CA Unpub Decisions

On May 15, 2006, at approximately 10:30 p.m. a Kern County Sheriffs deputy interviewed Javier Navarro who reported that while he was gone from his house, someone cut his chain link fence and took his dirt bike from his yard. The deputy saw tire marks and followed them to a nearby residence. The deputy contacted the occupant who told him that he saw appellant, Michelle Anne Montoya, push the dirt bike through Navarros chain link fence and walk toward him to ask for help putting air in a tire. After inflating the tire, Montoya left with the dirt bike.
Montoyas appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Montoya has not responded to this courts invitation to submit additional briefing.
Following independent review of the record, court find that no reasonably arguable factual or legal issues exist.
The judgment is affirmed.

It was alleged in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst Code, 602) filed August 24, 2006, that appellant Bobby B., a minor, committed battery with infliction of serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, 243, subd. (d)) and battery during school hours while on school property (Pen. Code, 243, subd. (a)). On September 14, following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found both allegations true. On September 28, following the disposition hearing, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court; declared the former offense a felony and the latter offense a misdemeanor; and ordered appellant committed to the Elkhorn Correctional Facility for a period not to exceed 365 days.
Appellant summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (Peoplev.Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this courts invitation to submit additional riefing.Following independent review of the record, Court have concluded that no reasonably arguable legal or factual issues exist.

Petitioner, in pro. per., seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450 8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Court deny the petition.

Appellant concedes that this appeal is taken from an order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Such orders are nonappealable. (Matter of Zany (1913) 164 Cal. 724, 726 727; People v. Ryan (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 144, 149.)
Upon the denial by a superior court of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a petitioners remedy is to file a petition in the court of appeal. (Matter of Zany, supra, 164 Cal. 724, 726 727.)
The appeal in the above entitled action is dismissed.

Plaintiffs Bryan Tran and Bryan Tran, M.D., Inc., appeal from a judgment of dismissal following the trial courts decision to sustain defendants demurrer without leave to amend. Tran argues he is entitled to pursue an action for damages relating to the termination of hospital staff privileges. Defendants state that an action for damages cannot be maintained because Trans privileges were terminated because he failed to meet hospital qualifications under a rule of general application to the entire medical staff. Court agree and affirm.

Defendant seeks relief from a default judgment totaling $34,507.86. Defendant argues the judgment was improper because its answer to a superseded complaint was sufficient, the plaintiff could not maintain the action and the trial court lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff was an unlicensed contractor, the judgment violates the one final judgment rule and was in excess of the amount sought in the complaint, and the judgment was supported by insufficient evidence. Because none of these arguments have merit, court affirm.

This is a dispute between Oso Valley Greenbelt Association and several of its members over the proper composition of its board of directors in 2005. Simply put, two elections were held, two boards were created, and a dispute arose as to which board, and thus which electees, had been properly elected board members. A judgment was entered which, among other things, found appellants were not the properly elected board and permanently enjoined them from engaging in certain specific actions, such as representing themselves as directors of the Association. An appeal was filed. The parties have now entered into a global settlement of the matter, including settlement of actions not a part of this appeal, and wish to put the entire matter behind them pursuant to the terms of that settlement. Accordingly, the parties filed a joint application and stipulation for reversal of the injunctive relief portion of the judgment only pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8).Based on the motion and accompanying documents, court find that there is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal of the injunctive portion of the judgment, and that the reasons of the parties for requesting reversal of that portion outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from its nullification and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement. Therefore, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties: (1) Paragraph 3 of the judgment filed April 12, 2006, including subparagraphs (a) through (g), is reversed and the matter is remanded to the superior court to strike Paragraph 3 of the judgment; (2) the remainder of the appeal is dismissed with prejudice; (3) in the interests of justice each side shall bear its own costs and attorney fees on appeal; and (4) the clerk shall issue the remittitur forthwith.

Rudy Renya filed a notice of appeal with this court following convictions for two counts of aggravated assault against the same victim (counts one and three) (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)) (subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code), one count of domestic battery with corporal injury with prior conviction (count two) ( 273.5, subd. (a)), and one count of criminal threats (count four) ( 422). Count four alleged great bodily injury, and count three specified the assault involved the use of a deadly weapon. The information also alleged four strike priors, two prison priors, and two serious felony priors.We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal(People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) . Counsel filed a brief which set forth the facts of the case. Court therefore fail to find any arguable issues, particularly any that defendant might have raised without a certificate of probable cause. Court therefore affirm.

Petitioner Palomar Pomerado Health (Palomar) seeks extraordinary relief from an order denying its motion to transfer this case to San Diego County. Finding plain error, court issue a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance directing the trial court to grant the motion to transfer.

This case presents a tortured saga of the parties attempts to settle plaintiffs employment discrimination and wrongful termination lawsuit filed in 1999. On several occasions throughout the litigation, the parties settled the case and then disputed the terms of the agreement, which have evolved over the course of these events. As much as we would like to end this saga, court conclude that under the circumstances presented here, neither of the two orders from which plaintiff has appealed is appealable. The first order was from the trial courts denial of plaintiffs second motion to enforce the settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 a clearly nonappealable order. The second order under appeal was from the trial courts grant of defendants second motion under the same section. While orders enforcing a settlement under section 664.6 are often treated as or converted to final judgments, in this particular case, the order called for further judicial action. Whats more, it did not finally adjudicate the rights of the parties for judgment purposes by ending the litigation. Accordingly, court dismiss the appeal.

The father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights as to his youngest child, L. B. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.) He cites no error arising out of the section 366.26 hearing. Instead he contends that he was denied fair and adequate reunification services and that the social services agency violated his rights by providing the court with inaccurate information as to his criminal record, and by denying him the opportunity to retake a drug test. These are not issues that can be properly raised in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights. Issues regarding reunification services can be raised only in a petition for an extraordinary writ. ( 366.26, subd. (l).) No such petition was filed in this case. However, since it appears from the record that the father was not properly noticed, under section 366.26, subdivision (l)(3), of his rights to proceed by extraordinary writ, Court consider his claims in this appeal. Court find that the courts order denying services was fully supported by the record and Court find no reversible errors. Court therefore affirm the order terminating parental rights.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine for sale, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana. (Health & Saf. Code, 11378, 11364, 11357, subd. (b).) On appeal, she contends that the superior court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. She further challenges a jury instruction given on the meaning of "sale" in possession for sale, and she asserts sentencing error in the order that she pay attorney fees as a condition of probation. Court find the last contention to be meritorious and reverse on that ground alone.

A petition was filed, alleging that Humberto J., a minor (15 years old at the time of the jurisdictional hearing), came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition alleged that on May 7, 2006, the minor violated Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(4) (unlawful carrying of a concealed dirk or dagger), a felony. A second count was later added, namely, the malicious defacing of property ( 594, subd. (a)(1)), a misdemeanor. The minor moved to suppress evidence relative to the felony charge. The court denied the motion, and the minor thereafter admitted the concealed weapon charge and that he had violated probation; the misdemeanor count was dismissed. The court ordered that the minor remain a ward of the juvenile court. Court conclude that the court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

In January 2006, defendant Setha Keo was charged with one count of forgery and one count of grand theft. He was provided with the services of a public defender. Both counts were later dismissed for insufficient evidence on the motion of the district attorney. Under Penal Code section 987.8, the trial court then ordered defendant to pay $2,500 for services of the public defender at the rate of $35 per month. Defendant contends on appeal that the court erred by ordering the payment of fees without a determination of his ability to pay those fees. Court agree that the record discloses no finding by the court of defendants ability to pay fees, and that even if the court were to have made such an implied finding, there is no substantial evidence in the record that would support it. Court accordingly reverse to the extent the court ordered defendant to pay attorney fees and remand the matter to the trial court to enable it to either make the determination as required by section 987.8 regarding defendants ability to pay or strike the order.