CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Willem Van Der Horst (Wim), respondent below, appeals from post judgment orders issued in marriage dissolution proceedings initiated by respondent Florence Lovie Van Der Horst (Lovie). Court affirm the courts post judgment orders.

A city adopted an amendment to its mobile home rent control ordinance that modified the formula used in establishing automatic, inflation-indexed annual rent increases. A mobile home park owner did not comply with the new formula, and the tenants objected. At a rent review hearing, the owner claimed that the amendment was invalid because the city published a summary of the amendment when it was statutorily required to publish the entire text upon the laws enactment. Alternatively, the owner claimed that the raise in rent beyond the inflation-indexed amount was justified under the terms of the rent control law, which allows additional rent increases if reasonable under the circumstances. The hearing officer found the amendment valid and rejected the owners claim that the circumstances warranted a rent increase beyond the inflation indexed amount. The superior court found that the record supported the hearing officers conclusions and entered a judgment denying the owners petition for a writ of administrative mandate. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant appeals from a final judgment disposing of all issues between the parties arising out of the three separate superior court cases referenced above. Appellants counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has declared that appellant has been notified that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Appellant was also advised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this courts attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally. Upon Court's independent review of the record we conclude there are no meritorious issues to be argued, or that require further briefing on appeal.

This case stems from a petition filed by the San Mateo County Public Guardian (San Mateo County) in which it sought to compel the appointment of the Alameda County Public Guardian (Alameda County) as the conservator of the person and estate of Raeven Auhkbar. Concluding that San Mateo County had not carried its burden of proving that Mr. Auhkbar was domiciled in Alameda County, the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, San Mateo County contends that in doing so, the trial court failed to apply the proper legal standard and abused its discretion in relying on Mr. Auhkbars testimony, which it deems not credible because it was confused, unintelligible and non-responsive.
Court conclude that the trial courts determination concerning Mr. Auhkbars place of domicile was supported by substantial evidence, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Having previously obtained the reversal of his conviction of first degree murder for the killing of Maria Montero, defendant Jorge Antonio Pantoja now appeals after the trial court found him guilty of second degree murder. He challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Court find that the evidence was sufficient and affirm the judgment.

Jennifer M. appeals from orders terminating her parental rights with respect to her daughters, Kira M. and Morgan M. Jennifer contends the juvenile court failed to secure compliance with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA), and she argues this court should grant an unqualified remand permitting the juvenile court to reconsider its orders terminating Jennifers parental rights.
Court dismiss the appeal from the order terminating parental rights as to Kira because Jennifer did not timely file her notice of appeal in that case. With regard to Morgan, Court agree the requirements of ICWA were not satisfied but Court do not agree that Jennifer is entitled to an unqualified remand. Court reverse and remand for the limited purpose of securing compliance with ICWA.

Plaintiff and appellant, Edward Camp, sued defendant and respondent Sandra Bear for wrongful eviction after Bear terminated Camps tenancy in order to move back into the San Francisco apartment she had rented to him. Concluding that Camps complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Bear. Court agree and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Sandra L. (mother) appeals from an order declaring her minor son, Dominic C., a dependent child of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). She contends the juvenile court erred in (1) finding clear and convincing evidence that Dominics removal was necessary because remaining in the home would subject him to a substantial risk of danger and (2) ordering compliance with an unreasonable reunification plan. Court affirm.

Appellant pled no contest to one count of willfully and intentionally using the contractors license of another, with intent to defraud, under Business & Professions Code section 7027.3. In sentencing appellant, the trial court imposed a court security fee of $20 under Penal Code section 1465.8. On appeal, appellant contends that the imposition of the court security fee violated constitutional prohibitions against retroactive and ex post facto application of statutes. Court modify the lower courts judgment to strike the court security fee under section 1465.8 and, as so modified, affirm.

Defendant pleaded guilty to vandalizing his wifes car after a domestic dispute. He was placed on probation, with conditions requiring alcohol abstinence and counseling. After defendant failed repeatedly to comply with the conditions of his probation, the trial court revoked probation and sentenced him to the middle term of two years. Defendant challenges the trial courts revocation of probation and imposition of the middle term. He also argues that a $20 court security fee was unlawfully imposed. Court affirm.

Counsel for appellant Michael Shawn Schinaman (appellant) has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised, and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has declared that appellant has been notified that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Appellant was also advised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this courts attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally.
Upon Court's independent review of the record we conclude there are no meritorious issues to be argued, or that require further briefing on appeal.

This appeal has been taken from an order in a juvenile dependency proceeding that terminated the dependency, granted sole legal and physical custody of the minor to the mother, denied the father telephone contact with the minor, but granted an exchange of mailing addresses to facilitate written communication with the minor. The father claims that he should have also been granted telephone visitation with the minor. Court conclude that the visitation order was not an abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, appellant George Branch pled guilty on June 27, 2006, to possessing cocaine for sale (Health and Saf. Code, 11351), with the remaining counts and special allegations dismissed. On August 22, 2006, appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea claiming that he did not understand what he was doing because he was taking medication for migraine headaches at the time of plea. Hearing was held on the motion, at the conclusion of which the motion was denied. Appellant was then sentenced to the agreed upon low term of two years in state prison.
There was, as well, no sentencing error as appellant received the agreed upon sentence.

A new schedule for rating permanent disabilities under the workers compensation law went into effect on January 1, 2005, replacing the schedule that had been in place since 1997. Labor Code section 4660, subdivision (d), provides that the 2005 schedule applies to injuries predating its effective date when there has been no report by a treating physician indicating the existence of a permanent disability before January 1, 2005. Here we conclude that a report describing an applicants injury and treatment does not indicat[e] the existence of a permanent disability when no medical opinion was given that the injury would result in permanent disability.