CA Unpub Decisions

this case Court affirm trial court orders which permitted a judgment creditor to renew his default judgment and authorized a receiver to seize documents and other evidence demonstrating the judgment debtor owned a substantial interest in two named corporations.
Contrary to the arguments of the judgment debtors and corporations, the judgment which the trial court renewed was valid. Prior to entry of the judgment the trial court conducted a thorough prove-up hearing at which the judgment creditor provided evidence of each element of damage alleged in the underlying complaint. Moreover, contrary to the judgment creditor's argument, the judgment did not exceed the amount alleged in the complaint.

This appeal by Miramar Truck and Auto Center, Inc. ("MTAC") and James J. Williams, Jr. (collectively Plaintiffs) arises from a judgment entered against them in their lawsuit against General Motors Corporation, its employee Doug Fields (the GM defendants) and several other defendants, including auto dealerships and certain individuals (the non-GM defendants). In 2001, Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to purchase an automobile dealership from the now-dismissed defendant, Miramar Pontiac, and contend in the current version of the complaint (second amended complaint, the operative complaint) that the GM defendants and non GM defendants caused them damages by interfering with their prospective economic advantage and committing other related torts.
Court have examined the record and conclude this matter is properly before us as an appealable judgment that resolves all the issues with prejudice. As Court explain, the stipulated judgment is sufficiently final and conclusive in nature to allow appellate review of all of Plaintiffs' claims on the merits of all the issues presented.

Defendant was convicted of attempted carjacking and making criminal threats. It was found true that he had served a term of imprisonment within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667.5, subdivision (b), and 668, that he had a serious felony prior within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subdivision (c), and that he had a strike prior within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), 668 and 1170.12. Thigpenn was sentenced to 10 years in prison. He appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to dismiss his 1999 robbery strike prior, and the court abused its discretion by failing to consider a mitigating factor. The judgment is affirmed.

After the court denied a motion to substitute appointed counsel (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118), Orson Young entered a negotiated guilty plea to stalking in violation of a temporary restraining order. (Pen. Code, 646.9, subd. (b).) He admitted personally using a firearm during the crime. ( 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23).) On June 18, 2004, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on five years' probation including conditions he serve 365 days in custody, report to the probation department as directed, successfully complete a stalking program and not contact, annoy or molest the victim. It ordered Young to pay a $239 fine, a $200 restitution fine, and $1,575 restitution to the victim. On March 10, 2005, the court revoked and reinstated probation after Young admitted failing to report to the probation department and failing to attend stalking classes. The court conditioned reinstatement of probation on Young serving 365 days in custody with credit for 231 served. Young waived good time credit and the court stayed the balance of the 365-day custody condition. On May 11, 2005, the court revoked probation after Young admitted violating the court order he not contact the victim. The court sentenced him to prison for four years: the three year middle term for stalking enhanced one year for weapon use. It awarded no good time credit for time served and ordered Young to pay a $600 restitution fine and a probation revocation restitution fine in an undesignated amount ( 1202.44.) Young contends the trial court erred in denying good time credit for time he served after he waived past good time credit on March 10, 2005, in increasing the restitution fine from $200 to $600, and in imposing the probation revocation restitution fine.

Gregory A. (Gregory) appeals the judgment terminating his parental rights over Gregory A., Jr. (Gregory, Jr.). Gregory contends notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) was inadequate because the juvenile court failed to order a proper inquiry into his Indian heritage and the ICWA notices sent by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) were incomplete. Gregory's counsel, Gregory, Jr.'s counsel, and the Agency's counsel have filed a stipulation for reversal of the judgment, a limited remand with directions to comply with the notice requirements of ICWA, and immediate issuance of the remittitur. Court accept the stipulation and reverse. (Code Civ. Proc., 128, subd. (a)(8); In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 711; In re Jonathan D. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 105, 111-112; In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1).)

Defendant appeals his conviction of three counts of attempted kidnapping. (Pen. Code, 207, 664.) He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred in failing to give, sua sponte, an instruction on a lesser included offense as to one of the counts. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of numerous felony and misdemeanor charges, set out in a 63 count amended information, all of which stemmed from defendants operation of a facility called Tiger Rescue. Defendant had operated the facility, at which defendant housed various exotic animals including tigers and leopards, in Glen Avon under permits from the appropriate governmental agencies including the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Due to housing growth in the Glen Avon area, defendant was forced to move the facility in 1999 to a new location in Colton.
DFG officers obtained a search warrant for the Glen Avon property in April 2003 after receiving information that defendant had alligators and a tiger named Theo at that location. On April 22, 2003, around 7:00 a.m., DFG and Riverside County Animal Control officers executed that search warrant. As the officers approached defendants house, the second of two located behind a locked, gated entrance to the property, they were immediately struck by the stench of dead animals. In their subsequent search of the property, the officers found the carcasses of numerous dead animals, including about 30 tigers, in varying stages of decomposition. A broken refrigerator on the back patio of defendants house was full of decomposing dead animals. A juvenile tiger, later identified as Theo/C, who appeared to have mange which is a parasitic infection, was in a four-foot square cage on the patio, and another young tiger named Madison was secured to the patio by a chain no more than four feet in length. A veterinarian who later examined the tigers expressed the opinion that both animals were malnourished and had been subjected to needless suffering as a result of the fecal waste and urine contaminating the areas in which they were confined. The DFG and animal control officers also found other animals that had been neglected including dogs and chickens in cages without adequate food and water, and goats and burros that had difficulty walking due to overgrown hooves.
Defendant and his eight year old son were in the house when the officers entered to execute the search warrant. The inside of the house was filthy and smelled of animal feces. The kitchen sink was filled with dirty dishes, pots, and pans all covered with rotting food. Food in the refrigerator was rotten and unfit for human consumption. In the freezer compartment of the kitchen refrigerator, as well as in the freezer compartments of a refrigerator in the dining area and one on the patio, the officers found a total of 58 frozen tiger and leopard cubs. The veterinary pathologist who later examined the frozen cubs expressed the opinion that the animals were between three and five days old when they died and that the cause of death was starvation.
As reported and set out in the search warrant affidavit, the officers found two alligators in a bathtub in a bathroom. After they heard noise coming from the attic, the officers searched that area by lifting a ceiling tile and found nine infant tiger cubs and two infant leopard cubs (also referred to at trial as neonates), all of which were lethargic, cold, dehydrated, and hypothermic, conditions which are life threatening in the opinion of a veterinarian who testified at trial. When asked about the cubs, defendant told the officers that he did not know who had put them in the attic.
In this appeal, defendant raises various challenges to the jurys guilty verdicts, beginning with his assertion that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence recovered from his home because the search warrant pursuant to which that evidence was obtained did not accurately describe the premises to be searched, and concluding with his assertion that there were inconsistencies between the verdict form and jury instructions that require reversal of the guilty verdict on count 52. Court conclude defendants claims, which we recount in detail below, are meritless, and therefore Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Dion Douglas Ford of attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 664/211) and found true the allegation that he was armed with a firearm during the attempt ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court found true that defendant had eight prior strike convictions ( 1170.12, subds. (a)(d) & 667, subds. (b)(i)) and sentenced him to a total term of 26 years to life in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends that the judgment should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of attempted robbery. Court disagree and affirm.

On July 9, 2002, the District Attorney of Riverside County filed a complaint that charged defendant and appellant, Cecil Newton Fanning II (hereafter defendant) with two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). Both counts alleged that the act occurred in Riverside County between June 30, 1990, and June 29, 1991, and that the victim of both counts was defendants daughter G.F., who was under the age of 14 at the time the acts occurred. The complaint also included an allegation that the prosecution was initiated in accordance with former section 803, subdivision (g) (hereafter section 803(g)), in that on or about July 10, 2001, G.F. reported to the Riverside County Sheriffs Department that while under the age of 18 years, she was molested by defendant, a criminal complaint was filed within one year of the date of that report, the statute of limitations set out in section 800 had expired, the charges involve substantial sexual conduct, and there is independent evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the victims allegation.We agree with defendant, for reasons we now explain, that the prosecution failed to file the charges within the time specified in section 803(g) and therefore the charges were untimely. Because Court reverse the judgment and direct that the charges against defendant be dismissed, defendants remaining claims of error are irrelevant and Court not address them.

A jury convicted defendant of premeditated attempted murder (count 1), assault with a deadly weapon (count 2), and active participation in a gang (count 3). The jury also found:
(1) In the commission of the attempted murder, defendant personally used a knife, personally inflicted great bodily injury, and acted for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (2) In the commission of the assault, defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury and acted for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
The court sentenced defendant to 19 years to life. Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff appeals from an order granting attorney fees to defendants and respondents Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), Aurora Loan Services, Inc. (Aurora), and the firms of Moss, Pite & Duncan, L.L.P., and Moss Codilis, L.L.P. (the Moss firms). The order granting attorney fees was entered after the trial court dismissed plaintiffs action. Plaintiffs sole contention on appeal is that the order was improperly granted because it was not timely filed. Court affirm.

Objector (father) is the natural father of Jonathan B., a dependent child of the juvenile court. The juvenile court entered orders terminating fathers parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for the child. Fathers sole ground of appeal is that the juvenile court failed to ensure proper notices were given under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Court affirm.

By appeal and by petition for writ of habeas corpus, Kenneth W. (appellant) challenges the juvenile courts order terminating parental rights as to Baby Jane Doe (the child). In his appeal, appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that the child was a safely surrendered baby under Health and Safety Code section 1255.7, and that the court failed to advise him of his right to seek writ review of its order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. In the appeal and the habeas corpus petition, appellant contends that the court should not have proceeded with a section 366.26 hearing in his absence, after he called the court to inform it that he was having car trouble. Appellant makes various other claims in the habeas corpus petition. Court affirm the juvenile courts termination order and deny appellants petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Jacqueline H. (Jacqueline) is the maternal grandmother of A.H., A.L.H., J.C., and H.H. She appeals from the juvenile courts denial of her request for de facto parent status. Court find no errors and affirm the judgment.