CA Unpub Decisions

In September 2003, plaintiff, sued defendant for damages for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident that occurred in September 2002. When the parties appeared for trial in November 2005, defendant sought dismissal on the basis that no expert medical testimony was available from plaintiff and plaintiff had not shown he would be able to argue or prove causation of injury without it, since other causative factors had been raised as set forth in the affirmative defenses in the answer. The trial court dismissed the action.
Plaintiff appeals, claiming the trial court erroneously applied the law to find that expert testimony would be necessary to prove causation of damages, since this was a rear_end collision and plaintiff believed lay witness testimony would have been sufficient to prove some of his injuries, such as emotional distress. Plaintiff also claims the trial court erred or abused its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss and/or refusing to continue the trial to allow other expert testimony to be presented, such as through cross-examination of the defense expert.
In response, defendant argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making those rulings because the court had the authority to hear a nonstatutory dismissal request and to dismiss the case under these circumstances. (Gotschall v. Daley (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 479 (Gotschall).) Court conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and there were reasonable justifications for each of the trial court's rulings. Accordingly, court affirm.

In September 2003, plaintiff, sued defendant for damages for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident that occurred in September 2002. When the parties appeared for trial in November 2005, defendant sought dismissal on the basis that no expert medical testimony was available from plaintiff and plaintiff had not shown he would be able to argue or prove causation of injury without it, since other causative factors had been raised as set forth in the affirmative defenses in the answer. The trial court dismissed the action.
Plaintiff appeals, claiming the trial court erroneously applied the law to find that expert testimony would be necessary to prove causation of damages, since this was a rear end collision and plaintiff believed lay witness testimony would have been sufficient to prove some of his injuries, such as emotional distress. Plaintiff also claims the trial court erred or abused its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss and/or refusing to continue the trial to allow other expert testimony to be presented, such as through cross_examination of the defense expert.
In response, defendant argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making those rulings because the court had the authority to hear a nonstatutory dismissal request and to dismiss the case under these circumstances. (Gotschall v. Daley (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 479 (Gotschall).) Court conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and there were reasonable justifications for each of the trial court's rulings. Accordingly, court affirm.

Petitioner sued the Home Shopping Network (HSN) after purchasing two items. She alleges that HSN uses a reference price structure that falsely creates the impression consumers are receiving a bargain by purchasing at HSN prices. She appeals from the order denying her motion to certify the action as a statewide class action for violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, S 1781), the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code,S 17200), and for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny certification, court affirm.

Defendant was convicted of six counts involving the attempted murder, kidnapping and carjacking of one victim, and the robbery or attempted robbery of four others. Defendant claims a number of errors, including the improper admission of his confession and hearsay evidence, the lack of sufficient evidence on several charges, and sentencing errors. Court find no error and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant, inter alia, of two counts of making fraudulent material statements for the purpose of obtaining workers' compensation benefits. Defendant contends that, because the magistrate dismissed one of those counts at the preliminary hearing, the superior court should have granted his Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss that count after the People refiled it. Defendant also asserts insufficient evidence supported the verdict on that count and the court improperly sentenced him to consecutive terms in violation of section 654. Finally, he claims he is entitled to additional presentence custody credit. Court agree the trial court miscalculated Defendant's presentence credit. In all other respects, court affirm the judgment.

Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450 - 8.452 [formerly rule 38 - 38.1]) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her son A. Court deny the petition.

Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allocate and award to the community a fair rental value for the family home pursuant to In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366. Court disagree and affirm.

Appellant was convicted after jury trial of first degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Pen. Code, SS 187, subdivision (a), 1202.1). A special allegation that appellant personally discharged a firearm, causing death, was found true. ( S 12022.53, subd. (d).) Appellant admitted a prior strike allegation. ( SS 667, subds. (a) (i), 1170.12, subds. (a) (e).) He was sentenced to 80 years to life imprisonment.
Appellant contends the court prejudicially erred by refusing his attorney's request for a trial continuance. Court disagree and affirm.

Mother of the minors, filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment terminating her parental rights rendered June 27, 2006. Mother served and filed her opening brief on October 27, 2006, contending (at p. 12 et seq.) that the judgment should be reversed solely on the ground that respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to comply with the notice requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. S 1901 et seq.) On December 19, 2006, the parties filed a joint application and stipulation for reversal with directions to determine whether ICWA applies, to comply with ICWA if applicable, and if not applicable to reinstate the judgment. The order terminating parental rights is reversed.

Defendant and appellant is the mother of the five children who are the subjects of this dependency proceeding. She appeals the termination of her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother argues that her parental rights should not have been terminated, because the juvenile court should have found that the beneficial relationship exception to termination, or the sibling relationship exception, applied. Court find no error and affirm.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine base for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5. Defendant's sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. For the reasons set forth below, Court affirm the judgment.

The decedent's girlfriend, plaintiff, filed an action against the decedent's son, Jr. (Isidro Jr.), over property bequeathed to her before the decedent's death. When son failed to answer plaintiff's complaint, the court granted plaintiff's motion for default judgment. The court later granted Isidro Jr.'s motions to vacate the default and quash service of process. On appeal, plaintiff claims the trial court erred in finding that service of process was inadequate where plaintiff sent a copy of the summons and complaint to son's attorney.
Court conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Isidro Jr.'s motions because Isidro Jr. had not authorized his attorney to receive service of process on his behalf. Court affirm the court's orders.

At a March 5, 1990, tax sale of a Palm Desert apartment complex, W.C. Lusardi (Lusardi) was the highest of several bidders, paying the County of Riverside (the County) a total of $ 269,796.45 for the property, including transfer fees, in exchange for a tax deed. Thereafter, Lusardi and the owner of the property at the time of the sale, an entity named 40235 Washington Street, Inc. (Washington Street), engaged in extensive litigation in both state and federal court concerning the validity of the tax deed, among other issues.
On August 1, 2002, over 12 years after the March 1990 tax sale, Lusardi filed the present action against the County. In a first amended complaint, Lusardi sought a refund of the purchase price he paid for the property, pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 3729 (the first cause of action) and rescission of the tax deed pursuant to section 3731 (the second cause of action). He also asserted separate claims for constructive trust and unjust enrichment (the third and fourth causes of action).
The County moved for summary judgment and?/or summary adjudication of each of Lusardi's causes of action. The trial court granted the County's motion in its entirety, denied Lusardi's cross motion for summary judgment and/or adjudication of his refund claim (his first cause of action), and entered judgment in favor of the County. On this appeal, Lusardi does not challenge the trial court's summary adjudication, in favor of the County, of his second, third, and fourth causes of action. Appellant challenges only the adverse summary adjudication of his first cause of action, his refund claim. The trial court ruled that the refund claim was barred by the one year limitations period of section 3729.
Court reverse the judgment to the extent it summarily adjudicates Lusardi's refund claim in favor of the County, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

The juvenile court made a true finding that 17 year old, defendant, assaulted two young men with a metal pipe, causing them great bodily injury. In this appeal, defendant challenges the two probation terms that he not possess or smoke tobacco and that he not change his residence without the advance approval of his probation officer. As discussed below, court affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.