CA Unpub Decisions

Elizabeth Q., mother of Kayla C., seeks writ review of the juvenile court order dated December 11, 2006, terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing for April 2, 2007. She contends the juvenile court failed to offer reasonable reunification services and that it erred in not extending those services up to and beyond 18 months. We conclude that the reunification services were reasonable and that the court did not err in terminating those services.
Court review Elizabeths contention that the court failed to offer adequate reunification services for substantial evidence.
The petition for extraordinary relief is denied on the merits. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, 14; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894.) Since the permanency planning hearing is set for April 2, 2007, our decision is immediately final as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(2)(A).)

A modification decision.

Attorney Wayne Hagendorf (Hagendorf) sued Dean Zanetos (Zanetos) for unpaid attorney fees. The trial court awarded Hagendorf $36,130, and thereafter awarded Hagendorf $77,414.96 in attorney fees and costs. Zanetos appealed from the judgment entered against him and Hagendorf filed a protective cross-appeal. Court affirm the judgment and pursuant to Hagendorfs request, dismiss the cross appeal.

The sole issue on appeal is whether Civil Code section 2527 violates the right to free speech of prescription drug claims processors. Court follow ARP Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1307 (ARP), which held that the statutes reporting requirement violates Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution. Court affirm the trial courts entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of respondent, an alleged prescription drug claims processor.

Carlos Alvarez appeals from judgment entered following a court trial in which he was convicted of eight counts of committing lewd acts with a child under the age of 14, counts 5 through 12 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a)), two counts of forcible rape, counts 17 and 18 (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2)), and six counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, counts 32 through 37 (Pen. Code, 261.5, subd. (c)). He was sentenced to prison for 31 years and four months and contends his conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor in count 32 must be reversed because prosecution of this count was time barred. Respondent agrees. For reasons stated in the opinion, Court reverse the conviction in count 32 and in all other respects affirm the judgment.

Dexter Eric Williams appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on count 1 second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187) and count 2 - shooting from a motor vehicle (Pen. Code, 12034, subd. (c)) with, as to each offense, personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (b)), personal and intentional discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (c)), and personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (d)), with court findings that he suffered a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (d)), a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code 667, subd. (a)), and a prior felony conviction for which he served a separate prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced him to prison for an unstayed term of 60 years to life.
The judgment is modified to reflect that punishment on the Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancement pertaining to count 2 is imposed, but execution thereof is stayed pending completion of appellants sentence on his conviction for second degree murder (count 1), such stay then to become permanent, and, as modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to forward to the Department of Corrections an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the above modification.

Court hold that the reporting requirement in Civil Code section 2527 violates Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution. Court therefore affirm the trial courts entry of judgment of dismissal.

Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment granted to defendant The Regents of the University of California (defendant). Plaintiff is a former employee of defendant at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA or the university), where he worked in the student accounting office as an accounting assistant. He began working there in January 1992 and his employment ended in June 2000 when he was fired. Thereafter, he filed a complaint with Californias Department of Fair Employment and Housing to challenge his firing, obtained a right to sue letter, and filed this suit.
Defendants asserted grounds for firing plaintiff were that he could not accept supervision and office rules, and could not be trusted. Plaintiff claims the termination was based on his request for medical leave, his asserted disability, and his race (he is of African American descent), and thus he contends the termination violates the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code, 12900 et seq.) Court find plaintiff has not presented cause for reversing the summary judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Edward James Marshall (Marshall) appeals judgments following grants of summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Playa L&M Enterprises (Playa), Decron Properties Corporation (Decron), Furama Hotel LA (Furama) (collectively, the hotel defendants) and Excellence Security Service, Inc. (Excellence) (collectively, defendants).
In this action against property owners and a security company for negligence based on their alleged failure to provide adequate security measures, the essential issue presented is whether a triable issue exists as to causation.
Court conclude Marshall failed to present substantial evidence of a causal link between his injury and defendants failure to provide greater security. The opinion of Marshalls security expert that hourly security patrols probably would have prevented the attack rested on speculation and was insufficient to raise a triable issue as to causation. Therefore, the judgments are affirmed.

In her action for damages for personal injuries she sustained while providing occupational therapy during the clinical portion of her post graduate course, plaintiff Jennifer Marshall appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant, the University of Southern California (USC). Plaintiffs duties as an occupational therapist included helping young, active children climb, swing, and glide on gym equipment. Plaintiffs training at USC in sensory integration therapy enabled her to perform these activities. Inherent in her profession was the risk that a child would jump or fall from such equipment and injure someone. We conclude, as a matter of law, that plaintiff assumed the risk of her injuries by participating in the clinical portion of her occupational therapy course, and no triable issue of material fact exists that USC did not increase the risk of harm to plaintiff. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

A grant deed purported to convey title to residential property to a married couple and one of their sons in joint tenancy. After the death of the father, the son brought an action to partition the property and the mother cross-complained, seeking to establish her sole ownership of the property. Court affirm the trial courts judgment reforming the deed to show the mother as sole owner.

Plaintiff and respondent Hee Ok Song (Mrs. Song) sued defendant Kevin H. Song (Mr. Song) and defendant and appellant Dr. Tay Seun Kim (Dr. Kim) for conversion and conspiracy to commit conversion. Mrs. Song alleged that Dr. Kim conspired with her former husband, Mr. Song, to convert money from a business in which Mrs. Song had invested and owned with Mr. Song in exchange for a 51 percent share of the profits. Mrs. Song alleged that Dr. Kim helped Mr. Song transfer money from the business account to Mr. Song for his personal use, and that she never received her share of profits from the business. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Mrs. Song for $450,000 against Dr. Kim and Mr. Song jointly and severally. Dr. Kim appeals from this judgment. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the judgment. Court further find that Dr. Kim has not shown that an earlier judgment in Mr. and Mrs. Songs marital dissolution collaterally estops this judgment against him. Court affirm the judgment.

Under federal and state regulations, a disabled person is eligible for vocational rehabilitation services if the individuals disability results in a substantial impediment to employment and vocational rehabilitation services are necessary to secure or retain employment. Seyed Torabzadeh is a quadriplegic. Nearly twenty years ago, he was granted vocational rehabilitation services that included modifications to a van (including a hand-control system and wheelchair lift) which enabled him to drive. He obtained employment and has thrived at work, in part because of his ability to independently drive. Now, his van needs to be replaced. In particular, the wheelchair lift mechanism in his van is no longer manufactured and replacement parts are no longer available. Torabzadeh sought financial assistance with obtaining a new modified van as a vocational rehabilitation service. The California Department of Rehabilitation (the Department) denied him rehabilitation services on the basis that any substantial impediment to employment suffered by Torabzadeh was caused by the fact that his van was breaking down, not by his disability. Torabzadeh sought writ relief, which the trial court granted on the basis that the Departments interpretation of controlling regulations was too narrow. Court modify the judgment and affirm.

Fremont Indemnity Company (Indemnity) appeals a judgment dismissing its complaint against Fremont General Corporation (Fremont General) and Fremont Compensation Insurance Group, Inc. (Insurance Group), after the court sustained demurrers without leave to amend. Indemnity, by and through the Insurance Commissioner as its liquidator, sued Fremont General and Insurance Group in two separate actions alleging the misappropriation of funds. In this action, known as the NOL action, Indemnity alleges that the defendants misappropriated its net operating losses. In a separate action known as the Comstock action, Indemnity alleges that the same defendants misappropriated net operating losses of its predecessor in interest, Comstock Insurance Company (Comstock), and misappropriated other assets of a former subsidiary of Indemnity, Fremont Reinsurance Company, Ltd. (Bermuda). The Comstock action is the subject of a separate appeal.
The judgment is reversed with directions to the superior court to (1) vacate its order sustaining the demurrer to eleven counts alleged in the first amended complaint without leave to amend, and enter a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend as to counts eight and nine only and overruling the demurrer as to counts one through six and ten through twelve; and (2) vacate its order sustaining the demurrer to each count alleged in the third amended complaint without leave to amend, and enter a
new order overruling the demurrer in its entirety. Indemnity is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.