CA Unpub Decisions

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Stephen D. Schuett, Judge.
Rodriguez & Associates, Daniel Rodriguez, Joel T. Andreesen, Joseph Whittington; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Andrew N. Chang and Kevin K. Nguyen, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Herr Pedersen & Berglund, Leonard C. Herr and Caren L. Curtiss, for Defendant and Respondent.
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Plaintiffs and appellants Davin Cano and Edie Cano (together, the “plaintiffs”) appeal from an order granting defendant and respondent Delano Union School District’s (the “District”) motion for judgment on the pleadings. No judgment has been entered in this case. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order appealed from is not appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a); Sanchez v. Westlake Services, LLC (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1105 (Sanchez).)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Sonny S. Sandhu, Judge.
Niddrie Addams Fuller Singh, John S. Addams, Rupa G. Singh; Hogue & Belong, Jeffrey L. Hogue, Tyler J. Belong; Law Offices of Devon K. Roepcke and Devon K. Roepcke for Movant and Appellant.
Capstone Law, Ryan H. Wu and John E. Stobart for Plaintiff and Respondent JeRae Porras.
Winston Law Group and David S. Wintson for Plaintiff and Respondent Mandi Sanchez.
Harris & Ruble, Alan Harris, David Garrett; North Bay Law Group and David Harris for Plaintiffs and Respondents Jason LeSure, Kadiedra Crawford, and Janie Salguero.
DLA Piper, Levi W. Heath and Steve L. Hernandez for Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Kathy Ciuffini, Judge.
Charles A. Miller, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Scampini, Mortara & Harris, Haig A. Harris, Jr., and Neil S. Turner for Defendant and Respondent.
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Charles Anderson Miller appeals after he was designated as a vexatious litigant who was unlikely to prevail on the merits of his lawsuit and had his case dismissed when he could not post the required security ordered by the trial court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.3.) In addition, Miller appeals following the trial court’s decision to issue a prefiling order against him. (§ 391.7.) For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The litigation underlying this case has been proceeding for more than a decade and has undergone multiple appeals. We recount facts relevant to the issues before us in this appeal.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Erin K. Alexander, Judge. Affirmed.
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Dawn M. Martin, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In July 2018 defendant and appellant M.R. (Mother) had three minor children: S.R. (female, born March 2001); D.R. (male, born Sept. 2012) and L.R. (male, born March 2015; collectively, the Children). M.F. (Father) is the father of D.R. and L.R. (collectively, Brothers). On appeal, Mother contends that the juvenile court’s findings and orders at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing terminating her parental rights to Brothers must be reversed. For the reasons set forth post, we affirm.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Teresa S. Bennett, Judge. Affirmed.
Demidchik Law Firm and D. Garth Sullivan for Appellant.
Law Office of James J. Kenny, James J. Kenny, and Kelly A. Price for Respondent.
After a four-day evidentiary hearing, the trial judge found Jinxin Chen had committed past acts of abuse within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq. (DVPA)) and issued a domestic violence restraining order requiring him to stay away from his wife, Juan Chen, for three years. On appeal, Jinxin argues the judge applied the wrong burden of proof. We disagree and affirm.
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FACTS
Jinxin and Juan have been married since October 2014, and they have a son together, who was born in 2016. In April 2021, Juan filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order against her husband. In her supporting declaration, Juan said Jinxin had attacked her on multiple occasions, blocked her movements by taking her car, and would monitor an

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Michelle D. Pena, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, Lisa Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

N.W. (Mother) appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders in the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 dependency proceedings for her minor daughter, I.G., in which the juvenile court found that the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) did not apply to her case. Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not meet its initial ICWA inquiry duty under section 224.2 because it did not make reasonable efforts to contact the maternal grandfather regarding I.G.’s possible Native American heritage.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Thomas S. Garza, Judge. Affirmed.
William M. Crosby for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Law Offices of John G. Wurm and John G. Wurm for Defendant and Respondent.



A 1965 deed to a Lake Arrowhead residential property prohibits the owner from cutting down “any living tree” unless first approved by an architectural committee (Committee). The primary issue in this case is whether this restriction is, as plaintiff-homeowners contend, unenforceable under the Marketable Record Title Act (Act) (Civil Code, § 880.020 et seq.). Disagreeing with plaintiffs, the trial court determined that the tree-cutting restriction was enforceable under an exception in the Act for equitable servitudes.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Katherine Bacal, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard A. Schulman, A Professional Corporation and Richard A. Schulman, for Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, Winter King, Tori Ballif Gibbons and Mindy K. Jian, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Appellant and real party in interest RCS-Harmony Partners, LLC (Harmony) appeals a postjudgment order awarding Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 private attorney general fees to respondents Elfin Forest Harmony Grove Town Council, Endangered Habitats League, and Cleveland National Forest Foundation, after the trial court found merit to respondents’ challenge under state planning/zoning law and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) to the County of San Diego’s (County) approval of a development project. The court entered its order during the pendency of Harmony’s appeal from the judgment on the C

Appointed counsel for defendant Michael Angelo Rogers filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After examining the record, we have found a clerical error in the abstract of judgment. We will direct correction of that clerical error and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In early 2021, defendant was serving a three-year prison sentence for stalking. A correctional officer received notice defendant had violated a restraining order. Upon a search of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s records, the officer found defendant had attempted to call the victim 21 times and one of those calls connected. An audiotape of that call was played for the trial court.

D.C. is the half-brother of the minor’s mother. He is married to K.C. The juvenile court denied the requests of K.C. and D.C. for appointed counsel and de facto parent status (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395), and they appeal. D.C. joins in, and adopts, the appellate contentions asserted by K.C. Finding no error, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
BACKGROUND
K.C. filed three previous and related appeals: one from an order issued by the juvenile court in Siskiyou County (In re A.C. (Mar. 22, 2022, C093887) [nonpub. opn.], review denied June 15, 2022) and two from orders issued by the juvenile court in Butte County (In re A.C. (Mar. 24, 2022, C094217) [nonpub. opn.] & In re A.C. (C094859), dismissed Mar. 28, 2022). We take judicial notice of the record in each of K.C.’s related appeals, as well as this court’s prior orders and opinions in these cases. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

After a bench trial, the court found defendant Larry LaShay Washington guilty of two counts of second degree robbery. The court found true that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of each offense. (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b).)
The court sentenced defendant to 12 years in prison: the low term of two years on count 1, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement. The court imposed a concurrent two-year sentence on count 2.
On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to control the objectives of his defense by not asking whether he consented to his counsel’s concession of guilt; (2) the court erred by failing to give him full Boykin-Tahl advisements because his bench trial was in effect a “slow plea” of guilty; and (3) the court’s imposition of certain fines and fees without holding a hearing on his ability to pay them violated his constitutional rights. We will modify the judgment to correct the trial court’s miscalc

Defendant Elidia Arlenelalain Tooley contends she is entitled to two days of conduct credit. Because Penal Code section 1237.1 required her to assert the contention at sentencing and she did not, her claim is not cognizable on appeal and we will dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND
Defendant pleaded no contest to vehicular manslaughter and child abuse. Prior to sentencing she spent two days in custody. The trial court sentenced her to an aggregate term of five years four months in state prison and awarded her two days of presentence custody credit for the actual time spent in custody. No conduct credit was awarded and there was no objection on this ground asserted in the trial court.
While this appeal was pending, defendant’s appellate counsel sent two letters to the trial court pursuant to section 1237.1 requesting an award of conduct credit. The trial court denied the request on the ground that a defendant must spend at least four days in custody for conduct credit to begin accruing.

On transfer from the California Supreme Court based on a change in the law, this court considers the case again.
The Viet Pride and Khome Zong Tong (KZT) gangs are rivals of the Hop Sing street gang. In 2012, Kao Saechao, a Hop Sing gang member, entered a store in a shopping center in South Sacramento, a gathering place for KZT and Viet Pride members who consider the shopping center their territory. A minute later, defendants Jhordan Villanueva and Danny Dien Do, Viet Pride gang members, appeared outside the store and were joined soon after by defendants Roderick Bernard Randall and Conrad J. Johnson, Jr., KZT gang members. Villanueva, Do, and Randall challenged Saechao to come outside and fight. Saechao, fearing there would be a shootout if he left the store, called other Hop Sing members for help, and they arrived shortly thereafter in a red Honda. Shots were fired at the Honda by defendants Lam Quoc Luong and Johnson, and occupants were hit.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Kristen Byrdsong, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Kelly Emling, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Joy G. (Mother), mother of minors Z.B. and L.B., appeals from the juvenile court’s findings and orders terminating her parental rights. Mother’s sole asserted basis for reversal is that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to ask extended maternal family members whether Z.B. or L.B. is an “Indian child” within the meaning of Section 1903 of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. Sec. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA), as required by section 224.2, subdivision (b), of the Welfare and Institutions Code.