CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of count 1, kidnapping to commit robbery (Pen. Code, S 209, subd. (b)(1)) and count 2, kidnapping during carjacking (S 209.5, subd. (a).) Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

Appellant appeals from an order correcting a clerical error in a stipulated judgment of dissolution after his former spouse, respondent, moved to set aside the judgment as to spousal support due to claimed fraud. Court affirm.

Appellant, believes that she should not have been involuntary detained pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. That statute provides: "When any person, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled" a designated person may "upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into custody and place him or her in a facility designated by the county and approved by the Sate Department of Mental Health as a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation."
Court affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Karen Cunningham and the entry of summary judgment in favor of Catholic Healthcare West.

The People appeal from the order dismissing the information charging Defendant with one count of theft from an elder or dependent adult (Pen. Code, S 368, subd. (e)). It was also alleged that he misappropriated in excess of $50,000 within the meaning of section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(1). The People contend that the trial court erred (1) in excluding in their entirety, two videotaped interviews of the victim on the ground that they violated defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him, as described in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford); (2) in excluding the portion of one of the videotapes depicting a tour of the victim's home to document its condition; and (3) in excluding the testimony of the People's expert psychologist who was going to render an opinion on the victim's mental capacity, because the opinion relied, in part, upon the videotapes that were inadmissible under Crawford.
Court reverse.

Plaintiff (Park Lands), owns an undeveloped parcel of real property (the Property) in the Santa Monica Mountains upon which it planned to construct a large, two-story, single family residence and guest house. Several months prior to the effective date of a new ordinance that would restrict development near ridgelines in the area, Park Lands applied to the Regional Planning Department (Planning Department) of defendant and respondent County of Los Angeles (the County) for approval of a plot plan necessary for the development of the Property. Because the original application did not include all the necessary information, Park Lands made subsequent submissions of additional information requested by the County, while the County reviewed the application for completeness. When the ordinance restricting development became effective, the County had not deemed the application complete and therefore processed the application under the more restrictive requirements of that ordinance.
Park Lands sued the County seeking, inter alia, a writ of mandate compelling the County to deem the plot plan application complete prior to the effective date of the ordinance and to process it under the development regulations in effect at the time it was filed. The trial court heard and denied Park Lands's motion for writ of mandate. On appeal from the order denying its motion for writ of mandate, Park Lands argues that the trial court erred in finding that its application was not "deemed complete" under state law prior to the effective date of the ordinance, and therefore not subject to the ordinance's "grandfather clause." In the alternative, Park Lands contends that its application should be processed under the less restrictive regulations in effect when it was filed, due to the County's unreasonable or intentional delays in approving it. Park Lands also challenges the trial court's postjudgment order denying its motion to tax costs.
Court hold that there is substantial evidence in the record the applicable standard of review to support the findings that Park Lands's application was not "deemed complete" under state law prior to the effective date of the ordinance and that the County did not unreasonably or intentionally delay in processing the application. Court further hold that Park Lands's notice of appeal from the judgment, which awarded costs but left the amount blank, also constitutes an appeal from the trial court's postjudgment order denying Park Lands's motion to tax costs. But court hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion. Court therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant appeals from the order revoking probation entered following her plea of no contest to stalking in violation of a restraining order in violation of Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (b), based on annoying phone calls she made to her soon to be ex husband. She was sentenced to three years, execution of sentence was suspended, and she was placed on formal probation for three years. She stipulated to a probation violation and the court imposed the previously suspended sentence of three years. Court appointed counsel to represent her on this appeal.
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)

Father appeals from juvenile court orders denying his petition for modification of certain orders regarding his children Jasmine, Priscilla and Jaime, Jr., and terminating parental rights as to Jasmine, freeing her for adoption.
Father contends that: (1) the dependency court erred by not setting a contested Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing on whether father could prove a parental relationship exception to the termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A); (2) the court should have sustained a sibling relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E); (3) the court erred in not setting a hearing on his petition for modification under section 388; and (4) father did not receive proper notice of the section 366.26 hearing. Court disagree and affirm.

Mother contends that the trial court failed to employ procedures comporting with due process when it appointed a guardian ad litem for her, and that such error mandates reversal of the court's order appointing a guardian ad litem and all subsequent orders, including the order terminating parental rights. Mother further contends that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding that the beneficial relationship exception set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply.

Mother appeals from the order of the dependency court following a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, at which the court terminated parental rights as to her sons. Mother contends the evidence established that the strength of the boys' relationship with their older siblings, and the likelihood of interference with that relationship if the boys were adopted, warranted application of the sibling relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E). Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

In its ruling on a summary judgment motion the trial court resolved a boundary dispute in the underlying quiet title action, and a jury thereafter found the Yeo Lai Sah Buddhist Monastery and Zen Temple of America (Temple) and Seol Jo Lee (Master Lee) had slandered their neighbors' title and interfered with the neighbors' right to use an easement for ingress and egress. On appeal, the Temple challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the applicability of the litigation privilege, and the admissibility of the trial court's ruling on the summary judgment motion. Court conclude that decisional law has expanded the litigation privilege to encompass all litigation-related conduct and renders the Temple's recording of an erroneous survey absolutely privileged. (Civ. Code, S 47, subd. (b).) Because the evidentiary and instructional errors related to the survey were harmless in light of four other disparaging communications, court affirm.

Plaintiff appeals, in propria persona, from summary judgment against her in an action for damages for alleged breaches of contract and torts concerning her employment with the State Controller's Office. She contends the trial court erred in entering a judgment against her signed by a judge who had been disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, in entering thereafter a duplicate judgment signed by another judge, and in granting her former counsel's motion to withdraw. Finding no prejudicial error, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant of felony and misdemeanor child molestation as to one victim (acquitting him or deadlocking on the remaining counts), acquitted him or deadlocked on all counts as to another victim, and convicted him of witness dissuasion and misdemeanor contempt in connection with a letter to the parents of the victims. Though the prosecutor initially sought to retry him on the unresolved counts, she acceded to the defendant's invocation of double jeopardy and dismissed them. The trial court sentenced him to a state prison term of eight years as follows: a middle term of six years on count 8, the lone felony sex conviction; and a full consecutive middle term of two years on count 15 for witness dissuasion. No additional time was imposed on the two misdemeanor convictions charged as counts 9 and 16.
On appeal, the defendant contends he was deprived of notice of the factual basis for his convictions (and trial counsel was ineffective if this argument is forfeited); the trial court did not adequately investigate his request for dismissal of appointed counsel; the evidence of his witness dissuasion does not support the count as charged; neither the prosecutor nor the instructions adequately advised the jury of the need for unanimity on the factual basis of his molestation conviction; it was prejudicial error to use the general instruction on circumstantial evidence instead of the one focused on mental state; and the instruction on the credibility of child witnesses lessened the prosecution's burden of proof. Court affirm.

An information accused defendant of four sexual offenses against victim A.T. and four sexual offenses against victim D.B. Two of the counts involving A.T. were dismissed at the close of the prosecution case and the jury acquitted defendant of the other two counts involving A.T.
As to D.B., defendant was convicted of sexual battery of a restrained person (Pen. Code, S 243.4, subd. (a); count one), forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code, S 288a, subd. (c)(2); count two), forcible rape (Pen. Code, S 261, subd. (a)(2); count three), and kidnapping (Pen. Code, S 207; count four) as a lesser included offense of kidnapping for rape (Pen. Code, S 209, subd. (b)(1)). On counts two and three, the jury found that defendant kidnapped D.B. within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2).
Defendant was sentenced to state prison for six years for oral copulation plus consecutive terms of one year for sexual battery and 25 years to life for rape. Sentence for kidnapping was stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by (1) admitting evidence of uncharged prior acts pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1101, and (2) instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.50.01, which violates the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant appeals from an order committing her to Napa State Hospital after she was found not guilty, by reason of insanity, of a criminal offense. Defendant contends that she was denied the statutory right to a judicial determination whether her offense was a felony or a misdemeanor, in violation of principles of equal protection. Court affirm.