CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant appeals an order revoking his probation following a contested probation revocation hearing. (Pen. Code, S 1237, subd. (b).) Defendant's counsel advises this court that her examination of the record reveals no arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel has advised her client in writing that a Wende brief was filed and that defendant had the right to personally file a supplemental brief in this case within 30 days. No such brief was filed. Court agree that the record reveals no arguable issues and affirm.

Defendant appeals the juvenile court's order denying his motion to modify restitution after we struck great bodily injury (GBI) enhancements and remanded the case to the juvenile court for a new dispositional hearing and order. (In re Michael L. (Dec. 30, 2005) WL 3588448 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.).) Appellant's counsel has filed a Wende brief. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436). Court affirm.

Plaintiff (Marriott) sued defendants and respondents the DJJ Family Limited Partnership and Vatche Boyadjian (collectively Boyadjian) for breach of contract for the sale of real estate, specific performance, and declaratory relief. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Boyadjian.
Court reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to enter judgment for specific performance in favor of Marriott. The trial court erred by enforcing a time is of the essence provision in the parties' purchase agreement. Alternatively, Boyadjian waived enforcement of the time is of the essence provision.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following a bifurcated jury trial in which he was convicted of two counts of assault upon a peace officer (Pen. Code, S 245, subd. (c)), unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, S 10851, subd. (a)), and evading an officer while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, S 2800.2, subd. (a)), with further findings that he had previously been convicted of violating Vehicle Code section 10851 within the meaning of Penal Code section 666.5 and had sustained 13 prior convictions within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court's response to a jury question, that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on mistake of fact and claim of right, and that he was improperly sentenced for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. The Attorney General seeks a sentencing remand with respect to the disposition of findings made under section 667.5, subdivision (b) and the trial court's failure to impose required security fees. Court reverse in part and remand for resentencing, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of second degree murder with the personal use of a firearm that he intentionally discharged, causing death, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon on January 17, 2004 (counts 1 and 2). Following the verdicts, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to three additional counts of illegal firearm possession (counts 3, 5, and 6) and one count of misdemeanor unlawful use of a driver's license (count 4), all of which crimes occurred on February 25, 2004. At sentencing, the trial court found that defendant had sustained two prior felony convictions under the "Three Strikes" law and sentenced him to 70 years to life for murder (15 years to life, trebled under the Three Strikes law, plus 25 years for the firearm enhancement), with sentence on the remaining convictions to be served concurrently.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the case to be filed a third time following two dismissals, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on count 2, that he was unduly prejudiced by evidence introduced in support of a gang allegation (which the jury found not true), that CALJIC No. 5.17 should have been modified, that the trial court failed to provide independent review on his motion for a new trial based on insufficient evidence on counts 1 and 2, and that his motion for a new trial on counts 1 and 2 also should have been granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Court find merit in defendant's contentions regarding the third filing of the complaint with respect to count 2 only and in his argument that the trial court failed to provide independent review. Accordingly, court reverse the judgment on count 2 with directions to dismiss that count, reverse the judgment on count 1 with directions to conduct a new hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, and affirm the judgment on counts 3 through 6.

This is a class action alleging gender based wage discrimination in violation of the state and federal Equal Pay Acts and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, in which the employer prevailed by summary judgment. Court affirm.

A jury convicted appellant of one count of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, S 422), and found true the allegation that he personally used a firearm (S 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to state prison for a term of five years, consisting of a mid term of two years and a consecutive low term of three years for the firearm enhancement. In this appeal from the judgment of conviction, appellant claims the trial court failed to recognize that it had the discretion to grant probation and so failed to exercise that discretion, and should have given a unanimity instruction as to the charge of making a criminal threat. Finding no error, court affirm the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, with true findings on allegations that he had served two prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, SS 245, subd. (a)(1), 667.5, subd. (b).) Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a term of five years (upper term of four years plus one year for one prior prison term). He appeals, claiming (I) the trial court should have granted his request for a continuance so that he could retain private counsel, and (II) his upper term sentence must be vacated. We agree that the upper term sentence must be vacated (Cunningham v. California (2007) ___ U.S. ___ [127 S.Ct. 856]) but otherwise reject Brown's claim of error, modify the judgment, affirm as modified, and remand with directions to enter a corrected abstract of judgment.

Anthony Nagy appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of two counts of elder abuse (Pen. Code, S 368, subd. (b)(1)), two counts of assault with a deadly weapon by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (S 245, subd. (a)((1)), and two counts of obstructing/resisting an executive officer (S 69). The jury found that appellant personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the elder abuse counts (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Appellant was sentenced to four years state prison. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of carjacking, robbery, assault with a firearm, assault with a deadly weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and burglary, as well as various enhancements. He contends: (1) the carjacking and burglary convictions were not supported by substantial evidence; (2) there were various sentencing errors; and (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to those sentencing errors. Court reverse and remand for resentencing and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempting to take a firearm from a peace officer (Pen. Code, S 148, subd. (d)) and placed on probation. Mayfield appeals, (I) contending the trial court should have sua sponte suspended the proceedings and held a competency hearing, and (II) claiming the trial court should not have admitted evidence of his prior misconduct. Court affirm.

A modification decision.

Defendant appeals from judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of nine counts of second degree robbery, counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 (Pen. Code, S 211) with the finding as to counts 1 and 2 that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a screwdriver, within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b); and as to counts 4 through 8, he personally used a handgun within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a). He admitted he suffered three prior convictions and served prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to prison for 21 years and 8 months and contends the evidence was legally insufficient to establish he committed a robbery as alleged in count 9. For reasons stated in the opinion, court affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.