CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant appeals from a conviction of one count of driving under the influence of alcohol with a prior conviction (count 1; Veh. Code, SS 23152, subd. (a) and 23550.5, subd. (a)); one count of driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 or above with a prior conviction (count 2; Veh. Code, SS 23152, subd. (b) and 23550.5, subd. (b)); one count of child endangerment (count 3; Pen. Code, S 273a, subd. (a)); one count of resisting arrest (count 4; Pen. Code, S 148, subd. (a)); and two counts of driving with a suspended license (counts 5 & 6; Veh. Code, SS 14601.1, subd. (a) & 14601.5, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true the allegation of the prior conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs causing injury (Veh. Code, S 23153, subd. (a)). Defendant was sentenced to a total of four years.
On appeal, Defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford).
The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant was convicted by jury of oral copulation committed upon an unconscious victim, a felony, and two controlled substance misdemeanors: possession of paraphernalia and being under the influence. The trial court sentenced him to 16 years (a doubled upper term for a second strike), and it ordered the misdemeanors to run concurrently with the prison term. Defendant challenges his misdemeanor convictions only, claiming that the rationale stated by the trial court for dismissing a further misdemeanor charge of obstructing an officer, that defendant's detention was unlawful because the officer failed to advise defendant of the basis for the detention, tainted the seizure of evidence of the two misdemeanor convictions. Court affirm.

Appellant pled no contest to two counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act against a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, S 288, subd. (a)). The court imposed a prison term of eight years and two fines of $1,600 each, pursuant to sections 1202.4 and 1202.45, respectively. The court stayed the latter fine pending successful completion of parole. Court refer to the latter fine as the parole revocation fine. On appeal, appellant contends, and respondent concedes, the court erred in imposing the parole revocation fine. Court agree.

Appellant appeals from an order terminating his parental rights (Welf. and Inst. Code, S 366.26) to Jessica G. An issue regarding the possible applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. S 1901 et seq.) arose late in the proceedings and, despite multiple continuances and further hearings to address the issue, appellant contends the court failed to assure compliance with ICWA's notice requirements. On review, court affirm.

Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450-8.452 [formerly rule 38-38.1]) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court denying him reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to his infant son F. He argues, as F.'s presumed father, he was entitled to reunification services. Court concur and grant the petition.

Petitioner Kern County Department of Human Services (department) challenges a superior court's December 2006 decision to return two dependent children to their mother's care subject to family maintenance services. The court reached this decision at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 stage when the department was recommending termination of parental rights. According to the department, the court erred because the mother failed to sustain her burden of proving that both changed circumstances and the children's best interests warranted the return to parental custody. (S 388.)
The petition for writ of mandate is denied.

Based on allegations of a sexual molestation, the Director of the Department of Social Services (the Department) served Brian Snavely with an order of immediate exclusion from any licensed day care facility. Snavely was forced to leave his home, which was also a child day care. After several months of further investigation, the Department held a hearing and decided a formal exclusion order was warranted. Snavely challenged the permanent exclusion order by filing a petition for a writ of mandate. This appeal concerns the trial court's denial of Snavely's petition. Appellant does not argue the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's ruling. Rather, he contends the Department lost jurisdiction over the case because it failed to follow the mandatory timelines for the accusation and hearing delineated in Health and Safety Code section 1596.8897. (All further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code, unless otherwise indicated.) Court find his appeal lacks merit and affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted Charles Drayton of domestic battery with corporal injury (Pen. Code, S 273.5; all statutory references are to this code, unless other noted) and misdemeanor assault (S 240). Drayton claims the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. (CALJIC No. 2.52.) Finding no basis to overturn the judgment, court affirm.

Defendant challenges his pimping conviction on the bases there is insufficient evidence to support it and the court erred in admitting evidence connecting him to uncharged prostitution activity. Finding his arguments unpersuasive, court affirm.

Court appointed counsel to represent defendant Dustin Davis on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth a statement of the case. Counsel did not argue against the client, but advised the court she found no issues to argue on his behalf. Defendant was given 30 days to file written argument in his own behalf. That period has passed, and court have received no communication from him. Court have found no arguable issues. The appeal is dismissed.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction of several crimes arising out of an attack on his wife. Defendant challenges certain aspects of the sentence imposed.
The judgment is modified to strike the true finding on the enhancement allegation of personal use of a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, S 12022, subd. (b)(1)) as to count 1. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed as modified. The superior court is ordered to send a certified copy of the modified abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections.

Appellant pleaded no contest to three felonies and two misdemeanors that arose out of domestic violence incidents and admitted six prior strike convictions. Following the denial of appellant's motion to dismiss his prior strike convictions, the trial court sentenced him to a state prison sentence of 25 years to life. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the prior strike convictions and that his attorney provided ineffective assistance at the hearing on that motion. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after he pleaded guilty to three counts of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, S 288, subd. (a)) and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (S 288.5, subd. (a)). Defendant also admitted the allegation that he committed the offenses against more than one victim (SS 1203.066, subd. (a)(7), 667.61, subds. (b), (e)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 15 years to life. After defendant appealed from his judgment of conviction, this court found that the trial court erred in concluding that its only sentencing options were probation or a life sentence and reversed the judgment. On remand, the trial court sentenced defendant to 18 years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court violated his due process rights when it declined to hear from the victims at the resentencing hearing. For the reasons stated below, court affirm.