CA Unpub Decisions

A modification decision.

This is a bodily injury case (dependent adult abuse and negligence) in which the trial court granted summary judgment. Court reverse.

Defendant was sentenced to 10 years 4 months state prison in four cases and ordered to pay restitution. He appeals contending that the trial court increased a restitution fine after he violated probation in one case and ordered victim restitution on a count that was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement. (Pen. Code, S 1202.4, subd. (f).) Court conclude that the trial court erred in increasing the restitution fine (S 1202.4, subd. (b)) in case number 2002029505 from $200 to $1,500, and reduce the restitution fine and matching parole revocation fine (S 1202.45) to $200. (People v. Arata (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 195, 201-203.) As modified, the judgments are affirmed.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following his negotiated plea of guilty to possession of marijuana for the purpose of sale and admissions that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and that he had sustained a prior felony conviction within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law. (In exchange for the plea, a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and allegations of additional prior felony convictions were dismissed.) Defendant was sentenced to state prison for seven years, comprised of two years for the offense, doubled under the Three Strikes law, and a three year gang enhancement. He contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence. Court affirm.

Defendant was convicted by jury of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (count 1) and receiving stolen property (count 2) based on evidence that on November 17, 2005, he drove a car that had been stolen the day before. The car had a punched-out ignition and the stereo system was missing. Defendant was sentenced to the middle term of two years on count 1, with sentence on count 2 stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Restitution to the victim under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f), was ordered in the amount of $1,300.
Defendant contends that the restitution should have been limited to $1,200. The basis of the contention is that, although the victim testified he had spent "[a]bout $1,200, more or less" to fix the car and the probation officer's report indicated that the victim had reported a loss of "approximately $1,200," at the sentencing hearing the prosecutor stated that the loss was $1,300 and the court ordered restitution in that amount. The Attorney General aptly concedes that defendant's contention is meritorious and that the judgment should be modified to reflect the $1,200 amount. Court modify the judgment accordingly.

Johnny N. appeals from the order continuing wardship entered following a finding that he committed robbery with personal use of a firearm. He was committed to the California Youth Authority and contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in allowing his disposition hearing to be continued until after he reached an age when he was no longer eligible for less restrictive placement options. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of forcible rape, during the commission of which he used a knife. The conviction arose from an incident in which defendant raped Julia D. on June 25, 2005, while the two were at the entryway of a building in Los Angeles. The information further alleged that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667.61, subdivision (b) (the "One Strike" law), 667, subdivisions (b) (i) (the "Three Strikes" law), and 667, subdivision (a)(1).The finding that defendant suffered a prior felony conviction is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings on the allegation of the prior conviction. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

In December 2004, Defendant entered an open no contest plea to one count of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, S 422), acknowledging as part of a plea agreement that the maximum "time in custody in [his] case [was] three years" (upper term), but that based on his open plea sentencing would be deferred for eight months, imposition of sentence would be suspended, probation would be granted with credit for the eight months served, and that if he violated any term of probation he "could be sent to state prison for up to the full three years." Jones waived his right to a jury trial, and probation was later granted in conformance with the agreement. Defendant violated the terms of probation and it was revoked in April 2006, at which time the trial court imposed the contemplated three-year state prison sentence.
The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant was convicted by jury of five counts of robbery and two counts of attempted robbery, and admitted having suffered a prior felony conviction within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law. The convictions arose from separate incidents that occurred between February 12 and March 11, 2005, during each of which defendant entered a commercial establishment and demanded money from the cashier. At sentencing, the court referred to another robbery matter (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. KA070207) on which defendant had been sentenced to 15 years. Sentence on that matter was deemed the principal term, and consecutive sentences of 2 years (one third the middle term of 1 year, doubled under the Three Strikes law) were imposed on defendant's robbery convictions in this case, for a total of 10 years. Concurrent terms were imposed for the attempted robberies.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that counsel has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109–110; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.)
The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant appeals from an order issued at a progress hearing held on July 31, 2006, wherein the juvenile court reiterated that it had terminated jurisdiction over appellant's daughter, C. W. (referred to in this opinion as C.). Appellant also appeals from an order issued on August 1, 2006, denying his request for disability accommodation.
After examination of the record, appellant's court appointed counsel advised this court in writing that he was unable to find any arguable issues. Court thereafter notified appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any argument he wished this court to consider and that failure to do so would result in dismissal of this appeal as abandoned.
Therefore, under the holding of In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th 952, the appeal is dismissed

By petition for writ of mandate, mother challenges the juvenile court order adjudicating her sons, Joel and Samuel C., dependent children, denying reunification services, and setting a permanency planning hearing. Court deny the requested relief.

The trial court abused its discretion in denying David Butler's petition for an order relieving him from the provisions of Government Code section 945.4. Accordingly, court grant the petition for writ of mandate.

Mother appeals from a juvenile court order
that terminated reunification services with respect to her six oldest children and adopted permanent plans of out of home placement with a goal of legal guardianship for five of them, and out-of-home placement with a goal of emancipation for the sixth. Mother argues the court should have returned custody of the children to her because the evidence was insufficient to establish that return would present a substantial risk to their safety, protection, physical or emotional well being. She argues the court also erred when it approved a permanent plan of emancipation for her eldest child. Since the first contention lacks merit, and the second was forfeited, court affirm the order.

This appeal arises from ongoing litigation in a marital dissolution action. Appellant seeks relief from a postjudgment order in which the trial court awarded Sarah Talerman (Sarah) $2,500 in attorney fees. Less than a month after the court entered a judgment in the Talermans' dissolution action, Abraham moved the court to set aside the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), and/or to modify the child support award. Although the parties' attorneys appeared before the court on the hearing date for the motion, the court indicated that it did not want to hear oral argument and that it would take the matter under submission. The court issued an order denying Abraham's motion to modify the child support award on several grounds. The court also ordered Abraham to pay Sarah's attorney fees in the amount of $2,500.
Abraham contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $2,500 in attorney fees. Abraham asserts that if the court's award of attorney fees was pursuant to Family Code[3] section 2030, the award of attorney fees should be reversed because the court failed to address the parties' relative circumstances at the time the request for attorney fees was made. Abraham also maintains that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees because the parties' respective financial circumstances did not warrant the award, and because prior to the hearing date, Abraham had requested that the matter be taken off the court's calendar. Finally, Abraham contends that if the court intended the attorney fee award to be a sanction, the court abused its discretion because Abraham was provided no notice of a request for sanctions or of the court's intention to impose sanctions, and also because his conduct did not warrant the imposition of sanctions.
Court conclude that the trial court failed to demonstrate that it considered the factors a court must consider when determining whether to award attorney fees under section 2030. Court therefore reverse the portion of the trial court's order awarding attorney fees, and remand the matter to the trial court for it to make the necessary findings pertaining to an award of attorney fees in a dissolution action.