CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendant and respondent City of Santa Monica, after the City's motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 was granted. Court affirm.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pleaded no contest to possessing cocaine base. (Health and Saf. Code, S 11350, subd. (a).) The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation on condition, among others, that he obey all laws and report to and obey all rules of the probation department. Shortly thereafter, defendant's probation was revoked pending a hearing based on allegations that he (1) vandalized a police car (Pen. Code, S 594) while being detained for sitting on a curb in violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 41.18, subdivision (d),[1] and (2) failed to report to the probation department.
The appeal is dismissed.

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, Albert T., already a delinquent ward based on earlier offenses (Welf. and Inst. Code, S 602; all further undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code), admitted committing second degree commercial burglary. The court placed him on home probation with certain conditions. Later, after a contested hearing pursuant to section 777 based on allegations of various probation violations, the court imposed a more restrictive placement despite finding "that there's [no] demonstrated violation of probation."
Albert appeals, contending that the court erred in imposing a more restrictive placement despite finding no probation violation. We agree, reverse the order imposing a more restrictive placement, and in all other respects affirm the judgment (order continuing wardship).

Defendant appeals from the judgment imposed after a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, S 187; undesignated section references are to that code) and found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing death (S 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)), and the court found he had suffered two prior strike convictions (SS 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), a prior serious felony conviction (S 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a prior prison term (S 667.5(b)). Sentenced to a term of 105 years to life, appellant contends that it was error not to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Court disagree, and affirm the judgment.

In two real estate transactions governed by different purchase agreements, plaintiffs sold defendants undeveloped lots subject to special city taxes. Defendants agreed to be responsible for the taxes and, in turn, were to receive a credit in escrow. Escrow closed in both transactions.
Plaintiffs filed this action, contending that the city's determination of the taxes on the first sale, and thus the escrow credit, was too high, such that defendants owe them an additional sum. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding that the parties had received exactly what they had bargained for under the purchase agreements. Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment.
Defendants then moved for attorney fees pursuant to an attorney fee provision in the agreements. Defendants requested $449,627 in fees. The trial court awarded $359,703. In addition, defendants filed a memorandum of costs. Plaintiffs moved to tax costs, which was denied. Plaintiffs appealed those rulings as well.
In a separate appeal (B186385), court filed an opinion today, affirming the granting of defendants' summary judgment motion. In this opinion, court affirm the award of attorney fees and costs because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making those awards.

Teresa Smith is the former executor of the Estate of Leticia McDonald (the estate). Wanda Smith is the current executor of the estate. As will be noted, as part of the mediation process, the parties agreed the mediator, Retired Judge Edward M. Ross, could make binding findings. Teresa appeals from a probate court order which confirmed Retired Judge Ross's report surcharging her $80,557.14 for breach of her duties as the former executor of the estate. Court affirm.

Factually, this case concerns a house in Woodland Hills which originally belonged to plaintiff and appellant Alex Pladott and now belongs to his sister and brother-in-law, defendants and respondents Josef and Carmella Blankstein. Legally, the case concerns the part performance exception to the statute of frauds. The Blanksteins demurred, contending, inter alia, that any repurchase contract was invalid under the statue of frauds. Pladott's response relied largely on the theory that his part performance of the repurchase agreement made the contract enforceable. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to every cause of action but the cause of action for fraud. Pladott later dismissed that cause of action, and the trial court entered judgment for the Blanksteins. Court reverse the judgment, although we find that demurrer was properly sustained to two causes of action, for unjust enrichment and for promissory estoppel.

Father appeals an order terminating his parental rights with respect to Savannah C. Father contends the juvenile court improperly refused to conduct a hearing on his petition for modification (Welf. and Inst. Code, S 388), erroneously failed to apply the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights (S 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E), and prejudicially failed to appoint separate counsel for Savannah's sister, Cori W. Court reject father's claims and affirm the order.

Defendant, purports to appeal from a judgment imposed on February 17, 2006. More than 60 days later, on April 24, 2006, defendant executed a probable cause certificate request. The notice of appeal was received in superior court on May 4, 2006. The notice of appeal was not even mailed to superior court until April 24, 2006, or later. Thus, the notice of appeal is untimely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a) (former rule 30.1(a).) Because the notice of appeal is untimely, the appeal must be dismissed. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1094; People v. Funches (1999) 67 Cal.App.4th 240,243.)
The appeal is dismissed.

Father and Mother appeal from the juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights to Stephanie, Justin, and Adam, three of their four children. Respondent concedes that the juvenile court erred in not requiring the Department of Childrens Services (the Department) to send appropriate notice to the Sioux tribes and the Bureau of Indian Affairs pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; In re Samuel P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1268; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1439(f)(5)). The Department does not oppose remand for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the notice requirements. (In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 386.) Two issues raised by Mother and Father remain: 1) whether a bonding study should have been ordered and 2) whether the juvenile court erred in finding that the section Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(a), applied. Court find no error in those decisions and therefore remand only for proper notice under ICWA.

Appellant pled guilty, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, to one count of possession of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378. The trial court sentenced appellant to the low term of 16 months in state prison.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Court affirm the judgment of conviction.

After a preliminary hearing and a discovery motion and pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pleaded no contest to possessing phencyclidine (PCP) for sale in exchange for a 5-year upper term sentence. (Health and Saf. Code, S 11378.5.) As part of the plea bargain, the court dismissed two other counts (transporting PCP (Health and Saf. Code, S 11379.5, subd. (a)) and evading police while driving with willful disregard for others (Veh. Code, S 2800.2, subd. (a))) and dismissed additional allegations that Pierce committed the crime while on bail for another crime and had a prior drug related felony conviction. (Pen. Code, S 12022.1; Health and Saf. Code, S 11370.2, subd. (b).) Also as part of the plea bargain, the court ordered the sentence to run concurrently with that imposed for another drug related conviction.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that Pierce's attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.) Because Pierce failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause, his appeal is dismissed.

The juvenile court erred in denying Patricia V.'s application for de facto parent status. Accordingly, court grant the petition for writ of mandate.

In 1996, defendant Medical Board of California (the Board) revoked the medical license of plaintiff, a dermatologist. Plaintiff petitioned for reinstatement of her license in 1999 (see Bus. and Prof. Code, S 2307; unspecified statutory references that follow are to the Business and Professions Code), but the Board rejected her application and the trial court denied her subsequent petition for administrative mandamus.
In this appeal, plaintiff contends the Board erred in denying her petition for reinstatement. Court reverse and remand the matter to the Board for further consideration.