CA Unpub Decisions

Disregarding multiple staff recommendations to the contrary, the Town of Woodside (Town) issued a permit to Steve Jobs authorizing the demolition of a mansion of historic significance to permit the construction of a smaller single family residence. The Town council (Council), like the planning commission, found that the proposed alternatives to the demolition identified in an environmental impact report (EIR) are not feasible and that overriding considerations justify approval of a conditional demolition permit despite the adverse impact on the environment. Upon a petition by respondent Uphold Our Heritage (Heritage), a private group of preservationists, the superior court concluded that these findings are not supported by substantial evidence and issued a writ of mandate directing the Town to set aside its approval of the demolition permit. The Town and Jobs have jointly appealed. Court are not unsympathetic with the manner in which the Town has attempted to strike a balance between the competing interests in permitting the property owner to improve his property as he wishes and preserving as much of the historical resource as possible. Nonetheless, based on our independent review of the administrative record, court agree with the trial court that the Town's feasibility findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Disregarding multiple staff recommendations to the contrary, the Town of Woodside (Town) issued a permit to Steve Jobs authorizing the demolition of a mansion of historic significance to permit the construction of a smaller single family residence. The Town council (Council), like the planning commission, found that the proposed alternatives to the demolition identified in an environmental impact report (EIR) are not feasible and that overriding considerations justify approval of a conditional demolition permit despite the adverse impact on the environment. Upon a petition by respondent Uphold Our Heritage (Heritage), a private group of preservationists, the superior court concluded that these findings are not supported by substantial evidence and issued a writ of mandate directing the Town to set aside its approval of the demolition permit. The Town and Jobs have jointly appealed. Court are not unsympathetic with the manner in which the Town has attempted to strike a balance between the competing interests in permitting the property owner to improve his property as he wishes and preserving as much of the historical resource as possible. Nonetheless, based on our independent review of the administrative record, court agree with the trial court that the Town's feasibility findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Disregarding multiple staff recommendations to the contrary, the Town of Woodside (Town) issued a permit to Steve Jobs authorizing the demolition of a mansion of historic significance to permit the construction of a smaller single family residence. The Town council (Council), like the planning commission, found that the proposed alternatives to the demolition identified in an environmental impact report (EIR) are not feasible and that overriding considerations justify approval of a conditional demolition permit despite the adverse impact on the environment. Upon a petition by respondent Uphold Our Heritage (Heritage), a private group of preservationists, the superior court concluded that these findings are not supported by substantial evidence and issued a writ of mandate directing the Town to set aside its approval of the demolition permit. The Town and Jobs have jointly appealed. Court are not unsympathetic with the manner in which the Town has attempted to strike a balance between the competing interests in permitting the property owner to improve his property as he wishes and preserving as much of the historical resource as possible. Nonetheless, based on our independent review of the administrative record, court must agree with the trial court that the Town's feasibility findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant challenges his sentence, imposed following his guilty plea entered pursuant to a negotiated agreement. Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying him probation and violated the terms of his plea agreement by imposing restitution and parole revocation fines. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from a judgment entered after he pled guilty to felony assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, S 245, subd. (a)). Defendant contends that his constitutional rights were violated by the imposition of the upper term of sentence, which was based on aggravating factors neither found by a jury nor admitted by his plea. (See Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely).) Court affirm the judgment.

By information filed in March 2006, the District Attorney of Lake County charged appellant with possession of oxycodone for sale (Health and Saf. Code, S 11351, count 1) and possession of oxycodone (S 11350, subd. (a), count 2). The information further alleged that appellant suffered two prior prison terms. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, appellant pleaded guilty to the first count in return for dismissal of the remaining count and the enhancements. The court sentenced appellant to the midterm of three years in state prison and also imposed a $600 restitution fine; a suspended parole revocation fine of the same amount; a $175 laboratory analysis fee plus penalty assessment (S 11372.5); a $525 drug program fee plus penalty assessment (S 11372.7); and a $20 court security fee. This timely appeal followed.

Defendant appeals an order revoking his probation. Defendant was sentenced to 16 months in prison on his underlying conviction of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, S 422). Counsel has advised that examination of the record reveals no arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel has advised her client in writing that a Wende brief was being filed and that appellant had the right to personally file a supplemental brief in this case within 30 days. Court affirm.

In the course of a probation search of Gerardo Zepeda's apartment police discovered a firearm in the bedroom of defendant, an ex-felon who shared the apartment with Zepeda. After the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the gun under Penal Code section 1538.5 and to set aside the information under section 995 Sosa pled no contest to the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His appeal is authorized by section 1538.5, subdivision (m). For the reasons explained below, court affirm.

On April 8, 2003, the District Attorney for Los Angeles County filed a complaint alleging that defendant unlawfully possessed an assault weapon in violation of Penal Code section 12280, subdivision (b). On July 9, 2003, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to the complaint. The trial court sentenced defendant to three years in state prison, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed defendant on probation for three years. The trial court awarded defendant seven days of presentence credit, and imposed a $200 restitution fine (S 1202.4, subd. (b)).
On November 3, 2005, defendant was arrested for a probation violation. On February 6, 2006, defendant admitted that he violated his probation. The trial court revoked defendant's probation and imposed the suspended three year sentence. The trial court granted defendant 151 days of presentence credit, and imposed a $600 restitution fine, an increase from the $200 fine the trial court imposed when it granted probation.
In his notice of appeal, defendant raises as an issue the failure to grant him an additional 462 days of actual credit for time he allegedly spent in custody in other cases while he was on probation in this case. Court appointed counsel to represent defendant in this appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436).
Court reviewed the record and requested supplemental briefing from the parties addressing the issue of whether the trial court had improperly increased defendant's restitution fine from $200 to $600. Because the trial court erred when it increased defendant's restitution fine and the corresponding parole revocation restitution fine (S 1202.45), Court order the abstract of judgment modified to reflect a restitution fine of $200 and a corresponding suspended parole revocation restitution fine of $200.

Appellant sued respondent City of Los Angeles (City or respondent), Budget Rent a Car System, Inc. (Budget), La Juana Sheree Smith, and Rigoberto Ruiz Chavez, for injuries suffered when Smith's vehicle collided with Solis's parked car. Respondent generally demurred to the first amended complaint (FAC) and the two causes of action naming respondent, claiming that the complaint failed to allege statutory liability or a special relationship between appellant and the police, and that respondent was immune from liability under Vehicle Code section 17004.7.
The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, and appellant appeals from the ensuing judgment of dismissal. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in applying section 17004.7. Without reaching the issue of immunity, Court conclude that the FAC failed to state a valid cause of action, and affirm the judgment.

In this appeal, defendant contends that two one-year sentence enhancements that the trial court imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) in effectuating a plea agreement must be stricken because the complaint did not allege, the prosecution did not prove, and he did not admit any enhancement under that section. Respondent concedes that the trial court erred in imposing two one-year sentence enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b), but requests that Court affirm the judgment and remand the case for resentencing rather than strike two years from defendant's sentence for those enhancements. Court affirm the judgment and remand the case for resentencing.

A/R Capital, LLC (A/R) appeals from the trial court's order denying its motion to vacate a judgment in favor of Santa Monica Properties (SMP) on a cross-complaint. A/R based its motion on the ground SMP was a suspended corporation which lacked the capacity to prosecute its cross action. Because A/R's challenge to the judgment on this basis came too late -- after the judgment was final -- Court affirm the trial court's order.
Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of three motions he brought after the court granted his motion for judgment on the pleadings on appellant's cross complaint: a motion for return of monies he paid as sanctions during the course of the litigation, a motion for attorney fees, and a motion for sanctions against SMP's attorney. Because none of these motions has merit, Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of second degree commercial burglary, count 1 (Pen. Code, S 459), and uttering a forged prescription, count 2 (Health & Saf. Code, S 11368). Defendant admitted he suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, SS 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and served a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant was sentenced to prison, in count 1, to the upper term of three years, doubled as a consequence of his admission of the strike prior, for a total of six years. Imposition of sentence on count 2 and the prior prison term enhancement was stayed. He contends the trial court's denial of his Romero motion was an abuse of discretion, and the trial court's selection of an upper term sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For reasons explained in the opinion, Court strike the one year enhancement and in all other respects affirm the judgment.

John Theodore Boyer appeals from judgment entered following a court trial in which he was convicted of indecent exposure (Pen. Code, S 314, subd. (1)) and his admission that he had previously been convicted of the same crime, causing the present offense to be a felony. He was sentenced to prison for the middle term of two years. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that no arguable issues exist and that appellant has, by virtue of counsel's compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, received adequate and effective appellate review of the judgment entered against him in this case.