CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff National Jewish Health is a beneficiary of a trust of which defendant Jason A. Blonska is the current trustee. After the trustor of the trust died, various parties with claims regarding the trust, or related claims, filed several actions. All of the parties to those actions entered into a global settlement agreement, whereby, among other things, plaintiff and two other charities compromised the amounts due them under the trust. The settlement agreement required the former trustee to pay plaintiff and the two other charities. When he failed to do so but instead paid only himself his trustee’s fees and paid his attorney, he was surcharged and ordered to pay the three charities and resign as trustee. Defendant was then appointed trustee.
The former trustee did not pay the surcharge amount. For a year defendant also failed to pay the charities. Plaintiff then filed a motion to enforce the settlement, which the court granted.

Plaintiff and appellant Peter Kote (plaintiff), as trustee of a trust, and defendant and respondent Randolf W. Katz (Katz) arbitrated objections Katz made to an accounting filed by Kote. Kote filed a petition to correct or vacate the award (Petition to Vacate). Katz filed an objection to the Petition to Vacate and, with defendant and respondent Jason A. Blonska (Blonska; together with Katz, defendants), the successor trustee, filed a petition to confirm the award (Petition to Confirm). The court issued an order denying the Petition to Vacate and confirmed the award but the record does not reflect a judgment was ever entered. Plaintiff’s notice of appeal stated he was appealing a “judgment” entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1294, subdivision (d) (all further statory references are to this code). But again there is no judgment in the record.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Hugh Michael Brenner, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed and remanded.
Hammett & Galan and Erik J. Hammett for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Robert L. Conn for Defendant and Respondent Gail Duncan.
Aleshire & Wynder, Anthony R. Taylor and Mily C. Huntley for Defendant and Respondent The Emerald Bay Inn.

Abdolhamid Risdana and Henny Risdana sued Gail Duncan as an individual and trustee of the Gail Duncan Trust dated September 27, 1990, The Emerald Bay Inn, LLC (Emerald Bay), and other defendants for breach of contract, financial elder abuse, and back wages, among other claims. A jury found in favor of Duncan and Emerald Bay on all claims. The trial court, after entering judgment, awarded attorney fees to Duncan and Emerald Bay on all causes of action. The Risdanas contend the court erred because all of the causes of a

Mark Berwick, the temporary successor trustee of a trust established for his mother, Sharon Luke-Borja, and as the conservator of her person and estate, appeals from the probate court’s award of guardian ad litem (GAL) fees from that trust to Cheryl L. Walsh as the GAL for Sharon’s husband, Salvador Borja, Jr. Walsh’s GAL fees totaled just over $12,000. Berwick does not contest the amount of the fee award, but he contends the court lacked authority to order disbursement of the fees from Sharon’s trust. We disagree. Probate Code section 1003 expressly provides that the GAL’s expenses, “including compensation and attorney’s fees, shall be . . . paid as the court orders, either out of the property of the estate involved or by the petitioner or from such other source as the court orders.” The probate court therefore did not abuse its discretion in ordering payment of Walsh’s fees from Sharon’s trust, and we affirm the judgment.

Appellant Christopher Rene Gomez pled no contest to premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187) and admitted a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5)) and a gang allegation that made him ineligible for parole until he served a minimum of 15 years (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) in exchange for a stipulated prison term of 15 years to life. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

In 2001, defendant was convicted of lewd acts with a minor under age 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) In 2004, he was again convicted of lewd acts with a minor under age 14, along with other sex offenses, and sentenced to 16 years in prison. He was paroled in 2014. Defendant’s conditions of parole include that he wear a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device, not tamper with it, and charge it every 12 hours for at least one full hour.
Since 2014, defendant was found to have violated his parole twice in 2014, once in 2015, twice in 2016, and three times in 2017. Three of these violations involved failing to charge or disabling his GPS tracking device.

L.O. (Mother) had an extensive history with child protective services and substance abuse resulting in the removal of her then 13-year-old son C.M. and then 10-year-old daughter T.M. Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order removing the children from her care. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Jose Pilar Flores Guzman of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, count 2) and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b), count 3). As to count 2, the jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally used a firearm. (Former §§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) The trial court sentenced him to a total term of six years in state prison, consisting of two years on count 2, plus a consecutive four years on the firearm enhancement. The court stayed the sentence on count 3, pursuant to section 654.
On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm; (2) the case should be remanded for the court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement pursuant to the recent amendment to section 12022.5; and (3) the two protective orders that were issued pretrial should be stricken. The People conce

A jury convicted Daniel Jo Hamilton of involuntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of murder (Penal Code, § 192, subd. (b); count 1) and assault causing death to Hayden, a child under eight years old (§ 273ab, subd. (a); count 2). The court denied probation and sentenced Hamilton to 25 years to life on count 2 and stayed his count 1 sentence under section 654.
Hamilton contends: (1) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to impeach the prosecution's medical experts; (2) the court erroneously failed to instruct the jury on its own motion on section 273ab's lesser included offenses of assault (§ 240) and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)); and (3) we should remand the matter for resentencing because the court misunderstood its discretion to grant him probation. We affirm the judgment.

Muhammed Hamawi appeals from a postjudgment order denying his motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate his conviction for possession of more than 28.5 grams of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; Pen. Code § 1203.073, subd. (b)(2)). Hamawi's conviction was the result of a guilty plea, and he contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to vacate the conviction because he established by a preponderance of the evidence neither the court nor his trial counsel properly advised him of the immigration consequences of the plea.
We conclude Hamawi has not established either the court or his trial counsel erred in their advisements. We, therefore, affirm the order.

Nikola Axten appeals from a judgment confirming an arbitration award for attorney fees and costs in favor of Gregory Axten. She contends the award should have been corrected to include an additional attorney fee and cost award in her favor. We conclude that Nikola waived any claims on appeal by failing to provide an adequate appellate record. Because Gregory provided an adequate record allowing review of appellant's claims on the merits, we further conclude Nikola is not entitled to relief on the merits—the arbitrator did not determine she was a prevailing party entitled to recovery, and the arbitrator did not act in excess of his jurisdiction. As such, we affirm the judgment

Rosalin Thurairajah (Wife) appeals from a postjudgment order requiring her to pay Narayanan Karuppiah (Husband) attorney fees of $9,835, costs of $860.03, and sanctions of $10,000 plus an additional $150 a day for each day she failed to move out of a home the court awarded to Husband in a dissolution judgment. She also appeals from a postjudgment order determining the community property interest in multiple investment and retirement accounts, confirming the remainder of the accounts as Husband's sole and separate property, and offsetting her share of the community property interest in the accounts for debts she owed to Husband.
Wife contends we must reverse the first order because the court erred in denying her request for a continuance, she did not engage in any sanctionable conduct, the $10,000 sanction was invalid, and the sanctions imposed an unreasonable financial burden on her. She contends we must reverse the second order because the court offset her share of the comm

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Allison V. Acosta and Michael Pulos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Herbert Kelm pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine for sale under a plea agreement in 2014. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) Kelm also admitted he had suffered a prison prior under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), and section 668 based on a 2011 felony conviction. Under the stipulated plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Kelm to three years in custody, and an additional four years under mandatory supervision.
After California voters approved Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014, Kelm successfully petitioned to have the 2011 felony conviction designated as a misdemeanor. He then filed a postjudgment motion in this case to strike the prison prior enhancement, which the trial court denied.

Appellant S.G., father of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment of disposition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, 395; statutory section references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.) He contends his due process and statutory rights were violated because he was not given proper notice of the disposition hearing. We agree and reverse the judgment.