CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendant and respondent Timothy A. Larson after the trial court sustained a demurrer to Barnes's second amended complaint without leave to amend on the basis that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant argues the trial court: (1) erred in sustaining the demurrer, because the statute of limitations was tolled under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a);(2) abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike the demurrer in that the demurrer was not timely filed; and (3) abused its discretion by refusing to reconsider its ruling sustaining the demurrer and by refusing to allow Barnes to file a third amended complaint.
Court hold that each of the causes of action was time barred and the demurrer was properly sustained. Court further hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to strike the demurrer, and Barnes has forfeited the issue of leave to file a third amended complaint by failing to brief the issue on appeal. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered after conviction by a jury of eluding a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, S 2800.2), grand theft from the person (Pen. Code, S 487, subd. (c)), felony child endangerment (S 273a, subd. (a)), and two counts of carjacking. (S 215.) (CT 177 - 181) Appellant admitted that he had served a prior prison term. (S 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to prison for 14 years, 4 months.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor child endangerment. He also contends that, in violation of section 654, the court imposed consecutive sentences for felony child endangerment and a carjacking conviction involving the same victim. Court affirm.

Defendant was convicted by jury of selling a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, S 11352, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that appellant had suffered a prior drug conviction (Health & Saf. Code, S 11370.2, subd. (b)) and a prior prison term (Pen. Code, S 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant was sentenced to eight years state prison. He appeals, contending that the conviction is not supported by the evidence and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals an order finding him to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, S 2960.) Defendant claims the finding is not supported by substantial evidence, and that his attorney cannot waive his right to a jury trial. Court affirm.

Plaintiff issued an umbrella insurance policy to North American Vaccine, Inc. ("NAVA") that provided both excess coverage and contingent primary coverage. Defendant is successor in interest to NAVA, and has been named as a defendant in pending third-party lawsuits alleging that a vaccine produced by NAVA causes autism and neurological disorders in children. Baxter tendered its defense against these claims to Plaintiff. Plaintiff accepted, subject to a reservation of rights, and later instituted the present action seeking declaratory relief and reformation of its policy. Plaintiff sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend and indemnify Defendant. In the alternative, Royal sought reformation of the policy to reflect the purportedly "true" insuring agreement so as to exclude coverage for the claims.
Plaintiff and Baxter filed cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff contended that Endorsement No. 3 of its policy excluded coverage, or should be reformed to do so. Baxter contended that the insuring agreement of the policy provided contingent primary coverage that covered the claims. The trial court granted Baxter's motion for summary judgment, and denied Royal's.
In this appeal by Plaintiff, court affirm.

The trial court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to a complaint alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and slander per se. The court concluded, among other matters, that the statement alleged in the complaint is privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), statement made in an official proceeding. Court affirm.

Mother appeals from the juvenile court's disposition order removing her 11-year-old son from her custody and permitting him to remain in the full-time custody of his father, mother contends the court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence and, in addition, the court erred in refusing to consider evidence of Jesus D.'s history of domestic violence. Carolina G. also asserts a portion of the court's disposition order prohibiting her from discussing religion, Satan or the Bible with Kevin or in his presence is overbroad. Court modify the order to remove that prohibition and, as modified, affirm the juvenile court's order.

The parents of minor appeal from juvenile court orders declaring minor a dependent child of the court; denying the parents reunification services; identifying adoption as minor's permanent plan; and ordering permanent placement services for the child. Mother and father contend they were denied due process because they were not given adequate notice of the detention hearing. Court agree, and reverse all orders.

This is the sixth appeal by mother in a series of appeals involving mother's children(collectively the minors). Mother challenges the juvenile court's order giving the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) discretion to permit visitation with the minors when appropriate. According to mother, the order was an improper delegation of authority. But that order was issued on March 14, 2006, and mother only appealed the orders of February 7, 2006. As explained by Polster, Inc. v. Swing (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 427, 436 (Polster), "[o]ur jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the . . . order appealed from." Mother's briefs do not attack any of the orders entered on February 7, 2006. Consequently, any assignment of error has been waived, and court affirm.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of ammunition by a felon in violation of Penal Code section 12316, subdivision (b)(1). Defendant appeals from the judgment, contending that his motion to suppress evidence -- the shotgun shells found in a car he was driving -- should have been granted because the peace officer who seized the shells did not have probable cause to believe that the shells were evidence of a crime. Defendant cannot raise this assertion on appeal, however, because he did not assert it in his motion in the trial court. In any event, the admission of the shells themselves did not prejudice defendant in light of witness testimony that there were shotgun shells in the car defendant was driving. Accordingly, court affirm the judgment.

Defendant was charged with one count of carjacking with the use of a gun, one count of unlawfully driving a vehicle, and one count of receiving stolen property. The charges were based on evidence that in May 2005 defendant approached a car in which Melissa Brown was sitting, pointed a gun at Brown and told her to get out, and drove the car away after Brown did so. Defendant was apprehended three months later while a passenger in Brown's car.
A jury convicted defendant of carjacking, with a finding that he personally used a firearm, and of receiving stolen property (the receiving conviction was dismissed at the prosecutor's request). Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and he was sentenced to state prison for a term of 15 years. Defendant filed a notice of appeal and we appointed counsel (Lynette Gladd Moore) to represent him. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that counsel has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Kelly (Nov. 27, 2006, S133114) ___ Cal.4th ___ [2006 D.A.R. 15444]; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.)

The plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging the defendant breached an agreement to pay plaintiff $3 million with respect to a corporation's promissory note to the plaintiff. The defendant sought summary judgment, contending the plaintiff's release of the corporation and its former officers and directors, of whom defendant was one, from 'any and all" claims expressly released the defendant from the $3 million obligation. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment for the defendant. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant appeals a judgment after jury trial, following his conviction of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, S 422), corporal injury to a child's parent (S 273.5, subd. (a)), forcible oral copulation (S 288a, subd. (c)(2)), sexual battery by restraint (S 243.4, subd. (a)), and forcible rape (S 261, subd. (a)(2)). The court imposed an aggregate state prison term of 24 years and 8 months, which included an upper term sentence of 8 years for the forcible oral copulation count, and the upper term of 8 years for the forcible rape count. The court ruled that those sentences run consecutively.
Court conclude 1) the trial court did not err by imposing consecutive sentences for Garcia's convictions of forcible oral copulation and forcible rape, and 2) the trial judge's exercise of discretion to impose the upper terms for those offenses does not implicate Garcia's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. (People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238, 1244.) Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from the order after judgment denying his motion to set aside his April 17, 2006, negotiated plea of no contest to possessing base cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, S 11351.5), with his admission that he had a prior conviction qualifying him for sentencing pursuant to the "Three Strikes" law (Pen. Code, SS 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12).