CA Unpub Decisions

The court readjudged appellant, Daniel S., a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) after he admitted allegations charging him with battery (Pen. Code, 242) and that he committed the battery offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, 186.22, subd. (b)). On September 19, 2006, the court committed Daniel to the Elkhorn Boot Camp for a period not to exceed 365 days. On appeal, Daniel contends the condition of probation prohibiting him from possessing deadly or dangerous weapons is constitutionally vague and overbroad. Court reject this contention.

Defendant challenges his convictions for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and attempted murder. He contends his convictions are unsupported by sufficient evidence. He further contends the court erred by failing to give a special, pinpoint instruction on self defense.
Court reject his contentions. Substantial evidence showed defendant aided and abetted fellow gang members who shot at one rival gang member, and later shot another in the head. Substantial evidence also showed defendant conspired with his fellow gang members to hunt down the first rival gang member in a drive by shooting, and set up an ambush for the other. The special pinpoint instruction was duplicative of form jury instructions and potentially confusing. Court affirm.

The juvenile court declared G. S. (the Minor) a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after he admitted allegations that he violated Health and Safety Code sections 11360, subdivision (a) and 11357, subdivision (e); Vehicle Code sections 20001, subdivision (a) and 23103; and Penal Code section 242. The juvenile court committed the Minor to 33 days detention in a juvenile facility, with credit for 33 days of time served, and imposed restitution fines and various probation conditions.
The Minor challenges the juvenile courts jurisdictional finding on the ground it was based on evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful traffic stop. He asserts the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle during a search following the stop. Court conclude the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supported the juvenile courts conclusion that the police officer who stopped the Minors vehicle had at least a reasonable suspicion the Minor had violated Vehicle Code section 22107. Court therefore affirm.

Appellant appeals from the probate courts order terminating her appointment as the temporary conservator of the person and estate of her mother Joan Braunersrither and dismissing her conservatorship petition and from the courts order denying her motion for reconsideration. Court reject her contentions and affirm the courts orders.

A jury convicted defendant James Taylor of (1) vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence, and (2) child endangerment. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte in the language of CALCRIM No. 3404 (defense of accident or misfortune). He alternatively claims that his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective for not requesting CALCRIM No. 3404. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant Mark Delroy Daley supplied three teenage girls with drugs and arranged for them to engage in acts of prostitution. He was tried before the court and sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of 19 years 8 months based on his conviction of one count of child endangerment (Pen. Code, 273a, subd. (a)), two counts of furnishing methamphetamine to a minor (Health & Saf. Code, 11353), two counts of procuring a minor for prostitution (Pen. Code, 266i, subd. (a)(5)), one count of procuring a person for prostitution (Pen. Code, 266i, subd. (a)(1)), three counts of procuring a child under 16 to perform a lewd and lascivious act (Pen. Code, 266j), and one count of possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)).
Appellant argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the child endangerment conviction; (2) the court relied on an improper aggravating factor when it imposed the upper term on the furnishing count that was selected as the principal term; (3) the upper-term sentence violated Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham) and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 301 (Blakely); and (4) a $20 court security fee must be stricken because the crimes in this case were committed before the operative date of the statute authorizing the fee. Court agree the case must be remanded for resentencing under Cunningham and Blakely, but otherwise affirm.

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of burglary. Imposition of sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation. After his second probation violation, Judge Lawrence G. Antolini sentenced defendant to four years four months, suspended execution of the sentence, and again placed defendant on probation. A little over a year later, after a contested hearing, Judge Dean Beaupre found defendant had violated probation on the basis of new criminal charges. Believing that the federal courts would reverse People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238 (Black), Judge Beaupre reduced the previously imposed sentence. At a subsequent court appearance on the new charges, Judge Antolini reinstated the original sentence.
Defendant contends that Judge Antolini erred in reinstating the original sentence. Court do not address that contention because court find that Judge Beaupre was without authority in the first place to modify the original sentence. Because that sentence must be reinstated, defendants contentions regarding the conduct of Judge Antolini are moot. In addition, court conclude that defendants failure to challenge his sentence under Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303304 (Blakely) at the time it was imposed precludes a collateral attack on that ground now. Court therefore affirm.

Defendant appeals his convictions for evading the police by reckless driving and for driving with a suspended license. He argues the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury that the pursuing police vehicle must be distinctively marked and that the court violated Penal Code section 654 by sentencing him for both crimes. Court affirm.

A modification decision.

A pregnant minor challenges conditions of probation requiring her to obtain prenatal and postnatal medical care for herself and her children. Court affirm.

Objectors and appellants Franklin De Julius and Alan Futrell appeal from a final judgment entered in the action brought by plaintiffs and respondents Fajima Bedran and Susan Langan against defendant and respondent American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. (American Express). The judgment followed a statement of decision approving a class action settlement. Appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion in approving the settlement, certifying the class and awarding attorneys fees.
Court affirm.

Damien Stevenson appeals his conviction for one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (GBI). The jury also found the attack was done for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Before this court, appellant asserts the trial court erred in: (1) denying his Wheeler Batson motion challenging the prosecutors use of preemptory challenges to remove African American prospective jurors from the venire panel; (2) admitting evidence the victim was shot by a third party during the assault; (3) admitting inadmissible hearsay statements of the victim to the police after the attack; and (4) misstating the language of CALJIC No. 9.11 in such a way as to misinform the jury as to the elements of assault. Appellant also complains the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by using the shooting evidence to prove the gang enhancement. None of appellants claims warrant reversal. Appellant did not establish Wheeler Batson violation because the record demonstrates prosecutor articulated plausible race neutral reasons for excusing the potential panelists. As for the complaints concerning the admission of certain evidence, court conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the shooting evidence was relevant to the assault and in finding the post-attack victims hearsay statements qualified as excited utterances. Concerning the courts recitation of CALJIC No. 9.11, any misstatement did not prejudice appellant. Finally, based on our review of the record, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct in referencing the shooting during the examination of the gang expert. Consequently, Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiffs and appellants Rudolph Washington, Shirley Edwards, Essie French-Preston, Robert Butler, Stanley Camilla Viltz and Leroy Porter appeal, following an order of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained demurrers without leave to amend filed by defendants and respondents Chancellor Marshall Drummond, Arthur Tyler, Ulis Williams, and the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges. Appellants challenged the constitutionality of and actions taken pursuant to Education Code section 71093, which was an urgency measure designed to stabilize the Compton Community College District. The trial court ruled that section 71093 does not violate the California Constitution, as it neither creates a new office nor changes the duties of any existing office. (Cal. Const., art. IV, 8, subd. (d).)
Court affirm. Section 71093 does not run afoul of the Constitutions urgency measure restrictions. Rather, it applies existing statutory provisions which permit the appointment of a special trustee to manage a community college district failing to achieve fiscal stability.

Petitioner, a professional property manager, hired an unlicensed and uninsured contractor to install rain gutters on a condominium building, and an employee of the contractor was seriously injured on the first day of the job. The Workers Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) concluded that petitioner was the employer liable for workers compensation. Petitioner contends that the WCAB erred because petitioner was instructed to hire the unlicensed contractor as the agent of the condominium homeowners association or the condominium owners, which were found not liable for workers compensation under the Labor Code.
Court conclude that petitioner and the unlicensed contractor were dual employers that are jointly and severally liable for workers compensation. The unlicensed contractor employed the injured employee, and petitioner hired the unlicensed contractor as a professional property manager and the agent of the homeowners association. The homeowners association was not an owner or exempt employer under the Labor Code. Even if petitioner was the agent of the condominium owners, an agent may be liable for performing an act authorized by the principal whose rights are not imputed to the agent. Since liability for an agents authorized act is imputed to the principal and the homeowners association was a legal entity separate from the owners, we further conclude that the liability of petitioner as agent is imputed to the homeowners association as principal.
Accordingly, the WCABs decision is affirmed in part and annulled in part, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.