CA Unpub Decisions

Ricky Claudino was convicted by jury of misdemeanor elder abuse (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (c)) and felony assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245). Imposition of sentence was suspended, and Claudino was placed on formal probation for a period of three years, with a condition he serve one year in county jail.
Assigned counsel submitted a Wende brief, certifying an inability to identify any issues for appellate review. Counsel also submitted a declaration confirming Claudino was advised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief raising any points which he wishes to call to the court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been submitted. As required, we have independently reviewed the record. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109–110.) We agree no arguable issues are presented and affirm.

Tabitha B. appeals from an order denying her petition to vacate and seal two juvenile delinquency adjudications (Pen. Code, § 236.14). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A May 2016 wardship petition alleged Tabitha, then 15 years old, committed misdemeanor battery on a peace officer. After considering a joint assessment report (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 241.1), the trial court determined Tabitha “would be ‘best served’ under the court’s delinquency jurisdiction[.]” It found Tabitha committed misdemeanor battery on a peace officer, adjudged her a ward of the court, and placed her on probation. Tabitha appealed; we affirmed. (In re Tabitha B. (June 12, 2017, A149826) [nonpub. opn.].) A second wardship petition alleged Tabitha committed vehicle theft and received stolen property. Tabitha admitted receiving stolen property and the court reinstated probation.
Third Wardship Petition and Probation Violation

In this case involving the provision of workers’ compensation insurance to Luxor Cabs, Inc. and Luxor Executive Car Service, LLC (Luxor), appellants Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc. (AUCRA), California Insurance Company (CIC), and certain other affiliated entities challenge the denial of AUCRA’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of a reinsurance participation agreement (RPA) between Luxor and AUCRA. In particular, appellants argue that the trial court erred both in determining the issue of arbitrability—given the existence of a valid delegation clause—and in subsequently concluding that both the delegation clause and the arbitration provision of which it is a part are unenforceable. The EquityComp workers’ compensation insurance program at issue in this case has garnered nationwide attention from numerous administrative agencies and judicial tribunals. (See, e.g., Minnieland Private Day School, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive

A jury found defendant Kevan Acton Smith guilty of two counts of stalking in violation of Penal Code section 646.9 (counts 1 & 2) and making annoying phone calls in violation of section 653m, subdivision (b) (count 3). Count 1 involved a violation of section 646.9, subdivision (a), while count 2 involved a violation of section 646.9, subdivision (b). Both offenses involved a woman whom defendant first met in August 2014 when he went to her home to purchase a vehicle that she had listed for sale on Craig’s List. Defendant chose to represent himself at trial.

A jury found appellant Gregory Martin Nelson guilty of resisting arrest but acquitted him on charges of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury and inflicting injury on a former cohabitant. The trial court granted a two-year term of probation with 10 days in county jail.
Nelson raises two claims on appeal. First, he contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for resisting arrest because the police were not engaged in the lawful performance of their duties at the time of the arrest. Second, he contends the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on resisting arrest. Because his trial counsel did not object or request pinpoint instructions, Nelson contends counsel provided ineffective assistance.

This case involves the purported general contractor for a condominium remodel project, Adam Bereki, on one side, and the condominium owners, Gary and Karen Humphreys (the Humphreys), on the other. After the Humphreys terminated Bereki’s involvement, a now defunct corporation formerly owned by Bereki, Spartan Associates, Inc. (Spartan Associates), sued Humphreys, claiming they still owed approximately $83,000 for work on the project. The Humphreys denied the allegations and cross-complained against Bereki and Spartan Associates. Among the remedies they sought was disgorgement of all payments made for the project, pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (b) , due to Bereki’s alleged failure to possess a required contractor’s license.
Following a bifurcated bench trial on the disgorgement cause of action, the trial court found in favor of the Humphreys and ordered Bereki to repay them all monies received in relation to the remodel work — $848,000.

The parties seek a stipulated reversal of the juvenile court’s order issued at a Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.26 hearing in May 2018 appointing legal guardians for now 13-year-old David P. and terminating its dependency jurisdiction without ordering visitation for appellant Jessica H. (mother) as required under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C). We accept the stipulation, remand with directions for the juvenile court to comply with the statute and order an immediate issuance of the remittitur.

Appellant Jose Luis Medina admitted violating his probation in Madera County Superior Court case Nos. MCR051492 (case 1) and MCR052608 (case 2) and was sentenced to a local term. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Appellant Jose Louie Farias pleaded guilty to four child sex abuse charges and admitted a prior strike conviction. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court should have granted his request to dismiss the prior strike conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We conclude the trial court’s denial of the request was not an abuse of discretion and affirm.

Defendant Race McKinley Bowen contends on appeal (1) admission of evidence of his prior misdemeanor conviction for spousal battery was prejudicial error, and (2) the minute order and abstract of judgment do not reflect the oral pronouncement of trial. We remand for amendment of the minute order and abstract of judgment, and otherwise affirm.

Appellant Jose Benito Hinojosa stands convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, a knife, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). He contends his conviction should be reversed because the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 371, consciousness of guilt: suppression and fabrication of evidence, and CALCRIM No. 372, defendant’s flight. We affirm.

After two incidents of domestic violence committed months apart against his wife, defendant Rhett Schuller was charged in Tuolumne Superior Court case No. CRF46598 with five offenses: inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a) (counts 1 & 2)), making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a) (count 3)), misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1) (count 4)), and misdemeanor disobeying a protective order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4) (count 5)). Attached to counts 1 through 3 were the sentence enhancement allegations that defendant served four prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).

Defendant and petitioner Louis Ramon Montes was convicted in 2003 of special circumstances murder, along with related crimes, and was sentenced to life without possibility of parole (LWOP) for crimes committed when he was 17 years old. After the United States Supreme Court ruled that mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles was prohibited in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 465 (Miller), the California Supreme Court ruled in People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 and In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, that juveniles sentenced to LWOP were entitled to a hearing in order to have an opportunity to present information as to juvenile characteristics and circumstances. Montes filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking such a hearing. We issued an order to show cause (OSC) why relief should not be granted. We now grant the petition in part and order the matter remanded with directions to the trial court to conduct a hearing at which Montes has the opportunity to present e

After becoming angry at his neighbor’s dogs, defendant and appellant Salvador Albert Hurtado grabbed a rifle from his closet and fired shots toward his neighbor’s property. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of gross negligent discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 246.3, subd. (a); count 2). Thereafter, defendant was placed on formal probation for a period of three years on various terms and conditions of probation, including serving 275 days in county jail with 275 days of credit for time served.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to instruct the jury with a unanimity instruction (CALCRIM 3500), and (2) he is entitled to additional conduct credits pursuant to section 4019. We agree with the parties that defendant is entitled to additional conduct credits, but reject defendant’s remaining contention. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment as modified.