CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant appeals from judgment entered following revocation of probation and execution of his previously stayed four year prison term. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, he previously pled no contest to possession of cocaine base for sale, count 1, (Health and Saf. Code, S 11351.5) and obstructing or resisting executive officers in the performance of their duties, count 4, (Pen. Code, S 69). In exchange, the court dismissed the charge of battery upon a police officer (Pen. Code, S 243, subd. (b)), possession of marijuana (Health and Saf. Code, S 11357, subd. (b)), and the allegation that he suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370, subdivisions (a) and (c).
The judgment is affirmed.

Father appeals a dispositional order dated May 24, 2006, entered with respect to four month old Vanessa, one year old Vivian and three-year-old Jesus. Father contends the evidence was insufficient to support the allegations of the dependency petition or the juvenile court's order removing the children from father's care and custody.
Court reject father's claims and affirm the judgment.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following his negotiated no contest plea to robbery. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 16, 2006, but he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied Defendant's attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (Nov. 27, 2006, S133114) ___ Cal.4th ___; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The judgment is affirmed.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of child abuse in violation of Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a), and one count of felony vandalism in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a). Defendant also admitted the special allegation in the child abuse count that he had inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and he admitted that he suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and one prior serious or violent felony conviction under section 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(d), and section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i).
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 119, 124.) Because this appeal from a conviction upon a guilty plea violates section 1237.5 and also California Rules of Court, rule 30(b), court conclude that the appeal must be dismissed. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1099.)

Defendant, also known as Frank Berry, appeals from the judgment (order of commitment) entered following a court trial in which he was determined to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, S 2962 et seq.) Defendant was committed to the California Department of Mental Health for treatment as a condition of his parole. (Id., S 2966, subd. (c).) Court affirm.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress illegally seized evidence, Defendant pleaded no contest to carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. Defendant was sentenced to three years in state prison. Defendant filed a notice of appeal.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied Defendant's attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277 - 284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (Nov. 27, 2006, S133114) ___ Cal.4th ___; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The judgment is affirmed.

On December 2, 2004 Logan was arrested following a hand to hand sale of rock cocaine to an undercover police officer. Several hundred dollars and additional rock cocaine were found on Defendant's person following his arrest. Defendant was charged by information with one count of selling cocaine base in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a), and one count of possession for sale of cocaine base in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5. The information further alleged as to both counts that Defendant had suffered two prior convictions for selling narcotics and one prior conviction for possession of narcotics for sale within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a) (enhanced punishment), and Penal Code section 1203.07, subdivision (a)(11) (ineligibility for probation or suspension of sentence), and that Logan had served five separate prison terms for felonies within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied Defendant's attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (Nov. 27, 2006, S133114) ___ Cal.4th ___; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)

Petitioner seeks extraordinary writ relief from the juvenile court's order setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and implementation of a permanent plan for his two dependent children. In its response to Cesar C.'s petition, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) advises it does not oppose granting relief to Cesar C. Court grant relief.

Appellant seeks extraordinary writ review of an order of the juvenile court bypassing reunification services and setting the matter for a hearing terminating parental rights of Felicia S. (Welf. and Inst. Code, SS 361.5, subd. (b)(6); 366.26; Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 38.1, now rule 8.452.) Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's findings that 1) he had sexually abused Felicia's half brother, Charlie; and 2) it would not benefit Felicia to pursue reunification services. Father requests that court vacate the order setting the 366.26 hearing and remand the matter for a hearing so he may offer the testimony of a rebuttal witness. Court deny his petition.

Defendant was convicted of being an accessory to a felon's possession of a firearm and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and placed on probation. Defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the delinquency conviction; (2) the court erroneously instructed the jury that it could draw an unfavorable inference from his failure to deny or explain facts within his knowledge; and (3) his trial counsel ineffectively failed to request an instruction that defendant's voluntary intoxication could negate the specific intent required for the firearm offense. Since the evidence was sufficient, any instructional error was harmless, and defendant has not established that trial counsel was ineffective, court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, S 211; count 1) and attempted second degree robbery (S 211; count 2). The jury found the deadly weapon allegation (S 12022, subd. (b)) as to each count not to be true.
Sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of five years (upper term of five years on count 1 and a concurrent midterm of two years on count 2), defendant appeals, contending (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his request to discharge retained counsel, and (2) the trial court's imposition of the upper term for count 1 contravenes Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403] (Blakely). Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant admitted shooting his former girlfriend and her new boyfriend as they stood on the porch of her grandparents' house. Rejecting his defense that the killing was manslaughter, not murder, the jury convicted him of first degree murder. On appeal, defendant contends: 1) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to excuse a juror who, during closing argument, expressed his confusion about the law in a letter to the court; 2) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by misstating the law during closing argument; 3) the court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that to find defendant guilty of shooting at an occupied building (Pen. Code, S 246), he must have fired in the direction of an inhabited dwelling house with knowledge that his act would probably result in harm to each of the named victims; and 4) there is insufficient evidence to support the special circumstance that defendant was lying in wait. Court agree with defendant's last contention. The special circumstance finding is reversed, the parole revocation fine is stricken, and in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, SS 459, 460); attempted first degree burglary (SS 459, 460, 664), petty theft with a prior (SS 484, 666), possession of stolen property (S 496, subd. (a)), and possession of a firearm by a felon (S 12021, subd. (a)(1)). True findings were also made that Defendant had served a separate prison term (S 667.5, subds. (a), (b)) and had been convicted of serious/violent felonies within the meaning of the three strikes law (SS 667, subds (b) - (i), 1170.12, 668). He was sentenced to a total term of 22 years and 4 months.
On appeal, Defendant contends reversal is required because a photographic line up was impermissibly suggestive; the court erred in admitting impeachment evidence or his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the evidence; an enhancement should have been stricken rather than stayed; and the abstract of judgment needs to be corrected. Court find merit to the last two contentions and therefore order the judgment modified. Otherwise, court affirm the judgment.

In this carjacking case, defendant took a car from a car salesman during the course of a test drive. On the day following the carjacking, Defendant was stopped by law enforcement officers while driving the stolen car and arrested. The salesman, who had spent a few minutes in the car in fairly close proximity to Defendant before the carjacking took place, was able to positively identify him and testify against him at trial. During the course of trial, at which Defendant acted in propria persona, the prosecution provided him with a police report which stated that two other employees of the car dealership were unable to identify him as the carjacker. The prosecution did not call the other two employees as witnesses and Defendant did not ask for a continuance to further investigate the information in the police report.
Following entry of a guilty verdict, Defendant moved for a new trial on the grounds that his defense was unfairly prejudiced by the failure of the prosecution to produce the police report in a more timely fashion. On this record the trial court did not err in denying his motion for new trial. Given the car salesman's positive identification and the circumstances which made that identification credible, testimony about the inability of the other employees to identify Duran would not have materially improved his case. Because, unlike the car salesman, the other employees had not been in close proximity to Duran, a reasonable jury would not have found any inconsistency between their statements and the salesman's positive identification.