CA Unpub Decisions

Hernandez’s deceased mother, Dora Rodriguez, was a patient of Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. (Crestwood), operator of a nursing home in Vallejo, California. Among other things, Hernandez alleged that Crestwood violated the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Elder Abuse Act), Welfare & Institutions Code section 15600 et seq., by knowingly withholding from Rodriguez the one-to-one monitoring she needed to stay safe as a high fall risk, which resulted in Rodriguez falling and sustaining a head injury that led to her death. Hernandez appeals from the trial court’s order granting Crestwood’s motion for summary adjudication regarding this part of Hernandez’s elder abuse claim.

Defendant Wilson Lor appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of rape in concert (Pen. Code, § 264.1), with the circumstance that the victim was kidnapped in the commission of the offense (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(5)). He contends he is entitled to a transfer hearing on his suitability for disposition under the juvenile law, that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court failed to instruct the jury correctly on the section 667.61 circumstance.

This appeal arises out of the dismissal of an unlawful detainer action involving certain real property located in San Mateo County (the Property). Marshall Edward: Mikels aka Marshall E. Mikels (Mikels or appellant) acquired title to the Property in 1977. In August 2010, however, title to the Property was transferred to U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee on behalf of the holders of the Adjustable Rate Mortgage Trust 2007-3 Adjustable Rate Mortgage Backed Pass Through Certificates, Series 2007-3 (U.S. Bank), under a trustee’s deed upon sale after Mikels appears to have defaulted on a mortgage loan secured by the Property. Three years later, on April 24, 2013, Hui Ping Shi (Shi or respondent) acquired sole ownership of the Property from U.S. Bank under a duly recorded corporation grant deed. According to Shi, she purchased the Property as a rental unit and spent the next three years renovating it before tenants began residing there in April 2016.

When Marcellous Lewis was between 15 and 17 years of age, he committed three forcible sex offenses, against two different victims (Crystal Doe and Sabrina Doe), and shot and killed a third victim (Robert Tibbs). Lewis was tried as an adult and convicted by a jury of the forcible sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)) and forcible rape of Crystal (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), the forcible rape of Sabrina (ibid.), and the second degree murder of Tibbs (§ 187, subd. (a)). In addition, the jury found true an enhancement for personal use of a gun with respect to the murder charge (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), as well as “One Strike” allegations that Lewis’s sex offenses involved multiple victims and kidnapping (former § 667.61, subds. (d)(2), (e)(5).) In 2011, the trial court sentenced Lewis to an aggregate sentence of 115 years to life.

Philip Ken Trujillo was driving a tractor-trailer rig with a noisy air leak that disabled the low gears of his transmission. He made a slow turn in front of oncoming traffic on a highway; he did not wait for cars to pass because stopping posed a risk that he would be unable to get the truck moving again. As he made his turn across traffic, his trailer was struck by an approaching minivan. The roof of the minivan was sheared off as it went under the trailer; all four occupants were killed. Appellant was convicted by jury of four counts of gross vehicular manslaughter and sentenced to six years in prison. (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1).)

R.R. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining a wardship petition after the court found true the allegation that appellant had committed the offense of possession of a firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602). The court declared appellant a ward, placed him in the Camp Community Placement Program for a term of five to seven months, and further declared that appellant could be held in physical confinement for up to three years.
Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm found in his possession. He contends that his detention for jaywalking (Veh. Code, § 21955) and his ensuing patdown search were both invalid under the Fourth Amendment. We agree that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of establishing the lawfulness of appellant’s initial detention and accordingly reverse.

C.H. (Mother) petitions this court for extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order setting a selection-and-implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for her three children. Mother claims insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that she received reasonable reunification services. In this memorandum opinion, we deny the petition.

Indugo Asifa Williams appeals from an order revoking, reinstating, and modifying his parole by ordering him to serve 240 days in county jail based on two parole revocation petitions. Appellant and respondent agree that the order must be reversed as to the second petition. To that extent, we will reverse the order.

The juvenile court found that 17-year-old E.R. committed one count of felony assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and one count of misdemeanor battery on a school employee (Pen. Code, §§ 242/243.6). The court adjudged E.R. a ward of the court, found his welfare required his removal from the custody of his parents pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (a)(3), and ordered he be committed to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (OAYRF) for nine months. E.R. now challenges the dispositional order removing him from his parents’ custody and placing him at OAYRF. We affirm.

William Davaughn Jack was convicted by a jury of pandering (Pen. Code, § 266i, subd. (a)(1); count one) and pimping (id., § 266h, subd. (a); count two). On appeal, Jack contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing an expert witness to testify to the ultimate issue of fact; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in permitting an investigating officer to offer expert testimony without being qualified as an expert; and (3) his pimping conviction is unsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Defendant Northrop Grumman Corporation (Northrop) appeals after a judgment of $117,050 in damages, $1,344,823.80 in attorney fees, and $258,390 in costs in favor of plaintiff Hot Rods, LLC (Hot Rods). Northrop argues that a referee incorrectly determined Hot Rods was the prevailing party, and that even if it was, the attorney fees award is excessive and an abuse of discretion. We conclude that both the prevailing party determination and the amount of fees awarded were within the referee’s discretion and therefore affirm.

In 2004, Kareem Salessi filed the underlying complaint against 19 defendants, including respondent Farrokh Peimani, arising out of the purchase of a home in Laguna Niguel. Most of the defendants prevailed on demurrers or judgments on the pleadings. We affirmed several of those orders in a prior opinion filed in 2008. (Salessi v. Shadab (Sep. 30, 2008, G038002) [nonpub. opn.].) We described the complaint as “a desultory document to say the least,” noting it was overrun with conclusions and arguments and descended into a labyrinth of nonsensical conspiracy theories, highlighted by a claim that the White House ordered the attacks of September 11, 2001.
This case was resurrected when defendant Farrokh Peimani, who did not previously appear, successfully moved to vacate a default judgment, and subsequently obtained an order of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer. Salessi appealed from the order granting the motion to set aside the defaults, the judgment of dismissa

Appointed counsel for appellant D.H. asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) D.H. was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from D.H. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to D.H., we affirm.

Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support his robbery conviction. We conclude his conviction was supported by substantial evidence and affirm.

A jury convicted appellant of the following offenses: second degree robbery, with the additional allegation another principal armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 211; 12022, subd. (a)(1)), possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)); and possession of a stun gun by a convicted felon (§ 22610, subd. (a)).