CA Unpub Decisions

The minor S.N. appeals from an order of the juvenile court sustaining one count of a petition, which alleged that he attempted to rob a victim named Lolita S. (Pen. Code, 211, 664.) He alleges that there was insufficient evidence presented at the jurisdictional hearing to prove his specific intent to rob the victim. Court reject this claim and affirm.

These appeals were consolidated in the Supreme Court. They are before court on remand from that court. Plaintiff, Peggy J. Soukup, sued defendants, the Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, Herbert Hafif, Cynthia D. Hafif, Greg K. Hafif, and Ronald Stock. The trial court denied defendants special motions to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and court reversed. The Supreme Court granted review, reversed the judgment of this court, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with court's opinion. (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 298.) The remittitur states, Costs, if any, shall be awarded by the Court of Appeal. The parties have not filed any supplemental briefs as permitted by California Rules of Court rule 8.200(b). This matter has now been submitted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.256(d)(2).) Consistent with the Supreme Courts opinion in Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pages 278 298, court affirm the orders denying defendants Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 special motions to strike. Plaintiff, Peggy J. Soukup, is to recover her costs on appeal, jointly and severally, from defendants, the Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, Herbert Hafif, Cynthia D. Hafif, Greg K. Hafif, and Ronald C. Stock.

This is a franchise tax refund case involving General Motors Corporation and its affiliated corporations (collectively, GM). The case is before us pursuant to a remand from the Supreme Court in General Motors Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 773 (hereinafter, General Motors), which affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of this court and remand[ed] the case for further proceedings consistent with the discussion herein and in Microsoft Corporation [v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2006)] 39 Cal.4th 750 [hereinafter, Microsoft] (General Motors, at p. 793), which was the companion case to the case herein. The matter is remanded to the trial court to allow the Board to make its section 25137 case, and for the trial court to resolve the matter consistent with the discussion in the General Motors and Microsoft cases.

This appeal arises out of the Aubry Revocable Family Trust dated March 4, 1987 (the Aubry family trust). Nina Ringgold appeals from: a November 15, 2005 preliminary distribution order; a December 6, 2005 order removing Daniel Stubbs as trustee of the Mary Louella Saunders Supplemental Needs Trust (the supplemental needs trust) and appointing Ernest Gordon Saunders, Mary Louella Saunderss son and legal guardian, as trustee; a December 16, 2005 attorney withdrawal order; and a December 16, 2005 distribution order. We affirm those orders as to Ms. Ringgold. In addition, Ms. Ringgold purports to represent Ms. Saunders on appeal from the foregoing orders. However, for the reasons discussed below, we find Ms. Ringgold is not authorized to pursue this appeal on Ms. Saunderss behalf. As a result, the appeal is dismissed as to Ms. Saunders.

Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) section 12.70 forbids the location of an adult entertainment business within 500 feet of a school. Grand Avenue Enterprises, Inc. (GAE) sought to open an adult entertainment concern in central Los Angeles. After issuing building permits to GAE, the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety learned that the Los Angeles Unified School District had already obtained approval from the Division of State Architect to construct a middle school 150 feet from GAEs lap dancing cabaret. The Department of Building and Safety revoked GAEs permits prompting GAE to file a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to overturn the Departments action. The trial court denied the writ petition and granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings brought by defendant City of Los Angeles (the City) concerning GAEs claim for damages. GAE appeals. Court hold that the Department of Building and Safety abused its discretion in relying on LAMC sections 12.70 B(11) and hence 12.70C as the basis for revoking GAEs permits. Accordingly, court reverse the judgment.

Defendant was found guilty of petty theft with a prior conviction. (Pen. Code, 484, subd. (a), 666.) Three prison priors alleged pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) were found true. He was sentenced to five years in state prison, and this timely appeal followed. His counsel has asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After review of the record, court find no error and affirm.

Uvaldo Mora appeals a judgment of conviction of kidnapping to commit carjacking, kidnapping to commit robbery, kidnapping, carjacking, second degree robbery, false imprisonment by violence, making criminal threats, and possession of a firearm by a felon, with findings of personal weapon use and the commission of criminal acts for street gang purposes. (Pen. Code, 209.5, subd. (a), 209, subd. (b)(1), 207, subd. (a), 215, subd. (a), 211, 236, 422, 12021, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), & 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Court remand for the calculation of Mora's sentence, presentence conduct and total custody credits, but otherwise affirm.

This is a third party bad faith case against an insurer. Court reject the plaintiffs claims of error and affirm a judgment in favor of the insurer.

Appellant appeals from the juvenile courts orders declaring his children, now 12 years old, and Raquel G., now nine years old, to be dependent children, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section300, and committing their custody to the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) for suitable placement in the home of their mother, pursuant to section 361. Appellant contends the juvenile courts denial of his request for a continuance of the dispositional hearing was an abuse of discretion. He further contends the courts refusal to grant a continuance denied him the opportunity to contest the Agencys disposition recommendations because he had not been not given proper notice that the dispositional hearing would be held on February 21, 2006, the same date as the jurisdictional hearing. Court affirm the juvenile courts orders.

Appellant appeals from a final judgment disposing of all issues between the parties. Appellants counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has declared that appellant has been notified that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Appellant was also advised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this courts attention. No supplemental brief has been filed by appellant personally.
Although no issues have been briefed, appellants counsel has pointed out two issues as items in the record that might arguably support the appeal under Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 744. First, whether the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on mutual combat self-defense (CALCRIM No. 3471) in light of the evidence at trial. Second, counsel has asked us to consider whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion in denying appellants request to be placed on probation.
The judgment is affirmed.

On May 27, 2005, appellant entered a plea of guilty to felony possession of a firearm. (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1).) On June 24, 2005, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on three years formal probation, and imposed a 90-day jail sentence, community service hours and certain fines and fees. In May 2006, following a probation revocation hearing, the trial court modified appellants probation, imposing an additional nine-month jail sentence and extending probation until July 8, 2008. A timely notice of appeal from this probation modification was filed. Appellants counsel raises no legal issues, but asks that we independently review the record to determine if any arguable issues exist. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel advised his client in writing that a Wende brief was being filed and that appellant had the right to personally file a supplemental brief in this case within 30 days. No such brief was filed.There are no arguable issues. The order is affirmed.

Appellant was charged with possession of methamphetamine (Health and Saf. Code, 11377 count 1) and with two misdemeanor drug offenses. He pled guilty to all three counts and on August 29, 2005, was granted probation on certain terms and conditions, including the payment of a restitution fine of $200 pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4. On April 3, 2006, appellant admitted violating probation and on May 8, 2006, he was sentenced on count 1 to the midterm of two years in state prison, with jail terms on the misdemeanors ordered to run concurrently. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay a $400 restitution fine pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4 and a matching $400 restitution fine pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.45, which latter fine was suspended unless parole was revoked.
The trial court is ordered to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect restitution fines in the amount of $200 and to transmit the corrected abstract to the Director of the Department of Corrections. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendants appeal from judgments entered after a jury convicted each of them of one count of first degree felony murder and two counts of attempted robbery. Sandoval contends, among other things, the trial court committed reversible error by violating his right to have his own defense interpreter throughout the proceedings against him. Martinez joined this claim and also asserted the trial court erred in sentencing him.
Court find the trial court erred when it forced the three defendants to share one defense interpreter during trial without a valid waiver of their rights to individual interpreters. During the time the defense interpreter was borrowed to act as the witness interpreter, court cannot conclude the courts error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, court reverse the judgments.

Plaintiffs, a minor, and his mother, as guardian ad litem, sued defendant and respondent for medical malpractice, alleging that Dr. Freedman negligently performed a hydrocelectomy on Sean, causing the boy to lose one of his testicles. Plaintiffs case was submitted to the jury under dual theories of general negligence and conditional res ipsa loquitur, giving the jury the option of finding Dr. Freedman negligent either because the surgery was performed below the standard of care expected of urologists in similar circumstances (general negligence) or because Seans injury ordinarily would not have occurred in the absence of Dr. Freedmans negligent performance (res ipsa loquitur).
Plaintiffs timely appeal raises two issueswhether the trial court erred in granting Dr. Freedmans motion for JNOV and whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial for insufficient evidence. As to the first issue, our independent review discloses substantial evidence of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur to support plaintiffs verdict. Nevertheless, our deferential review finds support for the trial courts discretionary new trial order. Court therefore reverse the trial courts entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but affirm the granting of the new trial motion.