CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff sued her former employer Gerald Chamales Corporation, formerly doing business as Rhinotek Licensing, LLP (Rhinotek), claiming that she suffered discrimination and sexual harassment by her supervisor, Scott Stanfield. Following a jury trial, she was awarded $15,000 in damages and $22,836.29 in attorney fees and costs. She appeals, contending that the trial court erred by denying her motion to limit evidence of other sexual conduct, granting Rhinoteks motion for nonsuit on the punitive damages claim, and failing to award appropriate attorney fees and costs. Rhinotek filed a cross appeal, contending that the verdict cannot be upheld as a matter of law. It also contends that the appeal should be dismissed for plaintiffs failure to include in her brief citations to the record as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant appeals from his conviction of misdemeanor child annoyance pursuant to Penal Code section 647.6, subdivision (a). He contends that the trial court erred when it found him competent to stand trial. Court disagree and affirm.

Highland Construction, the low bidder on three public works contracts, was not awarded the contracts because the agency found Highland was not a responsible bidder. Highland challenged the non responsible bidder determination by a petition for a writ of mandate and lost, then by an unsuccessful motion for a new trial. Highland appeals. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of theft with a prior theft related conviction and his admission that he had suffered a prior conviction under the Three Strikes law. He contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by conceding guilt in closing argument, the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on mistake of fact and claim of right, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an upper term sentence, and the upper term violated Cunningham v. California (2007) U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856]. Court conclude there is merit in defendants claim of instructional error and reverse on that basis without reaching defendants other issues.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of felony battery on a police officer (Pen. Code, 243, subd. (c)(2)), felony resisting an executive officer ( 69), and two counts of misdemeanor loitering or prowling ( 647, subd. (h)). The court subsequently found that Reilly had suffered a prior conviction, as contemplated by section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court sentenced him to three years in state prison, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed him on probation. Reilly was also ordered to pay restitution, fines, and fees. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that Reillys attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant appeals from the denial of a suppression motion. In a five count information, appellant was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance within the meaning of Health and Safety Code, section 11377, subdivision (a) (count 1). The remaining 4 counts were charged as misdemeanors: driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a) count 2); driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher (Veh. Code 23152, subd. (b) count 3); being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11550, subd. (a) count 4); and possession of marijuana while driving. (Veh. Code, 23222, subd. (b) count 5.)
Appellant pleaded not guilty to all counts and filed a motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5), which was denied. She subsequently withdrew her plea and entered a guilty plea as to counts 1 and 2 and the remaining counts were dismissed. Appellant renewed her suppression motion, which was again denied. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, and placed appellant on probation for 36 months, which included 30 days in county jail as a condition of probation. Court conclude the suppression motion was properly denied, and affirm.

Defendant appeals a judgment after jury trial, following his conviction of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, 422),corporal injury to a child's parent ( 273.5, subd. (a)), forcible oral copulation ( 288a, subd. (c)(2)), sexual battery by restraint ( 243.4, subd. (a)), and forcible rape ( 261, subd. (a)(2)). The court imposed an aggregate state prison term of 24 years and 8 months, which included an upper term sentence of 8 years for the forcible oral copulation count, and the upper term of 8 years for the forcible rape count. The court ruled that those sentences run consecutively.
Court conclude the trial court did not err by imposing consecutive sentences for Garcia's convictions of forcible oral copulation and forcible rape, but it exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing the upper term for the rape conviction by relying on sentencing factors which were not tried by a jury. Court vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, but otherwise affirm.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following revocation of probation previously granted after his plea of no contest to residential burglary and misdemeanor battery. (Pen. Code, 459, 243, subd. (e)(1).) Appellant was placed on five years probation in 2003, and ordered to stay away from the victim, Consuelo Montes.
On April 5, 2006, following a contested hearing, the court found that appellant had violated probation by failing to stay away from Montes. The court sentenced appellant to a four-year middle term for burglary, with a concurrent one-year term for misdemeanor battery.

Defendant appeals from a judgment entered following his no contest plea to aggravated battery by gassing (e.g., throwing bodily fluids) upon a peace officer and employee while confined in a state prison (Pen. Code, 4501.1, subd. (a)). Pursuant to the negotiated plea, he was sentenced to prison for the low term of two years concurrent to the prison sentence he was already serving. He was granted a certificate of probable cause. The judgment is affirmed.

In a prior action, Al Moshiri sued Albert Aimers and iLive, Inc., the corporation Aimers chaired. A default judgment was entered against Aimers as a terminating sanction. He moved to vacate the judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud or mistake. The superior court denied the motion. Aimers appealed. In an unpublished opinion, Court affirmed, rejecting Aimerss argument that the motion should have been granted (Moshiri v. Aimers (Dec. 23, 2005, B182836)). Court conclude that the demurrer should have been overruled and therefore reverse. The denial of the prior motion to vacate the default judgment did not preclude an independent action in equity seeking the same relief. Where, as here, extrinsic fraud or mistake is asserted, a motion is not an adequate means of resolving the contentions of the former defendant, and a subsequent action is permitted so that discovery may be taken and oral testimony presented on the issue.

Appellant challenges his possession of cocaine base and marijuana convictions on the ground the trial court erred by denying his suppression motion. Court conclude the search of appellants pockets was incident to a lawful arrest, and the trial court properly denied the motion.

This is a dog bite case in which the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered after a court trial convicting him of one felony count of driving under the influence (DUI) with prior DUI convictions (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a); 23550) and one felony count of DUI with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or more with prior DUI convictions (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (b), 23550).
Imposition of sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on formal probation including 270 days to be served in county jail with credit for three days served. The court also imposed a number of fees, fines and penalties. The judgment is affirmed.

An information charged Simpson with one count of grand theft by embezzlement. ( 487, subd. (a).) A jury trial followed. Debra Stephenson, the owner of TWC Educational Programs, Inc., testified that she had employed Simpson as an office manager. Stephenson identified 10 business checks written between November 24, 2004, and December 28, 2004, exceeding $400, that had been cashed without her authorization. In defense, Simpson testified that Stephenson's husband, Jonathan Schrieber, gave him the checks to process and obtain cash for on his behalf. In rebuttal, Schrieber testified and denied giving Simpson the checks to cash. Schrieber stated that he did not have the authority to sign or stamp checks on Stephenson's behalf.
Court have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that Simpson's attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issue exists. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)