CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant appeals an order finding him to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, S 2960.) Defendant claims the finding is not supported by substantial evidence, and that his attorney cannot waive his right to a jury trial. Court affirm.

In November 2004, respondents filed an action against appellants ("the firm"), and other defendants, all attorneys in the same firm, who prevailed in a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti_SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute.Appellants now appeal from that part of the judgment denying their motion for attorney fees. In the trial court, respondents opposed the motion on the ground, among others, that appellants were not entitled to attorney fees because they had represented themselves. In reply, appellants argued that they had not appeared in propria persona, but were represented by retained counsel; they also asserted that attorneys associated with their firm were the equivalent of in-house counsel, for whose services they should be compensated, and that regardless of who represented them, the purposes and policies of the anti-SLAPP statute required the court to award attorney fees.
The trial court agreed with respondents, rejected appellants' arguments, and denied the motion for fees in its entirety. Court conclude that the trial court correctly denied attorney fees on the ground that appellants had represented themselves, and court affirm the judgment.

Defendant was convicted by jury of selling a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, S 11352, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that appellant had suffered a prior drug conviction (Health & Saf. Code, S 11370.2, subd. (b)) and a prior prison term (Pen. Code, S 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant was sentenced to eight years state prison. Appellant appeals, contending that the conviction is not supported by the evidence and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered after conviction by a jury of eluding a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, $ 2800.2), grand theft from the person (Pen. Code, $ 487, subd. (c)), felony child endangerment ($ 273a, subd. (a)), and two counts of carjacking. ($ 215.) (CT 177-181) Appellant admitted that he had served a prior prison term. (S 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to prison for 14 years, 4 months.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor child endangerment. Appellant also contends that, in violation of section 654, the court imposed consecutive sentences for felony child endangerment and a carjacking conviction involving the same victim. Court affirm.

Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendant after the trial court sustained a demurrer to Barnes's second amended complaint without leave to amend on the basis that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant argues the trial court (1) erred in sustaining the demurrer, because the statute of limitations was tolled under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a);(2) abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike the demurrer in that the demurrer was not timely filed; and (3) abused its discretion by refusing to reconsider its ruling sustaining the demurrer and by refusing to allow Barnes to file a third amended complaint.
Court hold that each of the causes of action was time barred and the demurrer was properly sustained. Court further hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to strike the demurrer, and appellant has forfeited the issue of leave to file a third amended complaint by failing to brief the issue on appeal. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

This is a dental malpractice action in which the trial court granted the dentist's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals. Court reverse.

A modification decision.

The issue in this appeal concerns the proper interpretation of former section 4982.26 of the Business and Professions Code, the statute governing the administrative penalty for a licensed marriage and family therapist who has sexual contact with a patient or former patient. Until it was amended effective January 1, 2006, section 4982.26 provided that administrative decisions containing a finding of inappropriate sexual contact "shall [also] contain an order of revocation [of the therapist's license]," and that "[t]he revocation shall not be stayed by the administrative law judge." (Stats. 1994, ch. 1274, $ 32.) Section 4982.26 now provides that "[t]he board [referring to appellant Board of Behavioral Science of the California Department of Consumer Affairs (BBS)] shall revoke any license" where there has been a finding that the licensee engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with a patient, and that "[t]he revocation shall not be stayed by the administrative law judge or the board." ($ 4982.26, italics added; see $ 4980.03, subd. (a).) The question raised is whether, prior to 2006, the BBS had discretion to stay the license revocation of a therapist who had engaged in such behavior. The trial court concluded, based on both the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, that former section 4982.26 permitted the BBS to exercise discretion whether to stay revocation of the license in such situations, and that the BBS erred in failing to do so in the underlying case involving the license of respondent Gary Ventimiglia, M.F.T. The court issued a writ directing the BBS to set aside its decision revoking respondent's license and to re_determine the penalty to be imposed in light of the court's ruling. Court affirm.

This appeal arises out of the tragic death of a 14 year old girl who was struck by an automobile along a road owned and maintained by the County of Ventura ("County"). Her parents and estate sued the County alleging a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court granted the County's motion for nonsuit prior to the opening statement. (Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277, 284-285.) Court affirm the ensuing judgment.

Appellant appeals the juvenile court's orders that found true a supplemental petition alleging misdemeanor receiving stolen property and continued probation. Counsel has briefed no issues and asks that court review the record of the proceedings. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Court have reviewed the entire record and affirm.

The settlement of a class action included an agreement that class counsel could seek as much as $658,000 in attorney fees and costs. After appellant objected to the attorney fees aspect of the settlement, the trial court approved the settlement to the class, ordered an accounting of benefits, and made only a partial distribution of attorney fees. Ultimately, the trial court awarded class counsel the remaining $200,000 that had been set aside to pay attorney fees. Appellant appeals from the order awarding $200,000 in attorney fees, contending that the trial court erred in awarding this sum to class counsel rather than distributing it to class members. Court affirm the attorney fees order.

Alameda County Social Services Agency (agency) filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code on behalf of Minors. Following a jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations in the amended petition true and removed both boys from the custody of mother. Mother contends that the court made its jurisdiction findings without providing her with the admonishments required under California Rules of Court, rules 5.534(j)(1) and 5.682(b), and such error requires automatic reversal. Additionally, mother maintains that substantial evidence did not support the jurisdiction and disposition findings. Court conclude that the juvenile court erred in failing to provide the required admonishments, but such error was harmless. Court also determine that substantial evidence supported the lower court's jurisdiction and disposition findings.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to a charge of felony petty theft with a prior and, in exchange, received a promise that three prior felony convictions would be stricken "for sentencing purposes" and that he would be placed on probation. The court granted probation, but after defendant violated the terms of his probation, probation was revoked and defendant was sentenced to the upper term of three years in state prison. Defendant argues three sentencing errors on appeal: (1) that the aggravating factors cited by the trial court when it imposed the upper term were not supported by substantial evidence; (2) that the trial court breached the terms of the plea agreement when it cited the three prior felony convictions as factors in aggravation supporting imposition of the upper term; and (3) that the imposition of the upper term violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution pursuant to Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely). Court reject defendant's arguments, and affirm.

Appellant challenges his possession of marijuana for sale conviction on the ground the trial court erred by denying his suppression motion. Court agree.