CA Unpub Decisions

The trial court refused to modify an existing child support order requiring appellant Lubna Rashid (formerly Lubna Munir) to pay $1,060 a month in child support, and the court required Rashid to make a payment of $52,420.94 to her former spouse respondent Munir Javed to equalize the court's division of the community's assets and liabilities. Rashid challenges these orders on appeal.
As Rashid has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's orders were in error, the trial court's orders affirmed.

Defendants (Garcia), Jossue Cabrera (Jossue), and Arturo Cabrera (Arturo) appeal from a judgment of conviction entered after they pleaded no contest to grand theft (Pen. Code, SS 484, 487, subd. (a)). The trial court granted probation to defendants. On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred by denying their motion to suppress evidence. Court find no error and affirm.

Appellant appeals from an order awarding respondent Lena Fuentes sole physical custody of their child. Appellant's contentions on appeal involve the admissibility of evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the denial of his various motions. Court find no error and affirm.

Appellant appeals from the juvenile court's order committing him to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) after the juvenile court found that he had committed aggravated assault (Pen. Code, S 245, subd. (a)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, S 12022.7, subd. (a)). His appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which states the case and the facts, raises no issues, and asks us to independently review the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant was notified of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf, but he has not done so. Court therefore review the record to discern whether there are any arguable issues.
Our independent review of the record discloses that there are no arguable issues on appeal, and therefore the juvenile court's order is affirmed.

After finding that Gregory H. committed second degree murder, the juvenile court sustained a petition making him a ward of the court (Welf. and Inst. Code, S 602). Court find that the record lacks substantial evidence supporting the second degree murder finding. The record supports a finding that Gregory committed a voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense. Court reduce the level of offense and remand the case to the juvenile court to reconsider Gregory's commitment.

Plaintiff rejected a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to compromise but lost at trial, and the defendants claimed nearly $50,000 in costs. In this appeal from the order denying his motion to tax costs, Synchef argues the defendants were not entitled to recover costs pursuant to section 998 because their settlement offer was made in bad faith and was reasonably rejected. In the alternative, he contends the cost award should be reduced to exclude certain unrecoverable costs. Court affirm the order.

In an action by premises lessees against a lessor, the lessees prevailed on certain claims, but not on others. Following trial, the lessees moved for an award of attorney's fees and were awarded fees in an amount exceeding the judgment for damages. On appeal, the issues are (1) whether the lessees or lessor were the prevailing party at trial; (2) whether the attorney's fee award should be apportioned between the contract cause of action and tort cause of action for conversion; and (3) whether a proper lodestar calculation was performed.
This court concludes as follows: First, the trial court made an implicit determination that the Militonians were the prevailing party. Second, the Militonians failed to satisfy their burden in demonstrating the fee award should be apportioned. Third, although the trial court did not make specific findings as to the lodestar calculation, it weighed the appropriate factors in determining the award. Therefore, this court finds the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirms the award of attorney's fees.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of 10 counts of grand theft by false pretenses (counts 1, 2, 5 to 8, 13 to 16; Pen. Code, S 487, subd. (a)), fraud in the sale of securities (count 3; Corp. Code, SS 25401, 25540), engaging in a fraudulent securities scheme ( count 4; Corp. Code, S 25541), and four counts of forgery (counts 9, 11, 12, 17; S 470, subd. (c)). The jury found that appellant took property in excess of $2.5 million (S 12022.6, subd. (a)(4)), and on counts 1 through 4 and 6, that appellant took property valued in excess of $100,000 (S1203.045). The jury further found, as to counts 2 through 4, counts 6 through 9, and counts 11 through 17, that the victims did not discover the crimes until after August 15, 1996, a time within the four year statute of limitations. (SS 801.5; 803, subd. (c)
The trial court sentenced appellant to 12 years 4 months state prison, ordered $1,780,726.67 direct restitution (S 1202.4, subd. (f)), and ordered appellant to pay a $500 restitution fine (S 1202.4, subd. (b)) and a $500 parole revocation fine (S 1202.45).

Court affirm the convictions but reverse the sentence.

After appellant was convicted of the traffic infraction of speeding, he filed a civil complaint against the arresting officer, the sheriff, the County of Los Angeles and the two judicial officers who handled his arraignment and trial. The gravamen of his complaint is that traffic infractions do not rise to the level of public offenses and therefore peace officers cannot make warrantless arrests for such infractions. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint without leave to amend and entered judgments of dismissal. Court find appellant's appeal to be without merit and therefore affirm.

This is a suit for traditional mandamus relief. (Code Civ. Proc. S 1085.) The petitioners seek to compel a corporation, and three of its officers, to permit them to inspect and copy corporate books, records and documents. Five of the petitioners are members of the corporation.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded. The trial court is directed to vacate the writ, to reconsider and rule on petitioners' request for attorney's fees (including attorney's fees incurred by petitioners in this appeal), and to file a new and different writ and a new and different judgment, all consistent with the views expressed herein. Costs on appeal to petitioners.

Defendant appeals from judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, S 11350, subd. (a)). A second count for destroying evidence in violation of Penal Code section 135, a misdemeanor, was dismissed. The court additionally found appellant had suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, SS 1170.12, subds. (a) – (d) and 667, subds. (b) – (i)) and served a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). His motion for a new trial and Romero[4] motion were denied. He was sentenced to prison for a total of four years, consisting of the middle term of two years, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law. The one year for the prior prison term enhancement was stayed.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellant has, by virtue of counsel's compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered against him in this case. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113.)

Appellant Martin Ortiz Menchaca appeals his conviction by jury of transportation of cocaine (Health and Saf. Code, S 11352, subd. (a)) and possession for sale of a controlled substance. (S 11351.) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, and granted appellant 36 months formal probation, with 240 days of jail time and other terms and conditions. Appellant argues that the judgment must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Court affirm.

Ruben M. appeals from an order of wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 upon a true finding that on August 3, 2005, he unlawfully possessed a concealable firearm, count 1, in violation of Penal Code section 12101, subdivision (a)(1), and that on the same date he made criminal threats to two separate victims, counts 2 and 3, in violation of Penal Code section 422. He was placed in a camp community placement program for six months, and the maximum period of confinement was determined to be five years and four months. The maximum period of confinement included previously sustained petitions with detention time remaining.
For reasons stated in the opinion, court affirm the order of wardship and remand the matter to the juvenile court with directions to modify certain conditions of probation, to declare whether the offenses were felonies or misdemeanors, and to recalculate the maximum term of confinement.

Father and mother appeal from May 26, 2006, orders of the dependency court terminating their parental rights to their two children, A.S. and D.S.
Court hold: (1) the parents abandoned their pleas for substitute counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118; (2) the juvenile court erred in not ordering family reunification services to father; and (3) as to mother, the exception to terminating parental rights found in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply. Court reverse the order terminating parental rights and the section 366.21, subdivision (f) December 15, 2005, order only as to father. Court remand to the juvenile court.