CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss his prior "strike" conviction under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). Court conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Court therefore affirm.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance and giving false information to a police officer. (Health and Saf. Code, S 11377, subd. (a); Pen. Code, S 148.9, subd. (a).) He admitted that he had been convicted of residential burglary, a serious felony within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law. (Pen. Code, SS 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) Probation was denied and he was sentenced to a four-year term in state prison. He appeals, arguing the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument and the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce the possession charge to a misdemeanor, grant him probation, and strike his prior conviction of a serious felony. The Attorney General argues that the trial court failed to impose the required penalty assessments. Court modify the judgment to reflect the imposition of those assessments and affirm.

Defendant appeals the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of first degree murder committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang in which he personally discharged a firearm causing death. (Pen. Code, SS 187, 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.53, subd. (d).) The jury also convicted Mora of eight counts of attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang in which he personally discharged a firearm causing death. (SS 664/187, 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of 370 years to life in state prison and ordered Mora to pay restitution to the family of the murder victim in the amount of $1,283,442.
Court affirm the judgment.

K.T. appeals from an order continuing wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 upon a finding that he committed a first degree residential burglary. (Pen. Code, S 459.) Defendant was placed in the care, custody and control of the probation officer for suitable placement and contends discovery of his fingerprints four days after the burglary on the window used to enter the house did not provide the required substantial evidence of guilt. He additionally claims probation conditions which fail to give him reasonable notice as to what conduct is forbidden are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. For reasons stated in the opinion, court affirm the order of wardship.

A jury convicted defendant of one count of resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, S 69). Defendant admitted an allegation of a prior strike conviction (SS 667, subds. (b) (i), 1170.12, subds. (a) (d)), and was sentenced to a term of 32 months in prison (the low term of 16 months, doubled). Defendant appeals from the judgment, contending that the trial court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction concerning the use of an audio recording at trial, or in the alternative that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request such an instruction. Court affirm.

Minor appeals from the order of wardship entered by the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 following a finding that he had committed three counts of robbery. (Pen. Code, S 211.) Minor was placed in the camp/community program for a period of six months. Minor appeals, contending that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he participated in the robberies, (2) his counsel's failure to object to the hearsay statements of two witnesses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) the court erred in imposing probation conditions restricting his association with anyone disapproved of by his parents or his probation officer and prohibiting his participation in any type of gang activity. Court modify the terms of probation and affirm the juvenile court order.

Appelant appeals from the order of the juvenile court that terminated her parental rights to three-year-old T. She contends the parental-relationship exception to adoption under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) applies in this case. Court affirm.

Defendant, appeals from: his conviction for assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, S 245, subd. (a)(2)); the jurors' finding that he personally used a handgun (SS 667, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c), 12022.5); and the trial court's finding that he was previously convicted of two serious felonies. (SS 667, subds. (a)(1), (b) (i), 1170.12.) Appellant contends the trial court should have dismissed one or both of his prior conviction findings pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a). Court affirm.

Mother appeals from the order made on July 3, 2006, at a 12-month review hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (f), terminating reunification services for Lourdes S., born in 1988, and Oscar S., born in 1992, (the children). The children's father did not appeal. Mother contends the order terminating reunification services was an abuse of discretion because substantial evidence does not support the finding that reasonable services were provided. Court hold the finding is supported by substantial evidence and reject the contention. Court affirm the order.

Defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to possession of methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). In exchange for her plea, she waived her right to request Proposition 36 drug treatment (Pen. Code, S 1210.1) and an additional count for possession of methamphetamine for sale was dismissed. The trial court placed defendant on probation with the condition she serve 270 days in county jail and complete an inpatient substance abuse program.
On appeal, defendant contends the provision in the plea agreement waiving Proposition 36 drug treatment was invalid as against public policy. Court conclude that a determination on the merits of defendant's claim would be improper because she did not obtain a certificate of probable cause. Accordingly, court dismiss the appeal.

Defendant entered a plea of no contest to possession of cocaine hydrochloride for sale (Health and Saf. Code, S 11351) and possession of marijuana for sale. (Health and Saf. Code, S 11359.) Defendant's plea came after his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 was denied in part and a subsequent motion to set aside the information pursuant to section 995, in which defendant reargued his motion to suppress, was denied. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of two years and eight months in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends his motion to suppress should have been granted completely. Respondent disagrees, but points out an error in sentencing. Court order the judgment modified and the abstract of judgment amended to correct the sentencing error. Court otherwise affirm the judgment.

Appellant, the father of James V. (the minor), appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights. (Welf. and Inst. Code, SS 366.26, 395; further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his petition for modification (S 388). Appellant also claims the court and Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) violated notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. S 1901 et seq.) DHHS concedes ICWA notice requirements were not met. Court reverse conditionally and remand for proper notice only.

Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court's orders denying her petition for modification and terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, SS 366.26, 388, 395.) Appellant contends the juvenile court erred by denying her petition for modification. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals a judgment finding him incompetent to stand trial, contending that since his period of commitment has now exceeded the maximum term he could have served for his criminal cases, he should be released. Court affirm the judgment but remand to the superior court for further proceedings.