CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant pled no contest to one count of oral copulation of a person under 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288a and one count of a lewd act on a child in violation of section 288, subdivision (a). Sixteen years later he filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis seeking to withdraw that plea on the ground that he was not advised of all the consequences of his plea and that the trial court did not establish a factual basis for the plea. The trial court summarily denied the petition. Appellant appeals from the denial of the Petition, contending that the trial court erred. Court dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner is the presumed father of minor, a dependent of the juvenile court. By a petition for writ of mandate under California Rules of Court, rule 38.1 (rule 38.1), Father challenges the juvenile court's order setting a hearing under section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to consider termination of his parental rights concerning minor. Court deny the petition on its merits.

In this matter, Court hold (1) that plaintiffs may not obtain the defendant's psychotherapy records because they are absolutely protected from disclosure, and (2) that plaintiffs may not obtain defendant's other medical records because plaintiffs have not demonstrated good cause for disclosure.

A jury found defendant guilty of second degree robbery. Imposition of sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on probation for five years on the condition, among others, that he serve 180 days of incarceration and pay a $200 probation revocation restitution fine.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of robbery and incorrectly responded to a jury question. Court disagree and affirm.

Petitioner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner contends the Board of Prison Terms (now the Board of Parole Hearings; hereafter, the Board) erroneously denied him parole. (See Pen. Code, S 3041, subd. (a).) Court grant the petition in a limited respect.

Mother of the minors appeals from orders at an 18-month review hearing terminating her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Appellant contends substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that returning the minors to her care would create a substantial risk of harm. Alternatively, she argues the court should have continued services to her past the 18-month limit because reasonable services were not provided to her. Court affirm.

Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating appellant's parental rights. Appellant contends the juvenile court committed reversible error in failing to apply a statutory exception to termination of parental rights based on her regular visitation and a beneficial relationship with the minor. Appellant also claims the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights must be reversed because the finding by that court that it was likely the minor would be adopted was not supported by substantial evidence. Disagreeing with those contentions, court affirm.

Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights. (Welf. Inst. Code, ss 366.26, 395.) Appellant claims there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the minor is adoptable. Court affirm.

Appellant appeals a juvenile court judgment of jurisdiction over his child. Appellant contends that insufficient evidence supports the finding of jurisdiction; that he was denied due process when he was not permitted to cross-examine Joe's mother., and that the court abused its discretion by not continuing the hearing. Court affirm the judgment.

In this case mother alleges the juvenile court erred in finding the beneficial relationship exception to adoption of her son Tristen P. did not exist and a plan other than adoption would have been in Tristen's best interest. Court affirm.

Appellant seeks writ review of juvenile court orders terminating family reunification services and setting a permanency plan hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Court deny the petition.

Appellant seek writ review of juvenile court orders made at the 18-month review hearing terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Appellant assert the court did not apply the proper legal standard to determine whether returning their daughter to parental custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child's safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being. They further contend that no substantial evidence supports the court's finding of detriment.
Court conclude the court abused its discretion when it based its finding of detriment on the stability of the child in foster care and her attachment to the foster mother. There is no substantial evidence to support a finding that the child would suffer serious, long-term emotional trauma if separated from the foster parent and returned to parental custody. Court further conclude the court's finding that Guadalupe and Andres made no effort to visit their daughter is not supported by substantial evidence and is inconsistent with prior rulings of the trial court on that very issue. The parents satisfactorily completed their case plan in Mexico, and the Agency did not show that a return to parental custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child. Accordingly, court grant the relief requested.

Appellants Pam In Hur and Beom Soo (Bob) Hur appeal from a judgment decreeing a resulting trust for the benefit of respondent Blanca Margarita Mercado and her former husband, Rodolfo Gustavo Meza, with respect to Mercado and Meza's marital home, and quieting title to the home in the name of Mercado. They contend that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding of a resulting trust for the benefit of Meza and Mercado, that any such trust violated law and public policy, and that Mercado had 'unclean hands.' Court affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant, guilty as charged of two counts of murder committed on March 29, 2002, and both the proximate result of personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, and intentionally killing the victims, Carlos Cornejo (count 1) and Jose Vargas, Jr., (count 2), for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d), 186.22, subd. (b), 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (22)); one count of using a firearm to dissuade a witness, identified in the information only as April, from testifying or reporting a suspected crime, all for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, 136.1, subd. (c)(1), 186.22, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) (count 3); one count of possessing methamphetamine for sale for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Health and Saf. Code, 11378; Pen. Code, 186.22, subd. (b)) (count 4); and two counts of possessing a firearm for the benefit of a criminal street gang and after having previously been convicted of violating Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a) (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)) (counts 5 and 6). The jury further found true an allegation under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), that defendant had served a term in prison for his conviction in 2000 of illegally possessing a weapon in violation of Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a).
Based on the jury's verdicts and true findings, the trial court sentenced defendant to prison for two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole on counts 1 and 2, the first degree murder convictions, with consecutive terms of 25 years to life on the firearms use and gang enhancements related to those counts.
Defendant contends in this appeal that the trial court erred by admitting various evidence at trial, the details of which we recount below in our discussion of the pertinent claim, and committed various errors during sentencing. Court agree with defendant's assertion that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution had used due diligence in its effort to locate April Romero in order to subpoena her to appear and testify at trial, and therefore the trial court erred in admitting her preliminary hearing testimony. Court further conclude that error was prejudicial and requires reversal of defendant's convictions on count 3, the charge that defendant dissuaded April from testifying as a witness, count 4, the charge that defendant possessed methamphetamine for sale, and on count 5, the charge that defendant unlawfully possessed a .38-caliber revolver. Therefore, Court reverse defendant's convictions on those three counts. Court conclude defendant's other claims of error, the details of which court recount below, are meritless.