CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant appeals from the trial court's order, entered at her request, striking the class allegations from her proposed class action complaint following the trial court's denial of her application of a continuance of the trial date sufficient to allow her to pursue class certification proceedings.
As explained, court determine that the order striking the class allegations is not appealable, and accordingly, court dismiss the appeal.

Appellant appeals a judgment in favor of his daughter, and her domestic partner, (together, the defendants) following the grant of a motion for judgment at the close of his case. (Code Civ. Proc., S 631.8; all undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Appellant contends that the trial court's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Appellant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the defendants' request for expert witness fees because he refused to settle and did not obtain a more favorable result. (S 998, subd. (c)(1).) Court reject his contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant is the mother of minors appeal from orders denying their petitions for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and from judgments terminating parental rights to minors under section 366.26. Appellant appeals the judgments terminating parental rights. Court affirm the orders and judgments.

A jury convicted Defendant (Hosaka) of resisting an executive officer. (Pen. Code, S 69.) Defendant waived trial by jury on allegations of prior convictions, and the court found he had a prior strike (SS 667 subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668) and had served three prior prison terms (SS 667.5 subd. (b), 668). The court sentenced him to prison for seven years: double the two year middle term for resisting an executive officer with a prior strike conviction enhanced by three one - year terms for the prior prison terms.

In this action, claimed that his former employer, the Housing Authority of the County of San Bernardino (the Authority), failed to pay him various items of salary and employee benefits to which he was entitled. The parties have accepted the trial court's resolution with respect to all but one of the disputed items. Hence, the only item at issue in this appeal is Padres's asserted entitlement to have the Authority make matching fund contributions to his 457 plan.
The trial court ruled that the Authority was required to make matching contributions from 1982 through 1987, but not from 1987 through 1998. However, it also ruled that this claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
Defendant challenges both of these rulings. Court address the ruling that the Authority had no obligation to make matching contributions after 1987, because it is relevant to the issue of when the statute of limitations began to run. Ultimately, however, court uphold the ruling that this claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, court affirm.

Appellant pleaded no contest to possessing methamphetamine for sale. Appellant's plea was entered after his motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was denied. Appellant appeals the denial of the motion to suppress. Court affirm.

Respondent sought a writ of execution in the amount of $55,453.02 to enforce the balance remaining on a $30,000 equalization payment contained in a 1991 judgment of dissolution of marriage. Appellant (Raymond) filed a motion to prevent the renewal of the 1991 judgment and the enforcement of the equalization payment. The superior court denied Raymond's motion and he filed this appeal.
Court conclude that the 10-year limitation period in Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020 does not bar Sandra's efforts to collect the equalization payment. Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the superior court's implied findings that Sandra was reasonably diligent in her efforts to collect the equalization payment. Accordingly, the order of the superior court is affirmed.

On September 5, 2005, minor, who was 17 years old at the time, shot and killed another minor while brandishing what he thought was an unloaded rifle. He was charged as a juvenile with involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, S 192, subd. (b)), and it was alleged he had personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense (Pen. Code, S 12022.5, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted the charge and the enhancement allegation. Defendant was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, S 602, subd. (a)) and committed to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (formerly the Department of the Youth Authority) (CYA). Defendant contends on appeal, principally, that the court abused its discretion in committing him to CYA. Court agree and reverse.

Plaintiffs, a public agency, sold land containing a disused but historic railroad right of way to the Tuolumne Band of Me Wuk Indians without carrying out any environmental review pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act. The Tuolumne Band owned surrounding property and was known to plan on developing it, but had never presented any development plans to any agency. The trial court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the transferor agency to reverse its action. In this appeal, appellant argues that the transfer fell within CEQA's definition of a "project" requiring environmental review because it was reasonably foreseeable that the land would be developed and the development would have an impact on the historical resource. Court hold that the transfer was not a project requiring CEQA review because, although some development of the property surrounding the historical resource was reasonably foreseeable, review of conceivable impacts on the historical resource itself would have been premature in the absence of any concrete development proposals.
The judgment is affirmed.

In July 2005, a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, S 602) was filed, alleging appellant, a minor, committed vandalism causing damage of less than $400 (Pen. Code, S 594, subds. (a) & (b)(2)(A)), a misdemeanor. In March 2006, following the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the allegation true. In April 2006, following the disposition hearing, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court and placed him on probation.
Appellant's appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court's invitation to submit additional briefing.
Following independent review of the record, court have concluded that no reasonably arguable legal or factual issues exist.

Appellant appeals from a judgment entered after a bench trial in which the trial court found Stephen J. Jared, doing business as Osirusoft Research and Engineering (Jared), was immune from liability pursuant to two provisions of the federal Communications Decency Act (the Act), title 47 United States Code section 230 (section 230). Jared developed a filter using open relay data to block unsolicited commercial e
_mail from coming to his servers and network system. Jared made his filter and open relay database available at no cost through his Web site. At some point, Pallorium's Internet protocol (IP) address was listed on Jared's database as an open relay, which identified it as an IP address through which people could anonymously send unsolicited commercial e
_mail.
Appellant sued Jared for negligence, negligent and intentional interference with economic advantage and prospective economic advantage, and unfair business practices. Appellant argues the trial court erroneously allowed Jared to amend his answer to include the immunity defense, denied its right to a jury trial, and found Jared immune. Because court find Jared immune from liability pursuant to one provision of the Act, court not address his claims regarding the other provision and the denial of his right to a jury trial. Court affirm the judgment.

The issue in this appeal concerns the proper interpretation of former section 4982.26 of the Business and Professions Code, the statute governing the administrative penalty for a licensed marriage and family therapist who has sexual contact with a patient or former patient. Until it was amended effective January 1, 2006, section 4982.26 provided that administrative decisions containing a finding of inappropriate sexual contact "shall [also] contain an order of revocation [of the therapist's license]," and that
"[t]he revocation shall not be stayed by the administrative law judge." (Stats. 1994, ch. 1274, S 32.) Section 4982.26 now provides that "[t]he board [referring to appellant Board of Behavioral Science of the California Department of Consumer Affairs (BBS)] shall revoke any license" where there has been a finding that the licensee engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with a patient, and that
"[t]he revocation shall not be stayed by the administrative law judge or the board." (S 4982.26, italics added; see S 4980.03, subd. (a).) The question raised is whether, prior to 2006, the BBS had discretion to stay the license revocation of a therapist who had engaged in such behavior. The trial court concluded, based on both the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, that former section 4982.26 permitted the BBS to exercise discretion whether to stay revocation of the license in such situations, and that the BBS erred in failing to do so in the underlying case involving the license of respondent Gary Ventimiglia, M.F.T. The court issued a writ directing the BBS to set aside its decision revoking respondent
's license and to re-determine the penalty to be imposed in light of the court's ruling. Court affirm.

A modification decision.

This is a dental malpractice action in which the trial court granted the dentist's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals. Court reverse.