CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and appellant Anna Zabelina appeals from the summary judgment entered against her and in favor of her prior and current loan servicers, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (Select) and Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (Bayview). Zabelina argues that triable issues of fact exist regarding the defendants’ pursuit of foreclosure while she was diligently pursuing a loan modification. Finding no triable issues, we affirm.

Juvenile defendant T.L. appeals from the judgment finding him to be a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare & Institutions Code section 602 for driving or taking a vehicle without consent of its owner, in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (section 10851(a)). He contends there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We disagree and therefore affirm.

The trial court granted Shirley Peltier’s petition to confirm a FINRA arbitration award. Appellant James M. Roberts, formerly an investment advisor with Cullum & Burks Securities, Inc., appeals from the ensuing judgment. Relying on Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4) and (5), Roberts argues reversal is required because Peltier’s claim was barred by the FINRA “statute of limitations,” he was not a FINRA member when the arbitration was conducted and did not consent to proceeding in that forum, and the arbitrators prejudicially erred in refusing to grant his request to postpone the arbitration hearing. Finding no error, we affirm.

A jury convicted David Worley of attempted criminal threats. The prosecution arose from an interaction between Worley and his father, in which Worley ranted to his father for an hour and a half about his delusional belief that his family was dead, and then screamed, while sitting in the street, “I will kill you.” Father interpreted the statement to be an expression of frustration, and asked the police to help his son obtain mental health treatment. Instead, Worley was charged with making a criminal threat. The prosecution later added an attempted threat charge, and the court dismissed the original criminal threats charge.
Worley appeals from his conviction of attempted criminal threat, and argues that there was no substantial evidence his words conveyed the requisite “immediate prospect of execution of the threat.” (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 228 (Toledo).) We agree and reverse.

Under section 355, however, such hearsay “shall not be admissible” if there is a “timely objection” and “the objecting party establishes that the statement was unreliable because it was the product of . . . undue influence.”
This modification does not constitute a change in the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing filed October 30, 2018 is denied.

A jury found Ernest Bray, Jr., (Bray) guilty of robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed a consecutive sentence on the assault with a deadly weapon count. Bray appeals, contending that Penal Code section 654 precluded the consecutive sentence. We find that the consecutive sentence was proper and therefore affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Jose Alvarez of sexually abusing his girlfriend’s two granddaughters, and the court sentenced him to a total term of 93 years to life. He contends his convictions should be reversed because the prosecutor improperly introduced, the trial court improperly admitted, and his counsel ineffectively failed to object to the victims’ testimony about their feelings and a nurse’s testimony about the physical exams she performed on them. Defendant further contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for showing harmful matter to a minor, and that his sentence for that conviction should have been stayed. We reject his contentions and affirm the judgment.

Appellant T. Morrissey Corporation (Morrissey) asserted negligence and aiding-and-abetting claims against respondents The Check Connection, Inc. (TCC) and its owner Robert S. Milman, alleging that they improperly cashed checks that Morrissey was induced to issue as the result of a fraudulent scheme. At trial, following presentation of Morrissey’s case-in-chief, the court granted respondents’ motion for nonsuit. Morrissey contends the trial court improperly excluded evidence at trial and erred in granting nonsuit. We reject those contentions, and affirm.

Charles Abounassar resides with his wife, Anne Marie Martens, in their home in Haskell Canyon Ranch in Santa Clarita. Their lot abuts a landscaped hillside owned by defendant and respondent Haskell Canyon Ranch Homeowners Association (Association), of which Abounassar is a member.
In the wee hours of March 30, 2014, Abounassar awoke and went to use his bathroom. The floor was wet, causing him to slip and fall, sustaining injuries. He and his wife, who was awakened by the commotion, eventually ascertained the water came from a broken sprinkler on the adjacent hillside, which had caused water to spray into their open bathroom window. The sprinkler break also caused water to flow into the couple’s backyard. The couple called the fire department to ask it to turn off the water. The responding firefighters gave the broken sprinkler head to the couple, and placed a flower pot over the sprinkler pipe to shield the couple’s property from additional spray.

Defendant Darrell Lyn Hollis received a third-strike sentence of 80 years to life after robbing two fast food franchises at gunpoint. He contends that a prosecution witness’s reference to his parole status in violation of the court’s pretrial order was prejudicial, that the court abused its discretion in declining to strike one of his strike priors, and that he is entitled to resentencing so the court may exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancements. We agree with defendant that the court must be given the opportunity to strike the firearm enhancements. Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant Martin Anthony Gonzalez, a member of Pomona’s Olive Street gang, shot victim Vanessa A. in the arm and chest when she refused to leave an alley within Olive Street’s territory. A jury convicted defendant of the premediated attempted murder of Vanessa and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. It also found true enhancement allegations that defendant committed both crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang and caused great bodily injury during the attempted murder by personally and intentionally discharging a firearm. The court sentenced defendant to a third-strike sentence totaling 71 years to life in prison.

In two separate cases, defendant was charged with multiple felony offenses including unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, receiving stolen property, evading a police officer against traffic, and misdemeanor possession of burglar tools. Defendant pleaded no contest to all counts in both cases. Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to three years in state prison. In both cases, defendant in propria persona filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.

Petitioner IAR Systems Software, Inc. (IAR), on behalf of itself and its retained counsel Valla & Associates, Inc., P.C. (Valla), seeks a writ of mandate directing the superior court to set aside May 11, 2018 orders denying their motions to quash subpoenas duces tecum and grant a protective order and to submit separate statements and privilege logs. The background of these proceedings is set forth in this court’s prior opinion in IAR Systems Software, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 503, in which we set aside a prior order finding Valla to be part of the prosecution team in criminal proceedings pending against real party in interest Nadim Shehayed and imposing a duty on Valla to comply with the production obligations imposed on the prosecution under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. Although in these and related civil proceedings IAR and its counsel have produced substantial documentation requested by Shehayed, they have declined to produce documents they claim are c

Now 18-year-old A.O. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders in part placing him on probation for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and evading a peace officer–reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). A.O. contends the juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion to determine whether his offenses, which are “wobblers,” were felonies or misdemeanors. The Attorney General concedes the court erred, and we agree. Accordingly, we remand the matter for the court to exercise its discretion to make that determination.