CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Carl Louis Johnson appeals from an order of the Sacramento County Superior Court recommitting him for an additional two years to the Department of Mental Health as a sexually violent predator (SVP).
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court prejudicially erred when it refused to permit him to cross-examine an expert witness for the People on the witnesss prior conviction for grand theft, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the jurys finding that he remained a danger to others in that he was likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. Court reject both contentions.

Plaintiffs Michael Neeley (Neeley) and Rayla Neeley (collectively plaintiffs) appeal from the judgment in favor of defendants Carl Martin (Martin), Glenn Martin (Glenn), and Sierra Outdoor Resorts, Inc. (SORI) on their complaint, inter alia, for constructive and promissory fraud and wrongful discharge.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by failing to consider defendants fiduciary obligations to minority shareholders. Court find no error and affirm the judgment.

The minors, Marie H. and Madison S., appeal from orders of the juvenile court denying termination of the guardianship, reinstating the dependency and expanding visitation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.3, 366.4, 395.) Appellants contend the juvenile court erred in reinstating the dependency while maintaining the guardianship and abused its discretion in ordering expanded visitation. Agreeing with the first contention, we reverse the orders denying the petition to terminate the guardianship and reinstating the dependency and affirm the visitation order.

jury convicted Andres Reyes of second degree murder and found true the allegation that he intentionally and personally discharged a semiautomatic handgun that caused the death of Daniela Lopez. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), count one; 12022.53, subds. (b) & (d), enhancement.) The trial court sentenced him to 40 years in prison as follows: 15 years to life for count one, and a consecutive term of 25 years for the 12022.53, subd. (d) enhancement.
Reyes contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial; the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct; and, alternatively, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Court affirm.

jury found defendant Gerald D. Sanner guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 1, Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)); and hit and run involving injury (count 2, Veh. Code, 20001, subd. (a), (b)(1)). As to count 1, the jury found true an allegation that Sanner personally used a deadly weapon within the meaning of Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23). The trial court granted Sanner probation on the condition he serve 180 days in jail, stayed for one year.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred by not instructing the jury sua sponte on the defense of mistake of fact, as substantial evidence shows Sanner mistakenly believed he needed to strike the victim with his SUV and to leave the scene immediately to protect himself from being harmed by the victim and his brother-in-law. Sanner contends the court's instructions on self-defense were inadequate because the right of self-defense is limited to the use of reasonable force, and the mistake of fact defense would allow the use of excessive force. Court affirm the judgment.

Beatriz M. appeals an order of the juvenile court denying her petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. Beatriz contends the court abused its discretion by denying her request to have her minor son, Christian M., returned to her custody. Court affirm the order.

Defendant was charged with robbery (Pen. Code, 211, count 1) and taking personal property exceeding a value of $400 ( 487, subd. (a), count 2). He entered a plea bargain and agreed to plead guilty to robbery in exchange for dismissal of the other count. Under the agreement, the maximum possible custody commitment was five years. The court granted defendant probation for a period of five years under certain conditions, including that he serve one year in county jail. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse ( 273.5, subd. (a)), pursuant to another plea agreement. He also admitted violating his probation in the robbery case. The court revoked defendants probation and sentenced him to six years in the robbery case, plus one year in the corporal injury case.
On appeal, defendant contends that: 1) the trial court violated the plea agreement by sentencing him to six years on the robbery case; 2) the trial court failed to timely declare the degree of the robbery, and it should thus be declared second degree robbery. The People concede, and Court agree, that the court should not have sentenced defendant to more than five years on the robbery charge, that the robbery charge should be declared second degree robbery, and that the matter should be remanded for resentencing.

Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, Brian J., contending the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the benefit exception codified in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). Court disagree and affirm.

Objector and appellant Veronica P. (mother) is the natural mother of Jason P. (the child). Mother appeals after the juvenile court terminated her parental rights to the child. Mother contends the termination order must be reversed because she did not receive notice of the termination hearing. Court affirm.

In this petition for writ relief, S.W. (mother) asks us to vacate the juvenile courts order terminating reunification services and setting a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for her daughter, B.R. She asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of substantial detriment if B.R. were returned to her custody. Court disagree and, accordingly, Court deny the petition.

Appellant, Big Sandy Band of Western Mono Indians, a federally recognized Indian tribe (Tribe), challenges the judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of respondent, Michael Troilo. The Tribe contends the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the employment agreement entered into by Troilo and the Tribe when he awarded $478,000 plus interest in damages to Troilo for wrongful termination. According to the Tribe, the employment agreement limited Troilo to $75,000 in severance pay. The Tribe argues that the arbitrator further exceeded his authority by disregarding the agreements sovereign immunity waiver and definitions of good cause.
As discussed below, the arbitrator did not disregard or modify a plain and unambiguous provision of the agreement when he awarded damages. The employment agreement was silent as to remedies for a wrongful termination. Contrary to the Tribes position, the severance pay was not equivalent to liquidated damages. Rather, it was earned compensation. The arbitrator also considered and applied the agreements sovereign immunity waiver and good cause definitions. Since the arbitrator did not exceed his authority, his interpretation of the contract must be sustained.

On September 3, 2002, in case No. 02CM2644 appellant, David Borges Deniz, pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine (Count 1/Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)) and admitted an on-bail enhancement (Pen. Code, 12022.1). In case No. 02CM2642, Deniz pled guilty to transportation of methamphetamine for personal use (Health & Saf. Code, 11379). On October 2, 2002, the court placed Deniz on Proposition 36 probation. Following a contested hearing, on June 8, 2005, the court found that Deniz violated his probation in both cases by possessing methamphetamine for sale on February 1, 2005.
On July 7, 2005, the court sentenced Deniz to an aggregate term of six years eight months. On appeal, Deniz contends 1) the court committed Blakely[1]error; and 2) the evidence is insufficient to support the courts true findings with respect to the convictions underlying the two aggravating circumstances the court found true. Court affirm.

Defendant stands convicted of a violent sexual assault for which he received a sentence of 15 years to life. We affirm that conviction, rejecting defendants several claims of prejudicial error, including his claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected defendants bid to deny or explain prior offenses the prosecution planned to use to impeach his credibility. Any mistake the court made in this regard was harmless because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.
With respect to an additional conviction for failing to register as a sex offender, Court agree with defendants claim of prejudicial jury instruction error. Court reverse that conviction.

San Diego resident Elgin R. Parker and his wife, Eleanor Flo Parker, owned several thousand shares of Home Interstate Bancorp (Home Bank), a corporation they cofounded. On September 23, 1983, the Parkers created the Funded Intervivos Trust of the Parker Family (trust agreement or Parker Family Trust). In doing so, they transferred 12 numbered certificates representing 49,612 shares of Home Bank into their trust. As cotrustees of the trust, the Parkers had discretion to buy and sell assets during their joint lifetimes. The trust agreement also provided that the surviving trustor would have similar discretion to buy and sell assets during his or her lifetime.
[T]he gift of the Home Bank Stock as provided in [Trust Agreement] Section 4.03(b) was not adeemed and ... the assets on hand in the Elgin Parker Residual Trust C [shall] be transferred and administered by [appellant trustee] as trustee of a separate trust to be known as the Home Bank Trust, with the trustee to continue to distribute all income and/or interest and/or dividends generated from the traceable cash proceeds generated from the prior sale of the Home Bank Stock to the remaining surviving children of the [Trustors] in equal shares, and upon the death of the last surviving child of the [Trustors], the Home Bank Trust assets are to be distributed, in kind, in equal shares, share and share alike, among the grandchildren of the [Trustors] ....
Court have rejected appellants contention in issue I above and no further discussion is required.