CA Unpub Decisions

After the court denied a motion to quash a search warrant and suppress evidence (Pen. Code, S 1538.5), Danny W. Weaver entered guilty pleas to being a felon in possession of a firearm (S 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and ammunition (S 12316) and possession of narcotics paraphernalia (Health and Saf. Code, S 11364). He admitted having been convicted of two prior strikes (SS 667, subd. (b)(1), 1170.12, 668). The court struck the prior strikes, suspended imposition of sentence on the convictions of unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition, placed him on three years' probation for those convictions and imposed a sentence of time served on the conviction of possession of narcotics paraphernalia. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence. The judgment is affirmed.

Tina B. appeals a judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to her minor children Joshua B. and Justina B. (together the minors) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Tina challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. Court affirm the judgment.

Tyler H. seeks review of juvenile court orders terminating his reunification services regarding his child, Kylie H., and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He contends the juvenile court erred by not extending services for six more months. He argues he did not receive reasonable services because the relative caretaker obstructed visitation; he and Kylie's mother, Katrina E., participated regularly in services and made substantive progress; and there was a substantial probability of Kylie's return to their care before the 12-month date. Court deny the petition.

Claris Fisher, the wife of conservatee, Meyer Fisher, appeals from a probate order settling the second account current filed by the Riverside County Public Guardian, acting as the successor permanent conservator for Meyer. (SS 1300, subds. (b) and (f), and 1301, subds. (c) and (e).) Claris is being represented by her son, a lawyer, Eric Neshanian. Riverside County Counsel represents the public guardian. The main point of contention on appeal is whether the public guardian failed to list two notes for the sale of a business called Color Lab as the major asset of Meyer's estate.
Court deny Claris's request for judicial notice of items four through 14, composed of various newspaper and magazine articles. (Evid. Code, SS 452, subd. (h), and 459; Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.)
Court hold the trial court did not err in denying Claris's motion for a directed verdict or in approving the second account current.

A one count information filed by the Riverside County District Attorney charged defendant with commercial burglary, a violation of Penal Code section 459. It further alleged that appellant served a prior prison term for the crime of arson of a structure, a violation of Penal Code section 452, subdivision (c), and was released less than five years before committing the offense charged in count 1, within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
At the conclusion of defendant's jury trial, he was convicted as charged, and the allegation regarding a prior prison term was admitted by the defendant and found true by the court. Thereafter, on March 24, 2006, defendant was committed to state prison for 2 years 4 months and awarded the appropriate custody credits.
Court have concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
The judgment is affirmed.

The juvenile court found true that minor and appellant Marvin R. (minor) violated Health and Safety Code sections 11351.5 (possession of cocaine base for purpose of sale) and 11350, subdivision (a) (possession of cocaine). On appeal, minor contends that: (1) the true findings are not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the juvenile court failed to determine his maximum term of confinement under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c). For the reasons set forth below, court remand this case to the juvenile court to determine minor's maximum term of confinement. In all other respects, the disposition of the juvenile court is affirmed.

On appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to K.B., K.S. (Mother) and D.B. (Father, collectively "Parents") claim that the juvenile court erred when it found that the San Bernardino County Department of Children's Services (DCS) complied with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act , 25 United States Code, section 1901 et seq. (ICWA). They claim that the notice sent to the tribes did not contain all of the information that was readily available to DCS and therefore did not constitute meaningful notice. In addition, father claims that he was not provided with proper notice of his right to file a writ petition from the orders made at the hearing setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. He therefore challenges the juvenile court's failure to provide him with six months of reunification services in order to determine whether a suitable relative placement existed for K.B. Finding that there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that proper notice was given under the ICWA, court reverse.

Appellant appeals his conviction on drug and weapons charges claiming that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he had actual or constructive possession of the drugs or weapons and (2) the trial court had a sua sponte duty to clarify the jury instruction on constructive possession by providing the jury with a definition of the term "control."
Court conclude that the evidence presented provided an adequate basis for the jury to infer that appellant had possession of the drugs and weapons that were locked in two safes inside a locked bedroom of the apartment where appellant was arrested. Also, the jury instructions did not use the term "control" in a technical sense peculiar to the law. Therefore, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the meaning of "control."
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Appellant, was found guilty after a jury trial of felony vehicle theft (Veh. Code, S 10851, subd. (a), count one) and felony evasion of a peace officer (Veh. Code, 2800.2, subd. (a), count two). On March 24, 2006, the trial court sentenced Gonzales to the upper prison term of three years on count one and to a concurrent upper term sentence on count two of three years. The court imposed a restitution fine and granted Gonzales 159 days of custody credits.
On appeal, Gonzales contends the trial court violated his right to a jury trial when it relied on aggravating factors to impose the upper term sentence. (Cunningham v. California549 U.S. __ [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham).) Court disagree and affirm.

On April 17, 2006, appellant, entered a plea of guilty to possession of heroin (Health and Saf. Code, S 11350, subd. (a)). Wheelock admitted a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law. In exchange for Wheelock's plea, two misdemeanor counts were dismissed, as well as three other serious felony allegations and allegations that Wheelock served three prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The parties stipulated to a midterm sentence of two years doubled to four years pursuant to the three strikes law. Wheelock requested immediate sentencing, waiving his right to have a probation report prepared. The court sentenced Wheelock to prison for two years, doubled to four years pursuant to the three strikes law, imposed a restitution fine, and granted applicable custody credits.

On June 16, 2006, appellant, entered a plea of no contest to possession of a controlled substance (Health and Saf. Code, S 11377, subd. (a)) after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence filed pursuant to Penal Code, section 1538.5. Price waived drug treatment probation pursuant to Proposition 36 (S 1210.1). Price requested immediate sentencing, waiving his right to have a probation report prepared. The court sentenced Price to prison for 16 months, imposed a restitution fine, and granted applicable custody credits.

Wal Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal Mart) petitions for a writ of review contending the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) exceeded its powers by 1) not reopening a previously stipulated 100 percent permanent disability award for good cause, 2) issuing an award lacking substantial evidence, and 3) ordering Wal Mart to provide medical treatment despite its utilization review denial. Court deny the petition and remand the matter to the WCAB to award supplemental attorney fees because Wal Mart does not demonstrate its claims have any reasonable basis in the law.
The petition for writ of review, filed December 12, 2006, is denied.

Defendant appeals from the judgment after a jury found him guilty of the crime of resisting and obstructing an officer, and found true the gang enhancement allegation that defendant committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang and with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by members of that gang, within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (d). (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Court affirm.

Court appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a brief setting forth a statement of the case. Counsel did not argue against defendant, but advised the court she found no issues to argue on his behalf. Defendant was given 30 days to file his own written argument. That period has passed; Court have received no communication from him. Court examined the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Court find no arguable issues. The appeal is dismissed.