CA Unpub Decisions

Minor A. I. appeals from an order declaring wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) and ordering out-of-home placement for a maximum of 14 years 8 months, after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging appellant committed an assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(2)) (count 1), enhanced by use of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.5, subd. (a)), and possessed a concealable firearm as a minor (Pen. Code, 12101, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2). Appellant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his counsels failure to attempt to introduce one witnesss statement for its truth as a spontaneous utterance and failure to impeach another witness with a prior statement. Appellant also contends the case should be remanded due to the juvenile courts failure to declare his offense a felony or misdemeanor. Court reject appellants ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but remand for the juvenile court to state orally whether the offense in count 2 was a felony or misdemeanor.

After defendant breached a settlement agreement with plaintiff, International Marine Fuels Group (IMFG) (dba San Francisco Petroleum Co.), the trial court entered a judgment against Jin and Jins attorney, James Kim. Court reverse the part of the judgment entered against Kim because he is not a party to this action.

A consumer class action complaint alleged false advertising by pharmaceutical companies in the marketing of a cold sore medication. The class representatives and pharmaceutical companies reached a settlement, and the trial court approved the settlement over the objections of an individual class member. The settlement commits $1 million to independent cold sore research and distributes consumer vouchers for product discounts and rebates. The objector contends that the trial court (1) erred in certifying a nationwide plaintiff class when California lacks significant contacts with class claims; and (2) abused its discretion in approving a settlement that is inadequate to remediate the harm suffered by the class. Court reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.

Petitioner William P., Sr., the father of minors William P., Jr., and Christen P., seeks extraordinary writ review pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 to vacate the order of respondent juvenile court setting a hearing to terminate his parental rights in accordance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. At the hearing when it set the termination hearing, the court declined to order that real party in interest Humboldt County Department of Human Services (Department) continue to provide petitioner with additional reunification services. The sole contention made by petitioner is that this determination amounted to an abuse of discretion because it is not supported by substantial evidence. Court find this contention to be without merit, and deny the petition on its merits.

A modification decision.

In this eminent domain proceeding, following trial, a jury awarded defendant and appellant San Miguel Meat Distributors, Inc. (San Miguel), damages in the amount of $333,000 against plaintiff and respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (the District), to compensate San Miguel for loss of goodwill for the Districts taking of property which San Miguel leased for its chicken processing business. San Miguel relocated its business to a new location. In a second trial, the trial court determined that the taking caused San Miguels relocation and loss of goodwill.
The trial court then granted the Districts post trial motions, vacating the jurys award of damages for alleged loss of goodwill. Specifically, the trial court granted the Districts motion to set aside the judgment. The trial court found that the taking did not cause San Miguels alleged loss of goodwill, concluding that San Miguel moved its business location prior to the taking.
Court reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of San Miguel consistent with this opinion. San Miguel presented substantial evidence showing that the taking caused the alleged loss in goodwill. In addition, the trial court erred by striking the testimony of Pedersen, San Miguels expert on goodwill valuation. Pedersens methodology was reasonable. Contrary to the trial courts finding, Pedersen relied upon San Miguels financial information to compare the actual pre-taking goodwill with the actual post-taking goodwill. Finally, as to the lost improvements, the parties stipulated that the only issue left for the court was whether San Miguel was entitled to the amount of $6,205 for moveable equipment left at the Atlantic property. Thus, the trial court erred by reducing the award for lost improvements beyond $6,205.

This is an insurance coverage dispute concerning an insurers duty to defend a lawsuit by one insured (the former employee of an insured entity) against other insured entities, including the former employer. The liability insurance policy at issue excludes coverage for lawsuits between insureds, but excepts from the exclusion retaliatory treatment against an employee . . . on account of such employees exercise or attempted exercise of his or her rights under law. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurer, defendant and respondent Executive Risk Indemnity, Inc. (defendant), after concluding that the policy exclusion for lawsuits between insureds barred coverage of the underlying action, and that plaintiffs failed to present a triable issue of material fact as to whether the underlying lawsuit was potentially covered under the policy exception for retaliatory treatment against an employee.
In this appeal, the insureds, plaintiffs and appellants Richbell, LLC (Richbell) Richbell III, LLC (Richbell III), the Greenwich Group International, LLC (Greenwich), Greenwich Brokerage Services, Inc., and Simon Mild (Mild) (collectively, plaintiffs) contend that triable issues of material fact exist as to whether the underlying lawsuit alleged retaliatory treatment against an employee, thereby triggering defendants defense obligations under the policy. Plaintiffs further contend the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding declarations they submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. They argue that the declarations attest to retaliatory acts potentially covered under the policy.
Court affirm the judgment. Defendant owed no duty to defend the underlying lawsuit, which was excluded from coverage under the policy by the provision barring coverage for lawsuits between insureds. Plaintiffs raised no triable issue of material fact as to whether the underlying claims were for retaliatory treatment against an employee excepted from that exclusion and potentially covered under the policy. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by disregarding plaintiffs evidence of previously undisclosed facts purportedly establishing a potential for coverage, but not known to defendant at the time the third party lawsuit was tendered.

Plaintiff appeals a judgment entered against her and in favor of defendants and respondents Harold Mansdorf, Mildred Mansdorf, the Mansdorf Family Revocable Trust, Michele V. Giaccomazza and his corporations, Joint Venture Corporation and Malibu Hills Ranch Corporation. This lawsuit grows out of Marylin Mansdorfs claim that in December of 1976, her ex husband, Lee Mansdorf, orally gave her one half of his interest in the Mansdorf Family Revocable Trust. The trial court, sitting in equity, rejected Marylins claim that Lee made such a substantial oral gift.
On appeal, Marylin contends the trial court unduly and improperly was prejudiced against her by evidence that she had been involved in numerous other lawsuits. Court reject this contention, as well as Marylins claims the trial court erroneously admitted the testimony of the defense handwriting expert and rendered an incomplete statement of decision. Because each of Marylins claims fails, Court affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from a judgment after court trial. Plaintiff and Appellant (plaintiff) sued her real estate broker, defendant and respondent (defendant), asserting various claims of fraud and deceit in connection with the sale of her condominium and the subsequent purchase of a home. Defendant cross complained asserting claims for slander and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff represented herself at trial, testified at length concerning her claims against defendant, and responded to multiple questions from the trial court. In addition to his own detailed testimony concerning the parties respective claims, defendant presented testimony from a former client concerning the cross-claim for slander and from his chiropractor concerning treatment for stress.
After hearing all the testimony, receiving documentary evidence, and hearing oral argument from both sides, the trial court found defendant to be a hard working, decent, honorable person of our community. It further found that during the time defendant represented [plaintiff] as a broker. . . . [defendant] had [plaintiffs] best interest at heart. And he did what he could for [her]. In contrast, the trial court found that plaintiff had slandered defendant, caused him to lose a commission on the sale of a home, acted outrageously towards him, and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him. Based on those findings, the trial court entered a judgment under which plaintiff took nothing on her complaint and defendant was awarded $36,000 in lost commissions and $1,200 for costs incurred for chiropractic treatment.
Representing herself on appeal, plaintiff asserts a variety of contentions and allegations in her opening brief. But she does not present any theory upon which a claim of prejudicial error could be predicated. Based on the record on appeal, Court affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Court appeals from the judgment entered following his pleas of no contest to count 1 assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)), two counts of misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, 594, subds. (a), (b)(2)(A); counts 2 and 5), count 3 felony vandalism (Pen. Code, 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)), and count 4 battery against a person with whom appellant had a dating relationship (Pen. Code, 243, subd. (e)(1)) with an admission that he suffered a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subd. (d)). The court sentenced appellant to prison for four years.
Court hold the trial court properly refused to strike, pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, appellants Three Strikes law prior felony conviction. In light of the nature and circumstances of appellants current felony offenses and the qualifying prior conviction (a 2001 terrorist threats conviction), and in light of the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, appellant cannot be deemed outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law as to the prior conviction. Court also hold the trial court must amend the abstract of judgment to reflect that appellants conviction on count 1 was for assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and not assault with a deadly weapon.

Appellant appeals from a judgment ordering specific performance of a contract for the sale of residential property. Because the trial courts finding that respondents Ana Martinez, Yvonne Deward,[1]and Eusebio S. Martinez (respondents) are entitled to specific performance is in accord with the essential terms of the agreement and supported by substantial evidence, Court affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Glenmat Properties, LLC (Glenmat) appeals the judgment, following a court trial, in favor of defendants and respondents Pioneer Center (Pioneer Center), Pioneer Center, LLC, and Marta L. Brownfield (collectively, defendants), in Glenmats action for breach of contract for the sale of certain real property. Glenmat contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial courts findings that negotiations concerning essential terms of the sale were never concluded, and that no valid, enforceable contract existed. Substantial evidence supports the trial courts findings and Court therefore affirm the judgment.

This appeal is the latest flare-up in litigation that began in 1993 when appellant Deputy Sheriff Francisco Benach was fired by respondent Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department (Department), after he allegedly assaulted another deputy. This appeal involves the Departments alleged breach of an agreement resolving litigation that arose out of that and other incidents. It also involves a violation of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBR), Government Code section 3300, et seq. allegedly committed by the Department by virtue of an involuntary transfer of Benach from the bureau where the Departments pilots are based.
The trial court found no violation of the POBR, and granted the Departments motion for summary adjudication. The court also found that the gist of Benachs action sought equitable relief, and denied his request for a jury trial on claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Trial was conducted over a span of about three months, after which the court found in favor of the Department on both claims, and subsequently awarded costs to the Department. Benach filed these appeals, which we consolidated.
On the appeal from the judgment, Court find no error and affirm. Summary adjudication was properly granted on the cause of action for violation of the POBR, a jury trial was properly denied on contract related claims seeking primarily equitable relief, and Benach failed to prove the Department breached the settlement agreement in any respect. Regarding the cost award, Court affirm in part and reverse in part.

Appellants (mother) and Scott S. (father) (collectively appellants), parents of three-year-old Scott F., appeal from an order of the juvenile court declaring Scott to be a dependent of the court under Welfare & Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). Court affirm.