CA Unpub Decisions

Court review a judgment of dismissal after demurrer, regarding the " Writ of Mandamus . . . and Motion for Summary Judgment" filed in 2005 in superior court by plaintiff and appellant Michael Anthony Lane (a California prison inmate). In his pleading (the complaint), Lane seeks relief against respondents California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) and Jeanne S. Woodford (together defendants) for their alleged mishandling of his claims regarding the sum of $797.60, representing reimbursement of amounts taken from his inmate trust account at another prison, to satisfy then-existing restitution orders, between 1995 and 2002. Previously, in 2004, Lane obtained a small claims court judgment in that amount, which was honored by defendants. (Lane v. Dept. of Corrections (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2004, No. SC157217).)
Court agree with the trial court that the complaint fails to state any cognizable claim for relief and it is barred by section 116.710, subdivision (a). The demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend.

Father, the biological father of E.W. (child) who was born in September 2005, appeals from an order of the dependency court terminating his parental rights. The mother of the child is not a party to this appeal.
Counsel for father has filed a no-issue brief under authority of In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952 and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 setting forth a statement of the case and a statement of the facts. Counsel asks us to undertake an independent review of the entire record.
Father was afforded an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief which we have received and considered.
Finding no arguable issues, court affirm the judgment.

On October 4, 2004, appellant pled nolo contendere in case No. PCF129598 to possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health and Saf. Code, S 11379, subd. (a), count one), driving with a blood alcohol level of .08% or higher (Veh. Code, S 23152, subd. (b), count three), and driving with a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code,S 14601.1, subd. (a), count four). On November 9, 2004, a jury convicted Tapia in case No. VCF132057 of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, S 211, count one), corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, S 273.5, subd. (a), count two), assault with a weapon likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, S 245, subd. (a), count three), misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, S 594, subd. (a), count five), and a misdemeanor count of dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (Pen. Code, S 136.1, subd. (b)(1), count seven)
The judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the denial of a petition filed by a federal inmate seeking to change his name from Timothy Wayne Arnett to August Damian Kokopelli.
"One's name is a signboard to the world. It is one of the most permanent of possessions; it remains when everything else is lost; it is owned by those who possess nothing else. A name is the only efficient means to describe someone to contemporaries and to posterity. When one dies it is the only part that lives on in the world. [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Gulsvig (Iowa 1993) 498 N.W.2d 725, 730 (dis. opn. of Snell, J.).)
The order of the superior court denying Arnett's petition for a legal name change is reversed and remanded for further consideration applying the correct legal standards.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of guilt and sentence following a no contest plea. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record, pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, in order to determine whether there is any arguable issue on appeal. Court find no arguable issue and affirm.

Appellant appeals from the judgment in favor of Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. (Home Depot) on Humphrey's complaint for negligence. Humphrey argues that the jury instructions and certain evidentiary ruling were erroneous, and that the trial judge was biased against him. Court affirm.

This appeal raises issues involving the interplay between the litigation privilege (Civ. Code section, S 47, subd. (b)); the anti-SLAPP statute (California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 ("section 425.16")); and Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, regarding the procedure to be followed in lawsuits involving childhood sexual abuse and setting forth requirements prior to naming defendants in those pleadings. The trial court granted respondents' anti-SLAPP special motion to strike the instant lawsuit brought by appellant, Monsignor Joseph H. Alzugaray ("Alzugaray" or "appellant") against respondents. Alzugaray alleged eight causes of action involving defamation and false light invasion of privacy arising from complaints filed by respondents that alleged child molestation by Alzugaray, but did not name him as a defendant in those complaints. The trial court found respondents were protected by the litigation privilege. This appeal follows.
Court conclude that appellant is not a "defendant" entitled to at least temporary anonymity under section 340.1 and that the litigation privilege applies. Court therefore affirm the judgment following the trial court's order granting respondents' motion to strike.

Appellant appeals from the order denying his request to modify spousal support payable to his former wife. Court affirm.

Defendants were charged with several counts of murder, attempted murder, and firearm and drug possession, although not every count was alleged against all defendants. Before trial, the court denied Torres' and Ortiz' motions to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, S 1538.5; all further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.) Thereafter, also before trial, as part of a plea bargain, Ortiz pleaded no contest to one second degree murder and admitted that he personally used a handgun during the murder. (SS 187, subd. (a), 189; 12022.53, subd. (b).) After trial, pursuant to the plea bargain, the court imposed an aggregate 25 years to life sentence on Ortiz and dismissed the other 8 charges pending against him.
As to Ortiz, the judgment is affirmed in its entirety. As to Torres and Coreas, their convictions on count 7 are reversed, their sentences are vacated, and the case is remanded for a new trial on that count only and resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment as to Torres and Coreas is affirmed.

Defendant appeals from the judgment following her conviction on two counts of robbery. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of murder and attempted murder, and found that those crimes were committed for the benefit of a street gang. (Pen. Code, S 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Court modify the abstract of judgment to correct a sentencing error, and affirm the judgment as modified.

Defendants, appeal from orders granting a new trial and denying a motion to vacate a judgment in favor of plaintiff. Stock doing business as the Law Office of Ronald C. Stock. Court find no manifest and unmistakable clear abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Court affirm the new trial order. Because it is moot, court also affirm the order denying defendants' motion to vacate the judgment and enter a different judgment.

In this action instituted by a general contractor, a subcontractor filed a cross complaint against the general contractor seeking damages for nonpayment of services. The trial court disposed of the cross complaint by either granting a motion to strike or sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. It is not clear from the state of the record exactly what occurred below. But either way, the trial court acted properly because the subcontractor's corporate status was suspended during the trial court proceedings, and its contractor's license was not valid during the entire period of performance under the construction contracts.

In separate transactions governed by two different purchase agreements, plaintiffs sold real property to defendants that was subject to special city taxes. The city's formula for calculating the taxes, which was contained in a document filed with the county recorder, stated that the city's determination of the tax was "final and conclusive." Both purchase agreements gave the defendants a credit against the purchase price for the amount of the taxes.
Plaintiffs filed this action against defendants, contending that the city's determination of the taxes on the first sale was too high and that they were therefore entitled to an additional sum from the first sale. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding that the parties had received exactly what they had bargained for under the purchase agreements. Court affirm for the same reason.