CA Unpub Decisions

Mother and Louis B. (Father), parents of Louis B., Jr. (Lou), born in 1999, and Justice B., born in 2003, separately appeal from the Alameda County Juvenile Courts jurisdiction and disposition orders by which their two sons were removed from their home. They contend that the juvenile court erred in allowing telephone testimony and relying on outdated psychological evaluations, and that there was insufficient evidence supporting the courts findings. In addition, Mother claims the juvenile court erred in ordering her to sign a release of information for her daughter, who is not involved in this proceeding. Father claims the juvenile court failed to properly exercise its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 and that the court committed prejudicial misconduct. All claims are without merit and, therefore, court affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Kenneth J. Howard appeals a judgment after a bench trial in favor of his former employer, defendant and respondent Christopher B. Dolan. Appellant argues the trial court erred in concluding respondent did not engage in unfair business practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200. He further contends the court erred in finding the evidence insufficient for his fraud cause of action. Court disagree and affirm.

Following contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, Corey L. was declared a ward of the juvenile court after allegations were sustained that he committed one felony offense of second degree robbery and one felony offense of second degree robbery while personally using a deadly weapon, a pellet gun. The court removed Corey from the custody of his parents, committed him to a Boys Ranch for a maximum term of 180 days less 17 days custody credit, and specified the maximum term of physical confinement as seven years.
Coreys appellate counsel filed a brief asking this court to conduct an independent review of the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel discovered no issue meriting argument, but suggested possibly arguable issues regarding the admission of certain evidence and the effectiveness of defense counsel. Following our independent review of the record, court asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing regarding those issues raised by appellate counsel, as well as the additional issue of whether the court improperly removed Corey from the custody of his parents. With the aid of the supplemental briefing, court conclude that none of the issues warrants reversal and affirm.

Defendant (appellant) appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and respondents SBCC, doing business as South Bay Construction Company, Hunter/Storm/Durham, and 680 LLC (collectively, respondents) in respondents action for breach of an express indemnity agreement to pay attorney fees incurred in the defense of third party personal injury claims. Appellant contends summary judgment was improper because respondents did not tender the attorney fees before they filed the present action.

A jury convicted appellant James Brandon of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)), with the special circumstance finding that the murder was perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle ( 190.2, subd. (a)(21)). He was also convicted of attempted murder ( 664, 187, subd. (a)) and possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)). Various sentencing enhancements were found true. On January 20, 2006, the trial court sentenced appellant to prison for life without the possibility of parole.

The sole issue in this appeal concerns the trial courts evidentiary ruling restricting appellants presentation of evidence and limiting the scope of his cross-examination of prosecution witness Earl Pecot, who identified appellant as the murderer. Appellant argues that he suffered prejudice because he was unable to present evidence and fully cross-examine Pecot about Pecots prior lies to the police in an unrelated homicide investigation. We find the trial courts evidentiary ruling was well within the courts discretion and affirm.

A modification decision.

Alberto Lorenzo Ubau appeals following his no contest plea to spousal abuse. He argues the trial court was without jurisdiction to recall the order placing him on probation and resentence him to state prison. Court agree, and reverse the unauthorized prison sentence.

More than two years ago, 10 year old Alexis E. was declared a dependent of the juvenile court and was subsequently placed in long term foster care in the home of her maternal grandmother. Alexiss mother, Jacqueline E., seeks review by extraordinary writ of a juvenile court order setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 in order to consider a new permanent plan for Alexis. Court grant Jacquelines petition and issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate its order and enter a new order granting Jacquelines request for a contested status review hearing.

At issue are two writ petitions seeking extraordinary relief from a juvenile court order terminating reunification services and setting a date for a permanency planning hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Petitioners Denise V. and James H. (collectively, parents) seek the writ on the ground that no clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile courts finding that real party in interest, the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services (the department), provided them reasonable reunification services. They also request a stay of the permanency planning hearing, scheduled for March 26, 2007, should this matter not be resolved by that date. Court deny the writ petitions and the related requests for a stay.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment denying her petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., 1094.5), which challenged the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Boards (board) dismissal of plaintiffs appeal from an administrative law judges (ALJ) denial of State Disability Insurance benefits (SDI). The administrative appeal was dismissed on grounds appellant had not shown good cause for having filed it four days late. The trial court agreed with the board, and then proceeded to opine, negatively, about plaintiffs substantive grounds of appeal, which the board had never decided.
Court conclude that the board abused its discretion (Code Civ. Proc. 1094.5, subd. (b)) in refusing to entertain and determine plaintiffs appeal on the merits. Court direct issuance of a writ requiring the board to do so without regard for the trial courts further determinations of issues, which are within the boards province and which the court should not have addressed.

Mark Angelo Pirante appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on count 1 first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, 189) with special circumstance findings that he committed the offense by lying in wait (Pen. Code, 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and while kidnapping (Pen. Code, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The court sentenced appellant to prison for life without the possibility of parole.
In this case, court reject appellants argument that his Miranda advisement was deficient because a detective told appellant that anything he said may be used against him, instead of advising him that anything he said can and used against him. Either formulation is constitutionally sufficient.

Richard Aguirre and Scott Gleason appeal from judgments imposed after a joint trial in which Aguirre was convicted of the first degree murders of Joseph Torres, Alan Downey, and Raul Rodriguez, with a finding of personal firearm use in Downeys murder, and Gleason was convicted of the first degree murder of Rodriguez, with a finding of personal firearm use and a special circumstance finding that Rodriguez was intentionally killed because he was a witness to a crime (see Pen. Code, 190.2, subd. (a)(10); undesignated section references are to that code).[1] Aguirre was sentenced to a term of 79 years to life, and Gleason was sentenced to a term of life without possibility of parole, plus 10 years.
The parties raise the following contentions: (1) Testimony by the principal prosecution witness as to hearsay statements by appellants infringed their constitutional rights to confrontation; (2) It was error not to strike a gang experts opinion that Aguirre was a shot-caller, because the defense lacked access to surveillance transcripts on which the opinion was based; (3) There was insufficient evidence to establish the special circumstance; (4) Due process required that the prosecutions chief witness be corroborated; (5) The parole revocation fine imposed on Gleason was unauthorized; and (6) appellants are entitled to presentence conduct credit.
Court find merit only in the two sentencing-related contentions. After modifying the judgments accordingly, court affirm them.

Plaintiffs and appellants Peter and Paula Brown filed a complaint for medical malpractice and loss of consortium in April 2003. Over a year later, in October 2004, they substituted defendants and respondents Dr. Ann McKittrick and Northridge Emergency Medical Group (NEMG) in as previously named Doe defendants. Dr. McKittrick and NEMG moved for summary judgment on the ground, among others, that the one year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 barred the action against them. The trial court, holding that the October 2004 amendment naming Dr. McKittrick and NEMG as defendants did not relate back to the April 2003 original complaint, granted summary judgment in defendants favor. The Browns appealed. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant molested his 10- and 12-year old nieces while they were visiting him during summer vacation. A jury convicted him of five counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under 14 and returned true findings on allegations that he had committed offenses against more than one victim, making him eligible for One Strike sentences of 15 years to life on each count and ineligible for probation. (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a) , 667.61, subds. (b), (c)(8) & (e)(5), 1203.066, subd. (a)(7).) The jury further determined that appellant had engaged in substantial sexual conduct with one of the victims, which also rendered him ineligible for probation. (Pen. Code, 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).) The court sentenced appellant to consecutive terms of 15 years to life on two of the counts (one for each victim) and ran the sentences on the remaining counts concurrently.
Appellant contends: (1) the judgment must be reversed because defense counsel was not permitted to fully examine one of the girls concerning the use of words that implied a knowledge of sexual matters beyond her years, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of substantial sexual conduct. Court affirm.