CA Unpub Decisions

This lawsuit is a collateral attack on a default judgment entered against plaintiff and appellant Marc Grossman in a small claims action brought by defendant and respondent Leonard Baca. Grossman appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained Baca’s demurrer without leave to amend. Grossman contends that he adequately pleaded a cause of action for declaratory relief because the small claims judgment is void for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, or he could plead such a cause of action if given leave to amend.
We find that the small claims court did not lack either personal or subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs and respondents Laurel Wright and Marvin Hersh, homeowners in a residential desert community, challenge an amendment to their homeowners association’s covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs) that added a $250 monthly assessment to cover the costs associated with the members-only golf and tennis club located within the community, and the assessment of $550.96 per lot “to fund defense of case #1505335,” the original lawsuit filed by homeowners who sought to challenge the $250 monthly assessment. Plaintiffs sued several defendants, including appellants The Morningside Community Association (Association), and its directors: Randy Zien, Jack Buckingham, Ron Kolar, Wayne Pollard, Chris Norman, Liza Ivins-Hazelrig, and George Rotner (collectively referred to as Association Defendants). Association Defendants filed a special motion to strike the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion ) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section

Plaintiffs and respondents, homeowners in a residential desert community, challenge an amendment to their homeowners association’s covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs) that added a $250 monthly assessment to cover the costs associated with the members-only golf and tennis club located within the community. Plaintiffs sued several defendants, including appellants The Morningside Community Association (Association) and its directors, Randolph B. Zien (erroneously sued as Randall B. Zien), Jack W. Buckingham, Liza Ivins-Hazelrig, Ronald Kolar, Chris Norman, and Wayne Pollard (the Association and its directors, collectively, will be referred to as Morningside Defendants); and the Club at Morningside (the Club), its directors, Rusty Goepel and Richard Cantlin, and its general manager, Greg L. Harris (the Club, its directors and its manager, collectively, will be referred to as Club Defendants). The defendants filed special motions to strike the action as a strategic lawsuit a

Law Offices of Joseph Amato and Joseph Amato for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Plaintiffs and respondents Laurel Wright and Marvin Hersh, homeowners in a residential desert community, challenge an amendment to their homeowners association’s covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs) that added a $250 monthly assessment to cover the costs associated with the members-only golf and tennis club located within the community, and an assessment of $550.96 per lot “to fund defense of case #1505335,” the original lawsuit filed by homeowners who sought to challenge the $250 monthly assessment. Plaintiffs sued several defendants, including appellants Peters & Freedman, LLP, and David M. Peters (Peters Defendants), lawyers for the homeowners association. The Peters Defendants filed a special motion to strike the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion ) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motio

Plaintiffs and respondents, homeowners in a residential desert community, challenge an amendment to their homeowners association covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs) that added a $250 monthly assessment to cover the costs associated with the members-only golf and tennis club located within the community. Plaintiffs sued several defendants, including appellants Peters & Freedman LLP, and David M. Peters (Peters Defendants), lawyers for the homeowners association. The Peters Defendants filed a special motion to strike the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion ) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that plaintiffs’ causes of action did not arise out of protected activity. We affirm.

Victor Manuel Lopez seeks reversal of his conviction and sentence of 25 years to life in prison. He argues: (1) he was improperly denied the opportunity to testify about the suicidal ideation he felt after he killed his wife; (2) a journal entry written by the victim was admitted improperly over his hearsay objections; (3) the prosecutor misstated the law and shifted the burden of proof during closing argument; and (4) the court misstated a jury instruction. For reasons we explain, we conclude there were no reversible errors and affirm the judgment.

Eduardo Flores sued Sharp Grossmont Hospital (Sharp) seeking to recover for injuries suffered during a surgery. The court granted Sharp's motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding Flores's claims were untimely under the one-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.) We determine Flores met his appellate burden to show a reasonable possibility he can amend his complaint to show the limitations period was tolled during his claimed incapacity. (See § 352.) We thus reverse with directions. To satisfy his pleading burden on remand, Flores must allege facts (1) specifying the nature of Sharp's alleged wrongdoing and breach of duty owed to him; (2) describing the nature of his claimed incapacity and the time period he claims he was incapacitated; and (3) showing his claim was timely under applicable tolling principles.

The respondent superior court struck a peremptory challenge by petitioner Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) to assignment of Judge Leslie C. Nichols on remand following reversal on appeal by this court. Because it appears respondent court erred in striking the peremptory challenge based on its findings (1) the challenge was barred by law of the case, (2) there was no “new trial” to permit a peremptory challenge on remand, and (3) petitioner was judicially estopped from arguing that the issues on remand had been previously litigated, we shall issue a writ of mandate compelling the superior court to grant the peremptory challenge.

Appointed counsel for defendant Nico Martin Collins Moreno asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Andrew Scott McKinley pleaded no contest to second degree burglary in case No. 16F6051, and to receipt of stolen property with an on-bail enhancement in case No. 16F3324. In return, he was promised the dismissal of the remaining counts in both cases and a court trial on an allegation that his 2002 conviction for first degree robbery in the state of Washington was a strike under California’s “Three Strikes” law. Based on certified documents presented to the trial court, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s 2002 Washington conviction was a strike under California law. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate state prison term of nine years four months, which included doubling the terms on both current offenses for the strike.
Defendant now contends (1) in determining that his prior Washington conviction qualified as a strike, the trial court looked beyond the facts necessarily admitted as part of his plea; and (2) even if the

In Monterossa v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 747 (Monterossa), this panel held that the “ ‘California Homeowner Bill of Rights’ ” or HBOR (Monterossa, at p. 749, fn. 1; Stats. 2012, chs. 86 & 87) authorized an award of legal fees to borrowers who obtained a preliminary injunction preventing a trustee’s sale of their residence. In the present case, after granting a preliminary injunction in 2013 to plaintiff Danilo Sese against the trustee’s sale of his residence, the trial court initially denied an award of legal fees. We concluded this was not an appealable order. (Sese v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 710.) After our decision in Monterossa, Sese renewed his request for legal fees. The trial court issued an order in December 2016 awarding him almost $13,000 in legal fees. Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., appeals from that order; in contrast with Sese’s prior appeal, this collateral order is appealable because it directs the payment of money

This case involves rival claims to the death benefits under an insurance policy on the life of Oscar Litton. One of the claimants, Litton’s minor son, sued the insurer (through his guardian ad litem) for breach of contract, declaratory relief, reformation and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The minor alleges the insurer acted in bad faith by failing to honor Litton’s request to change the beneficiary of his policy from his ex-wife to the minor. The insurer filed a cross-complaint in interpleader.
The trial court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment on the interpleader action and on the minor’s first amended complaint and denied the minor’s motion for summary adjudication on his reformation cause of action.

In this case, dependency proceedings commenced during a lengthy, contentious family law dispute. Father O.M. contends substantial evidence did not support dependency jurisdiction over his daughter M.M. We agree and reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order and vacate its dispositional order.
Father also appeals from the juvenile court’s restraining order against him naming his daughter as one of the protected parties; he seeks modification of that order to remove his daughter as a protected party. We agree that modification is appropriate. We therefore remand the case to the juvenile court with directions to modify the restraining order and then dismiss the petition.

Appellant Interstate Fire and Casualty Company (Interstate) brought this action against respondent Axis Surplus Insurance Company (Axis), seeking reimbursement for expenses Interstate expended in defending non-party Pulte Home Corporation (Pulte) in a separate lawsuit. Interstate alleged that Axis had a duty to defend Pulte in the underlying action because Pulte is an additional insured under insurance policies Axis issued to non-party Gothic Landscaping, Inc. (Gothic). The trial court entered judgment in favor of Axis after granting Axis’s motion for summary judgment and denying Interstate’s motion for summary adjudication. On appeal, Interstate argues the trial court erred in determining Pulte is not an additional insured under Axis’s policies. We disagree and affirm the judgment.