally alleges that she held title to the Brawley property as a joint tenant with her deceased brother, David Patterson. Other family members allegedly divested her of this joint tenancy by influencing David to sever the joint tenancy and transfer the Brawley property to his trust. After a bench trial on the trust petition and civil complaint, the court entered a judgment adverse to Audella and in favor of the family members.

A jury found Efren Iniguez Delgadillo guilty of one count of attempted premeditated murder, by personally using a deadly weapon; and one count of assault. As to both counts the jury further found that Delgadillo personally caused great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced Delgadillo to an indeterminate term of seven years to life, and a consecutive determinate term of four years.
Delgadillo contends that the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication with respect to the attempted murder count, as the jury was instructed that voluntary intoxication could be considered in determining whether Delgadillo acted with an intent to kill but did not state that voluntary intoxication could be considered in determining whether Delgadillo acted with premeditation and deliberation. We conclude that the voluntary intoxication was legally incorrect, but that Delgadillo has not established that the error was prejudicial. We accordingly affirm.

A jury convicted Rashawd Jarrael Rahming of sodomy and oral copulation with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a) & (b), counts 1 & 2), and lewd touching of a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a), count 3). The court sentenced Rahming to prison for eight years plus 40 years to life.
Rahming contends his convictions should be reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct occurring in closing argument. Specifically, Rahming contends that the prosecutor (1) improperly told the jury to use evidence of pornography found on Rahming's tablet to show propensity to commit the charged crimes, and (2) referred to facts not in evidence. Because Rahming's trial attorney did not make these objections at trial, and to avoid forfeiture of these issues on appeal, Rahming contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject these contentions, direct the clerk to correct an omission in the abstract of judgment, and affirm the judgment.

The jury convicted Marcus Goodall and Brian Schwickert of offering to sell heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a); count 1); possession of heroin for sale (§ 11351; count 2); transportation of methamphetamine (§ 11379, subd. (a); count 3); and possession of methamphetamine for sale (§ 11378; count 4). Goodall admitted prior convictions under sections 11379 and 11378; one prior conviction under Penal Code section 1203.07, subdivision (a)(11) as well as five prison priors under Penal Code sections 667.5, subdivision (b) and 668. Schwickert admitted that he was previously convicted under section 11351 within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.07, subdivision (a)(3) and section 11370.2, subdivision (a).

A jury found Patrick Woldmskel guilty of three counts of corporal injury to a spouse or roommate resulting in a traumatic condition (Pen. Code , § 273.5, subd. (a); counts 1, 3 & 9); four counts of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); counts 2, 4, 8 & 10); two counts of false imprisonment by means of violence, menace, fraud, or deceit (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a); counts 5 & 11); two counts of attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2); counts 12 & 13); and two misdemeanor counts of violating a protective order. As to counts 1 and 2, the jury found true allegations Woldmskel personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence. Additionally, Woldmskel admitted having a prior prison commitment conviction (§ 667.5), a prior serious felony conviction, and a prior strike conviction. The court sentenced Woldmskel to 29 years in state prison.

Appointed counsel for defendant Renae Dawn Disney asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

On June 19, 2017, defendant Freddie Dean Bigelow pleaded guilty to felon in possession of a firearm and admitted a prior strike. (Pen. Code, §§ 30305, subd. (a), 1170.12.) On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress (§ 1538.5) and notes an error in the court’s oral pronouncement of custody credit. We modify the judgment and otherwise affirm.

The underlying case involves a shooting with four victims. Noe Hernandez (appellant) was convicted on one count of murder and three counts of attempted murder. On each count, he was sentenced to 15 years to life and received a firearm enhancement of 25 years to life pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Alternative 10-year and 20-year enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c) were stayed. We affirmed appellant’s convictions in People v. Hernandez (June 13, 2017, B262261) [nonpub. opn.] (Hernandez I) but remanded for resentencing for the trial court to specify whether the sentences were concurrent or consecutive. After a new sentencing hearing, the trial court specified that the sentences were consecutive. (Hernandez I, supra, B262261; People v. Hernandez (May 29, 2018, B285819) [nonpub. opn.] (Hernandez II).)